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Once upon a time, law professors and political scientists assumed that
the Supreme Court was, as a practical matter, the final word on matters of
statutory interpretation. Although Congress as a formal matter could alter a
judicial construction with a statutory amendment, the conventional wisdom
was that it rarely did so. In 1991, that conventional wisdom was shattered
by one of our's empirical study demonstrating that congressional overrides
of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions blossomed in the period
between 1967 and 1990.1 Later that year, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act (CRA) of 1991, overriding as many as twelve Supreme Court decisions
that had significantly cut back on workplace antidiscrimination protections.2
Since 1991, legal and political science scholarship has confirmed the
importance of federal statutory overrides and has explored their incidence.
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1. William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331 app. 1 (1991); see also id. app. 1 at 424-41 (reporting statutory overrides of 121
Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also infra Appendix 1 (listing Supreme Court statutory
decisions overridden by the 1991 CRA).
3. For important empirical analyses, see, for example, Richard L. Hasen, End of the
Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205
(2013); Virginia A. Hettinger & Christopher Zom, Explaining the Incidence and Timing of
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Scholars have also debated what they tell us about Court-Congress
interaction, as well as how they have been integrated (or not) into statutory
policy and even constitutional norms.4 The override phenomenon has not
gone unnoticed among Supreme Court Justices, who periodically invoke
this tradition in important cases, including one overridden by the 1991
CRA.5 In June 2013, Justice Ginsburg reminded the Court that "Congress
has, in the recent past, intervened to correct this Court's wayward
interpretations of Title VII" and importuned Congress to correct the Court
once again after its decision in Vance v. Ball State University6 narrowed
protections against workplace sexual harassment.7
Recently, however, the New York Times claimed that overrides had
fallen off dramatically after 1991 and that in the new millennium "[t]he
number of overrides has fallen to almost none." 8  Responding to this
possibility, our current study updates the 1991 Eskridge study, bringing the
overrides record forward twenty years (so accounting for overrides 1967-
2011) and improving upon the methodology for identifying overrides, as
Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5 (2005); Joseph
Ignagni & James Meernik, Explaining Congressional Attempts to Reverse Supreme Court
Decisions, 47 POL. RES. Q. 353 (1994); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word:
Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425 (1992);
Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals of
Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 503 (1996); and Nancy C. Staudt et al.,
Judicial Decisions as Legislation: Congressional Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954-
2005, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1340 (2007).
4. For some important normative examinations, see, for example, JEB BARNES, OVERRULED?
LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS
(2004); EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION (2008); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010); J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL
DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM
(2004); James J. Brudney, Distrust and Clarify: Appreciating Congressional Overrides, 90 TEXAS
L. REV. SEE ALSO 205 (2012); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 2162 (2002); Staudt et al., supra note 3; and Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining
Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 859
(2012).
5. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112-15 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (assailing the "purely literal approach" of the majority opinion and citing recent
examples of congressional overrides).
6. 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
7. Id. at 2466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing the 1991 CRA and Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, which overrrode Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)). In her blistering Ledbetter dissent, Justice Ginsburg invited
Congress to overrule the majority's opinion. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Legislature may act to correct this Court's parsimonious reading of
Title VII."); accord University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517,
2547 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (calling for "yet another Civil Rights Restoration Act").
8. Adam Liptak, In Congress's Paralysis, a Mightier Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/2 l/us/politics/supreme-court-gains-power-from-paralysis-
of-congress.html (quoting Professor Richard L. Hasen of the University of California, Irvine).
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described in Part I. Like the earlier study, the current one treats as an
override any statute that "(1) completely overrules the holding of a statutory
interpretation decision, just as a subsequent Court would overrule an
unsatisfactory precedent," or "(2) modifies the result of a decision in some
material way, such that the same case would have been decided
differently," or "(3) modifies the consequences of the decision, such that
the same case would have been decided in the same way but subsequent
cases would be decided differently." 9
Contrary to the New York Times and to a 2013 override study by
Richard Hasen ° (which was the basis for the Times's claim)," Part II of the
current study finds that the 1990s was actually the golden age of overrides,
with an unprecedented explosion of statutes resetting statutory policy in
important ways. After 1998, however, we found that overrides declined as
dramatically as they had ascended, though they have not (yet) "fallen to
almost none."
Overrides never went away, but the climate for overrides has changed.
To appreciate the new era, Part III suggests an important distinction. The
most-publicized overrides, such as the 1991 CRA, are what we call
restorative overrides: maintaining that the Supreme Court has reneged on
historic legislative commitments, Congress "restores" what it considers the
correct understanding of the statutory scheme, often the understanding that
an agency had implemented before being rejected by the Court. Restorative
overrides such as the 1991 CRA are an important phenomenon and include
other landmark statutes, such as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978,12 the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 198213 and the Voting
9. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 332 n. 1. Thus, we do not consider statutes passed in response to
Supreme Court decisions based on common law or constitutional grounds, see Ryan Eric
Emenaker, Constitutional Interpretation and Congressional Overrides: Changing Trends in
Court-Congress Relations, 3 J.L. (2 J. LEGAL METRICS) 197 (2013), nor do we include statutes
that do nothing more than codify points of law announced by the Supreme Court, e.g., Act of June
30, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 1(7), 81 Stat. 100, 104 (codifying United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163 (1965)), or that decline to extend a Supreme Court baseline presumption to a different
statutory scheme, e.g., Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of
2007, Pub. L. 110-175, § 4, 121 Stat. 2524, 2525 (inserting specific text to head offapplication of
the interpretive presumption applied to a different statutory scheme in Buckhannon Board & Care
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Heath & Human Services, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)); infra
note 155 (listing other instances where we did not count this kind of provision as an override).
10. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 217 (concluding that "congressional overruling of Supreme
Court cases slowed down dramatically since 1991").
11. See Liptak, supra note 8 (citing Hasen's study and claiming the Supreme Court "almost
always has the last word").
12. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)).




Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006,14 the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008,'15 the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,16 and
the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. 17  Justice
Ginsburg's dissent in Vance urged Congress to restore the proper law for
Title VII precisely along these lines. Most restorative overrides involve
high-salience issues of public law, such as civil and political rights. Many
of them divide Congress along strict party lines-more so today than
twenty years ago.
Part III makes clear, however, that the large majority of overrides are
not well-publicized restorative overrides like the 1991 CRA-but are
instead more routine policy-updating overrides, namely, override statutes
frequently supported by bipartisan majorities in Congress that have as their
stated goal the updating of public law, rather than "correction" of judicial
mistakes. Updating overrides often occur years, decades, or, in two cases,
centuries, after the Supreme Court decisions being overridden and do not
reflect ideological rebuffs of the Court. Landmark statutes such as the
Copyrights Act of 1976,18 the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,19 the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,20 the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996,21 the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,22 the Telecommunications Act of
1996,23 and the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,24 are just some
examples of broad bipartisan laws that ambitiously reset statutory policies
and, in the process, override bushels of Supreme Court opinions. Notably,
it is these policy-updating overrides, and not so much the restorative ones,
that have dried up most dramatically after 1998.
In Part IV, we examine characteristics of Supreme Court decisions that
render them particularly susceptible to being overridden by Congress. We
14. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
15. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
16. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.).
17. Pub. L. No. 111-31, div. A, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 10,
15, 21 U.S.C.).
18. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
19. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.).
20. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
21. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
22. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered titles of
U.S.C.).
23. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 31,
47 U.S.C.).
24. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
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present our findings both generally (as applied to all 275 Supreme Court
decisions in our study) and as applied to decisions targeted by restorative
overrides like the 1991 CRA. We found statistically significant correlations
between a congressional override of a Supreme Court statutory
interpretation decision and the following variables:
* close division (plurality or 5- or 6-Justice majority) among the
Justices when deciding the case;
e judicial rejection of the interpretation offered by a federal agency
and usually defended by the Solicitor General;
@ judicial narrowing of federal regulation, except in tax and
intellectual property cases, where regulation-friendly interpretations
are often overridden;
9 reliance on plain meaning of statutory texts, especially when such
reliance depends critically on whole act and whole code arguments
or flies in the face of strong legislative history; and
* invitations for Congress to override, issued by majority,
concurring, or even dissenting Justices.
We do not offer a causal account, only a strong set of correlations that
might be the basis for probabilistic analysis. If the past is any guide, the
Court's interpretation of Title VII in Vance ought to be vulnerable to a
congressional override. A failure of Congress to override Vance in this
decade would support the hypothesis that the current downturn in override
activity is a long-term trend and will persist into the next presidential
administration.
The big override winners are governmental institutions, as Parts III-IV
document. Federal agencies win almost seventy percent of their cases
before the Supreme Court, and Congress is much less likely to override the
Court when a federal agency defends the Court's decision. Conversely,
when the Court rejects a federal agency interpretation, that decision is much
more likely to be overridden by Congress than the average Supreme Court
decision, much less a decision supported by the agency. More generally,
we found that the Department of Justice or another federal agency was
noticeably involved in seventy percent of the 275 overrides reported in our
study-and the agency view prevailed with Congress in three-quarters of
those overrides.
In the last portions of this Article, we step back and consider some
normative issues. We know that congressional overrides are, as a practical
matter, the result of the sequential policymaking process of our separation
of powers: Agencies and courts make important policy decisions, to which
Congress often responds with statutory overrides. Part V explores the
normative question: What values and goals does an override potentially
serve? Do overrides actually serve those goals? We consider three
important public-regarding goals: the predictable operation of the rule of
13212014]
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law, democratic legitimacy, and institutional efficiency and good public
policy. Especially when adopted through an open and deliberative process,
overrides most clearly serve democratic legitimacy goals-but we were
surprised that overrides also frequently advanced rule of law values.
Tentatively, from an empirical perspective, our study also supports the
proposition that most overrides often advance the goal of "good" public
policy-and almost always update public policy to reflect current values
and priorities.
In Part VI, this Article deploys our findings to support some normative
suggestions for the institutions that create and elaborate upon policy in our
republic of statutes. We offer these suggestions in a spirit of realistic
resignation: our study helps us understand the role each branch of
government plays in national governance, and from that deeper
understanding we offer some ideas about how each branch might play a
more productive role in the process of statutory elaboration reflected by our
study and how each branch might adapt to the new reality of fewer
overrides.
For Congress, the central lesson of our study is that overrides are a
sign of health for the greatest legislature in history: when Congress is
churning out overrides of Supreme Court statutory decisions, it is making
solid contributions to the legitimate evolution of public policy and even the
rule of law. We are impressed with the ability of Congress to advance
public projects after a transparent and deliberative process in which leading
stakeholding groups and institutions are well represented. Indeed, one of
the most surprising features of our study is that Carolene25 groups and
women fare better in the legislative process than in the judicial one.
Another surprising feature is that conservative policies fare almost as well
as liberal ones when Congress overrides the Court-so there is no necessary
partisan political reason to reject or denigrate overrides.
Overall, the override process has operated pretty effectively (until
recent years), and we have only a modest suggestion for improvement.
That is, Congress ought to create a statutory certification process: if six
Justices in a statutory case certify the issue to Congress, and if the
substantive committees in each chamber report an override bill, our
certification legislation would provide fast-track procedures for the override
proposal to be considered and voted upon by each chamber (with
filibusters, for example, eliminated).
Looking forward, Congress needs to pay greater attention to how
courts interpret and apply overrides. In particular, the drafting offices or
committee staff ought to bring to the attention of legislators the practical
25. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (articulating more
aggressive judicial review for laws harming "discrete and insular minorities").
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effect of statutory overrides: by adding specific statutory protections in one
place, Congress runs the risk of negating them elsewhere. It may be asking
too much of congressional staff to search the entire U.S. Code for
provisions that might be affected by changes to a provision the Court has
construed narrowly-but there is another remedy those offices ought to
consider: an amendment to the Dictionary Act (1 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.)
negating the rule of meaningful variation for a particular statutory issue.
Like many state legislatures, Congress might consider codifying certain
canons (such as those reflecting the value of legislative history) that reflect
legislative assumptions, as well as seeking to negate other canons (such as
rules of negative implication). Perhaps most important, both committee and
legislative drafting staff ought to make choice of enforcement an even more
important focus for drafting and finalizing proposed legislation. If the
enacting coalition wants legislation to be implemented in a manner that is
more responsive to current political preferences and practical policy needs,
and relatively less constrained by accidents of textual construction, the
coalition should provide for implementation by an agency. On the other
hand, if the enacting coalition is concerned that the relevant agency will be
more responsive to presidential or interest-group influence, its proposed
legislation should tilt toward judicial rather than administrative
interpretation.
Our study demonstrates the importance of the Executive Branch to the
legislative process, generally, and to the override process in particular.
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution gives the President a formal role in
the legislative process,26 and commentators have pointed to the President's
power that flows from his or her leadership of a political party27-but our
study reveals the deeper involvement of the Executive Branch in legislative
updates and overrides of landmark statutes. Federal agencies, especially the
Department of Justice, play a critically important role in the override
process-bringing issues to the attention of Congress, working with
legislative staff to draft override legislation, and lobbying for such
legislation (as well as implementing it). The Executive Branch process is
both deliberative and effective.
Ironically, the decline of overrides reveals an even more dramatic role
for the Executive Branch, which stands to assume a great deal more power
when Congress leaves policy vacuums. If Congress remains unable to
respond to Supreme Court decisions with override statutes, presidential and
agency responses will increase, both in number and significance. If we are
right that overrides serve important policy-updating purposes, then one
26. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.




would expect more administrative overrides of outdated Supreme Court
decisions. As we demonstrate, agencies can often work around Supreme
Court decisions or even override them altogether; we suggest a legitimate
process by which agencies might accomplish this goal.
A further irony is that the Supreme Court, like Congress and the
President, benefits from the override process, for it allows the Justices to
avoid political heat for controversial policy updating and it frees up the
Court to focus on the rule of law duties at which it excels. For example, the
Court's super-strong stare decisis for statutory precedents rests upon a
robust override process-and now that this process has dried up the Justices
face new challenges in keeping the rule of law current as well as
predictable. Additionally, the process we have described provides
normative support for the Court's many override-inviting canons of
statutory construction, such as the rule of lenity. Indeed, we propose a
meta-canon, whereby close statutory cases ought to be resolved in favor of
interests not well represented in the legislative process; our data show that
very few overrides advance the interests of the poor or prisoners, especially
when compared to the vast number of overrides addressing the interests of
businesses, women, state and local governments, racial minorities,
prosecutors, financial institutions, the disabled, and environmental
organizations, to name a few.
A moribund override process leaves the Supreme Court with
potentially more power to impose its (libertarian) values onto statutes, such
as Title VII, which has been the source of much contention. Overall,
however, we believe that long-term trends support a view of the Court as
deferential to agency interpretations, a stance reflected in the Court's
Chevron28 jurisprudence. So long as congressional overrides remain scarce,
as they have in recent years, we predict that the Court will usually (but not
always) defer to administrative overrides. Indeed, this is precisely the point
of the Court's decision in National Cable & Telecommunications
Association v. Brand X Internet Services,29 which held that an agency was
not bound by judicial precedents affirming previous agency views because
they were within the agency's discretion under the statute.30 Just as the
Court welcomes most congressional overrides of its statutory decisions, so
it will accept most administrative overrides.
This Article will conclude with some thoughts about the possibility
that statutory overrides have sunk into a permanent funk, a prospect we
28. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
29. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
30. See id. at 981-86 (holding that judicial precedent can only trump agency deference when
that governing statute makes the preemption unambiguous).
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consider unlikely. 31 As Professor Hasen has argued, the effect of
governance without overrides would be "to empower the Court over
Congress" in the short term and to threaten the legitimacy of the Court in
the longer term.32 But we think the more important effect of a long-term
override drought would be to empower the President and executive, as well
as independent, agencies. Because the large majority of overrides are
policy updates that transcend ideology, to some extent, the failure of
Congress to update statutes would present an opportunity, and a strong
public need, for the Executive Branch to fill the vacuum through agency
updating, perhaps encouraged by White House organs such as OIRA. In
turn, the Supreme Court would be under pressure to acquiesce in agency
updating. Although we view governance without overrides as a distinctly
inferior world, we urge the Court to take an even more tolerant view of
agency updates, with less dogmatic statutory readings when reviewing
those updates and more attention to the agency discretion underlying
BrandX
I. Methodology: Counting and Coding Overrides
It is hard to do empirical studies of statutory overrides, because it is
very hard to find them all. Adding to our headaches, sometimes it was not
easy to figure out whether some congressional responses were overrides or
were partial codifications of Supreme Court statutory opinions. We have
done a much better job identifying statutory overrides than any previous
study has done, including the 1991 Eskridge study. Yet surely we have
missed a few.
Once we identified an override, we coded both the Supreme Court
decision and the statutory provision overriding it. This, too, proved
difficult, but for a different reason: even when grounded upon factual
research, some of the judgments involve an element of subjectivity. For
that reason, we relied on Eskridge to code all the Supreme Court decisions
and Christiansen and our research assistants to code all the override
statutes, trying to make the judgments as consistent as possible.
31. In the short term, i.e., the remainder of the Obama Administration, we see no realistic
possibility for a revival of statutory overrides, but in the medium and long term, they seem likely
to make a comeback simply because there is bipartisan need for legitimate updating of statutory
policy, which is the dominant story for overrides in the last two generations, but which have
largely disappeared since the Clinton impeachment.
32. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 210.
33. 545 U.S. at 981-86. As we shall explain in the Conclusion, the Court in BrandX
acknowledged that agencies operating within the discretionary boundaries of Chevron are
sometimes not confined by judicial precedents handed down without the benefit of the agency's
views. See id. at 982-83. Of course, the agency remains limited by judicial precedents that define
the limits of its discretion under Chevron. Id.
13252014]
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A. Finding the Overrides
In her 1983 study, political scientist Beth Henschen was the first
scholar to engage in a reasonably thorough effort to identify all statutory
overrides as well as codifications of Supreme Court decisions in a particular
area of law (labor and antitrust) over a lengthy period of time (1950-
1972). 34 Legal scholar Nancy Staudt and her colleagues recently engaged
in a reasonably thorough effort to identify all statutory responses
(codifications as well as overrides) to Supreme Court decisions in a
particular area of law (tax) for a lengthy period of time (1954-2005)." 5 The
1991 Eskridge study was the first reasonably thorough effort to identify all
statutory overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions for a
lengthy period of time (1967-1990).36
The methodology of the 1991 Eskridge study was simple but
laborious: the author and his research assistants37 identified all references to
Supreme Court statutory interpretation opinions contained in the House and
Senate committee reports published in the U.S. Code Congressional and
Administrative News for each Congress and then determined whether the
final statute included a provision significantly altering either the point of
law, the result in the Supreme Court's opinion, or both.38 This previous
study did not identify as an override a statute containing legislative history
critical of a Supreme Court decision unless there was a specific statutory
provision that created a different point of law. 39 Nor did that study count as
34. See Beth Henschen, Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court: Congressional
Response, 11 AM. POL. Q. 441 (1983) (reporting legislative responses, including codifications as
well as overrides, to the Supreme Court's labor and antitrust decisions); see also Beth M.
Henschen & Edward I. Sidlow, The Supreme Court and the Congressional Agenda-Setting
Process, 5 J.L. & POL. 685 (1989) (examining how the Supreme Court's labor and antitrust
decisions have affected congressional agenda-setting). Most, if not all, of the earlier efforts to
report congressional overrides were anecdotal or case studies rather than systematic efforts to
identify all overrides for a particular period of time. For an excellent article along these lines, see
Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses to Supreme
Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB. LAW. 301 (1988).
35. See Staudt et al., supra note 3 (delineating how many Supreme Court tax cases between
1954 and 2004 led to a congressional response, how many times Congress cited a case positively
or negatively, and how many cases yielded congressional proposals for codification or reversal).
36. See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 335 & nn.5-6 (surveying prior override studies).
37. Primarily Kathleen Blanchard and Robert Schoshinski, as well as Amy Birnbaum, Dixon
Osburn, Jami Silverman, Ken Smurzynski, and Stuart Weichsel. All were wonderful students at
the Georgetown University Law Center.
38. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 418-19.
39. Id. at 419 & n.309. In a similar way, the current study does not include the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2012)), as an override (though we do include § 101 of the same
statute). Although congressional committees heard testimony that was critical of the Court's
failure to recognize a private cause of action for aiding and abetting securities fraud in one case,
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), see, e.g., S. REP.
No. 104-98, at 48-49 (1995), the statute left the private cause of action provisions alone and,
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overrides statutes that codified, without significant change, the point of law
found in an earlier Supreme Court opinion.40  Also not overrides, for
purposes of that and of the current study, were statutes overriding a
Supreme Court decision that were interpretations of the Constitution or of
federal or state common law.41 Finally, the 1991 study and the current one
tried to avoid inflation in our findings; that is, we identified as an
overridden Supreme Court decision only the leading case, and we did not
include the Supreme Court decisions that did nothing more than routinely
apply its point of law.
The methodology of the 1991 Eskridge study uncovered 121 Supreme
Court statutory interpretation decisions overridden by Congress between
1967 and 1990-more than anyone had imagined would be the case. For
the first time, legal as well as political science scholars started treating
statutory overrides as a significant phenomenon in national governance.42
instead, empowered the SEC to prosecute such activities, see § 104, 109 Star. at 757. Section 104
was a congressional response to the Supreme Court decision, but not an override of the decision.
40. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 419 & n.31 1; supra note 9 . For another example, the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 3 10(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5113-14 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012)), codified and expanded upon ancillary jurisdiction recognized in United
Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 721-29 (1966). Hence, neither the 1991
Eskridge study nor the current study included this provision as an override of Gibbs, although
§ 310(a) did override other decisions.
41. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 418 & nn.304-05. For example, the Federal Employees
Liabilities Reform and Tort Compensation (Westfall) Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, §§ 5-6,
102 Stat. 4563, 4564-65, overrode the Supreme Court's decision in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S.
292 (1988), but was not an override for purposes of the 1991 Eskridge study or for the current
study because the Court's decision was entirely an interpretation of the federal common law of
federal employee liability. Both the 1991 study and the current one do, however, include statutes
overriding decisions that interpreted both the common law and federal statutes. See, e.g.,
Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
576, § 18(a), 86 Stat. 1251, 1263 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 905 (2006)) (overriding
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), which interpreted both common law
and statutory law).
42. See, e.g., BARNES, supra note 4 (studying the effectiveness of congressional overrides);
Brudney, supra note 4, at 205 (commenting on Professor Widiss's articles regarding the Supreme
Court's "shadow precedents" and hydra-like tendencies when interpreting statutes); Lori
Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme Court
Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POL. SC. 162 (1999) (examining the Court's
"invitations" for congressional revision and the Justices' potential motivations behind these
invitations); Hettinger & Zorn, supra note 3 (explaining how congressional overrides function
within the separation-of-powers system according to both case-specific and branch-specific
influences); Ignagni & Meernik, supra note 3 (discussing how electoral considerations and
pressures influence congressional counteraction toward the Supreme Court); Spiller & Tiller,
supra note 3 (applying a rational choice model of judicial behavior to the Supreme Court's
"invitations to override"); Staudt et al., supra note 3 (collecting and examining statutory
codifications as well as overrides of tax decisions); Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and
the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 511 (2009) (identifying and examining the implications of "shadow precedents," whereby
the Supreme Court continues in some degree to apply a congressionally overridden precedent).
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The 2007 Staudt study expanded the agenda to consider congressional
codifications as well as overrides of Supreme Court decisions in tax cases.43
We have not tried to identify all congressional codifications of Supreme
Court decisions in all areas of statutory law; it is even harder to find all
codifications, and the new methodology we deploy in this study (described
below) would not be helpful to fill the inevitable gaps.
Strongly at odds with the assumptions of the post-1991 studies, 44 legal
scholar Richard Hasen deployed the committee-report methodology of the
1991 Eskridge study45 and reported that, after 1991, statutory overrides
plummeted and, since 2009, have "slowed to a trickle. ' 46 We have found
more overrides than the 2013 Hasen study did, especially for the 1990s.
The paucity of overrides in his study is, in large part, the result of the
radical decline of committee reports as a useful source of information for
major legislation.
In part motivated by the diminished value of committee reports after
1990, we turned to supplemental methods for discovering overrides. We
located on Westlaw every Supreme Court decision between 1964 and 2010
and inquired of Westlaw the subsequent citation history of the Supreme
Court opinion. For a large number of cases, Westlaw identified the Court's
opinion as having been "superseded by statute," "superseded by statute/
rule," or "called into doubt by statute" and referred the reader to subsequent
legal documents (usually lower court opinions) discussing the legislative
response to the Supreme Court decision in question. We read all of those
leads and the statutes they cited to determine whether the later mentioned
statute was actually an override as we are using the term.4 7 About half the
time, they were not overrides, but this was still an invaluable source of data
because it provided concrete leads that we then investigated and evaluated.
Thus, not only were a large majority of the overrides after 1990 discovered
by this Westlaw method, but we discovered many new overrides for the
earlier period as well (1967-1990). Hence, the current study updates and
adds to the 1991 Eskridge study.
43. Staudt et al., supra note 3.
44. Indeed, the leading political scientist opined that statutory overrides need to increase in
the new millennium "because today's statutes may be increasingly prone to obsolescence and
inconsistency" and the judiciary is "increasingly overwhelmed" by the flood of statutes. BARNES,
supra note 4, at 34.
45. See Hasen, supra note 3 app. IV at 259-61 (describing the author's methodology and
indicating that he included rather than excluded "questionable" overrides to make sure he was not
undercounting the overrides).
46. Id. at 217-18.
47. Specifically, both Christiansen and Eskridge read the Westlaw leads and made
independent evaluations as to the existence of a statutory override. Disagreements were resolved
by further research on our part and by our excellent research assistants, specifically, Peter Chen,
Chris Lapinig, Sam Thypin-Bermeo, and Jacob Victor.
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The process of following up on the Westlaw leads and of coding the
Supreme Court decisions generated yet more overrides. The coding process
also weeded out statutory responses that we originally considered to be
overrides but which reflection and input from our research assistants
persuaded us were not overrides as we have used the term.48 Appendix 1
reports the statutory overrides, Supreme Court statutory opinions
overridden, and the subject matter of the overrides that we found using both
the committee-report method of the 1991 Eskridge study and the Westlaw
method of the current study. Altogether, we have assembled 286 overrides
of 275 Supreme Court decisions that had interpreted a federal statute.
B. Coding the Overridden Supreme Court Cases
We coded each of the 275 overridden Supreme Court decisions. In
addition to routine information, such as the name of the case and its
citation, we identified for each case the votes of each participating Justice
and the reasoning followed by the majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions. For the reasoning, we largely followed Professor James
Brudney's methodology for coding Supreme Court statutory interpretation
decisions.49  Specifically, we coded each separate opinion to determine
48. See supra text accompanying note 9 for our definition of "override." For a tough case
under our criteria, see, for example, Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). It appears that
Congress may have overridden Brecht's "substantial and injurious effect" standard of harmless
error review, see id. at 637, in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012)).
However, that override was not obvious to us, nor did we find legislative history targeting Brecht.
Moreover, in Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-20 (2007), the Supreme Court plausibly ruled that
Brecht's standard of review was codified in, and not overridden by, AEDPA. In the end, we did
not include Brecht. For a tough case going the other way, see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989), which was overridden by AEDPA § 104. Teague established a dichotomy wherein "old
rules" of criminal procedure announced by a court could apply retroactively to cases already
decided, but that "new rules" could not. See 489 U.S. at 294-96 (limiting the applicability of new
procedural rules); id. at 305-10 (plurality opinion) (detailing the contours of retroactivity).
Teague, however, had two exceptions: one "if [the new rule] places certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe"
and a second if the new rule established a "watershed rule[] of criminal procedure." Id. at 311
(internal quotation marks omitted). AEDPA adopted the standards established in Teague but
without explicitly mentioning the exceptions. See AEDPA sec. 104, § 2254(d)(1); see also
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (plurality opinion) (recognizing the effect that
AEDPA had on Teague); id. at 402-13 (majority opinion) (same). Moreover, AEDPA also
required that the rule be clearly established by the Supreme Court, see AEDPA sec. 104,
§ 2254(d)(1), thereby limiting the role for lower federal courts both in announcing rules for the
purpose of Teague and in recognizing an old rule's retroactivity. See Rodriguez v.
Superintendent, Bay State Corr. Ctr., 139 F.3d 270, 274 (1st Cir. 1998), abrogated on other
grounds by Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998). For these reasons we have
included Teague as an override.
49. The pioneering article for coding Supreme Court statutory decisions was James J.
Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning,
58 VAND. L. REv. 1 (2005), which we followed in William N. Eskridge Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The
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what sources of statutory meaning the opinion discussed or invoked to
support its conclusion. We not only coded for such basic sources of
meaning as the plain meaning rule, the whole act rule, legislative history,
statutory precedents, and deference to agency interpretations-but we also
coded for the most prominent canons of statutory construction, such as the
dictionary canon and the rule of lenity. And we coded for whether the
opinion implored Congress to respond with a statutory override.50 Because
academics as well as judges focus so much on statutory plain meaning,
often to the exclusion of contextual evidence, we recorded for each case
whether the majority and dissenting opinions clashed on whether there was
a plain meaning.
The large majority of overridden decisions attracted amicus briefs,
which helped us identify the "winners" and the "losers" of the Supreme
Court decisions that were overridden. We were most interested in the views
of state attorneys general and, especially, the Solicitor General, who
participated in most of the overridden Supreme Court cases, either as a
party or as an amicus. From the government's briefs and the opinions
themselves, we derived information about the success of agency
interpretations before the Court, the authority invoked by the agency, and
the role of formal deference regimes in the various opinions in the case.
Appendix 2 reports the specific criteria and some explanation for our
coding of the overridden Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions.
C. Coding the Overrides
We coded each of the 286 overrides. For each Supreme Court decision
overridden by statute, we identified not only the basic data (public law
number and location in the Statutes at Large), but also the precise section or
title of the statute that overrode the Court's decision. How quickly was the
override delivered by Congress? Was it delivered in a stand-alone statute,
whose only point was to override the Court? Or was the override part of a
comprehensive piece of legislation?
We were most interested in what override supporters, both inside and
outside of Congress, represented to be the basic purpose of the override.
Was the stated motivation primarily "restorative" (rebuking the Court for a
"bad interpretation" and reinstating Congress's understanding of its earlier
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008).
50. The academic literature has focused so much on Supreme Court "invitations" for
Congress to respond to, and override, its results in statutory cases-but no one has ever collected
all the instances where the Court has issued such invitations and Congress has responded. Hence,
we not only coded for this feature, but we read every Supreme Court statutory opinion for seven
Terms (1960, 1970, 1975, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2005) to see how often the Court issues such
"invitations" and how often Congress responds with an override.
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purpose), was it "policy updating" (correcting what had emerged as a "bad
policy"), or was it "clarifying" (cleaning up "confusion in the law" or
supplying details that have little effect on policy)?
We also explored the direction and depth of the congressional
override. Thus, each override was coded for political valence: Was
Congress shifting policy in a conservative direction? A liberal direction?
Or neither? We also coded for how thoroughly or deeply Congress
overrode the Court's point of law: Was the override a marginal one, merely
modifying the point of law or adding some exceptions, without necessarily
producing a different result in the case at hand? Or would the override have
changed the result of the case as well as the point of law? More deeply,
was the override an effort by Congress to renounce the reasoning as well as
the result and the point of law? Obviously, the last would be the deepest
form of override, and most commonly associated with restorative overrides.
Another primary focus of our override coding was to determine the
"winners" and "losers" in the congressional override process. To make
these determinations, our research assistants and we poured through the
legislative history to figure out which interests and institutions supported
the precise provision(s) that overrode the Court's decision (so, who won?)
as well as those opposed to the provision(s) (so, who lost?).
To help determine how much the override "mattered," we coded the
judicial response to each override: Were there reported cases interpreting or
applying the new override provision? If so, did the override yield judicial
consensus-or did it yield significant disagreement among judges?
Relatedly, did judges nullify the override, either by striking it down as
unconstitutional or by giving it an exceedingly narrow construction? Or did
judges apply the override normally, i.e., applying its plain meaning in a
reasonable way? Or did courts apply the override liberally, to reflect a
broader principle of law? These questions allowed us to gain a perspective
on how overrides affected the rule of the law in practice, which, in turn,
allowed us to ground our normative recommendations in how overrides are
actually applied by the judiciary.
Appendix 3 reports the coding criteria and categories that we applied
to each of the congressional overrides.
II. Rise and Decline of Overrides, 1967-2011
We found overrides in every Congress between 1967 and 2011
(inclusive), and many overrides in most of the Congresses. Figure 1 sets
forth, for each Congress between 1967 and 2011, the number of Supreme
Court decisions overridden in that Congress. Overall, the primary
phenomenon is that the number of congressional overrides of Supreme
Court statutory interpretation decisions dramatically increased, starting with
the post-Watergate 94th Congress and ending with the impeachment of
President Bill Clinton in the 105th Congress (1975-1998, a period of
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twenty-four years). Since Clinton's House impeachment and Senate trial in
1998, there has been a significant fall-off in the number of statutory
overrides.











a, 0I 5. 6 "-
The boom in overrides started with the Democrats' post-Watergate
landslide in the 1974 off-year elections. For the next twenty years, the
Democrat-dominated Congress was energized, aggressive, and highly
regulatory/interventionist in matters of state policy-not only happy to
denounce and reverse antiregulatory Supreme Court constructions but also
eager to update and revise major areas of federal law.51 Responsive to this
activist regulatory agenda, Congress radically increased the size of its staff
in the 1970s and early 1980s, which helped fuel a huge increase in
substantive legislation generally and overrides in particular. 52 Even after
staff sizes stabilized and the partisan balance in Congress became more
even, the overrides continued to roll. Indeed, the 1990s, a period of fierce
party competition and divided government, was the golden age of statutory
overrides.
Almost as dramatic as the twenty-four-year boom in overrides has
been the more recent bust. Although Professor Hasen's study was
premature to announce that the bust came right after 1991, overrides have
fallen off substantially since 1998. Nonetheless this distinction is critical.
51. The Democrats controlled the House for the entire period of 1975-1995, and the Senate
for most of that period, namely, 1975-1981 and 1987-1995.
52. See R. ERIC PETERSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40056, LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
STAFFING, 1954-2007, at 1 (2008) (detailing the increase in congressional staffing).
1332 [Vol. 92:1317
Congressional Overrides, 1967-2011
Despite bitter partisan acrimony, the period between 1991 and 1998 was
one of Congress's most productive in terms of overrides. 3 We consider the
turning point to have been the congressional impeachment, but not removal,
of President Clinton and the resulting collapse of successful override
activity by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. We do not
consider the reduced level of override activity a permanent feature of
national governance, but it will probably continue for the remainder of the
decade, and perhaps longer.
A. The Override Boom, 1975-1990
Before 1975, Congress regularly overrode Supreme Court decisions
interpreting federal statutes, but this was an occasional, low-salience
phenomenon. 54 Thus, almost all of the override statutes we found in the
period 1967 to 1975 were simple, routine laws overriding single Supreme
Court decisions. There was only one statute overriding a cluster of
decisions-the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
Amendments of 1972, which overrode no fewer than six Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the 1927 Act. 55 One of the overridden cases was the
Court's celebrated decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,56
which expanded the Death on the High Seas Act to cover deaths in
territorial waters, 57 a protection the 1972 Amendments retracted for
longshoremen. 58 All of the other overrides in this early period were one-
off: one statute overrode one Supreme Court decision, generally without
much public attention.
The big turning point in our nation's history of statutory overrides was
the 94th Congress (1975-1976), where the post-Watergate legislators
overrode twenty Supreme Court decisions-for the most part not in one-off
53. See supra Figure 1. Indeed, the 104th Congress was the most productive on this measure
and the 105th Congress was tied for the fifth most productive.
54. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 3500) (overriding Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957)); Hobbs Act, ch. 645,
§ 1951, 62 Stat. 683, 793 (1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1951) (overriding United
States v. Local 807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 (1942)); see also James v. United
States, 366 U.S. 213, 231 & n.13 (1961) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(listing statutes overriding the Court's interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code).
55. See Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.) (amending
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927)).
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960), was also reversed by the 1972 Amendments
but we did not include this as an override because we considered it a routine application of Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), a leading decision overridden by the 1972
Amendments.
56. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
57. Id. at 399-401.
58. § 18(a), 86 Stat. at 1263 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 905 (2006)).
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overrides but, instead, in comprehensive landmark legislation that overrode
several Supreme Court decisions in the process of comprehensive reform
and updating of statutory law. Major legislation overriding multiple Court
decisions included the Tax Reform Act of 197659 and the Copyright Act of
1976.60 In an important departure from the pattern of these and prior
overrides, Congress rebuked as well as overrode the Supreme Court in The
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.61
This activity reflected the political energy of the post-Watergate
Congress: overwhelmingly liberal, aggressively reformist, and suspicious of
rather than acquiescent in the Supreme Court's conservative jurisprudence.
Additionally, Congress had already started arming itself with large
increases in committee and member staff needed to carry out the
Democrats' aggressive regulatory program.62 Between 1973 and 1975,
House committee staffs increased by two-thirds and Senate committee
staffs by one-third, with even more dramatic increases in the staff of the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees, the primary override-generating
committees.63
The post-Watergate Congress was followed by the election of
Democrat Jimmy Carter as President in 1976. Spurred on by the voters'
mandate and by unified party government for the first time since 1968, the
95th Congress (1977-1978) generated even more override activity,
reversing or modifying no fewer than twenty-seven Supreme Court
statutory decisions, including the famous Snail Darter Case, TVA v. Hill.
64
More important, Congress accomplished massive law revision projects,
most notably the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,65 as well as the Clean
59. See Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.)
(overriding eight Supreme Court interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954).
60. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.) (overriding six Supreme Court interpretations of the Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat.
1075, and its amendments).
61. See Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006))
(overriding Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)). Both Alyeska
and the 1976 Act were landmark policy pronouncements by the Court and Congress, respectively.
62. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
63. See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 339 (citing NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL
STATISTICS ON CONGRESS, 1989-1990, at 136 tbl.5-5 (1990)).
64. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
632, 92 Stat. 3751 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.), overrode TVA v. Hill;
however, when the 1978 override did not save the TVA dam in suit, Congress passed a second
override saving the dam directly. See Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-69, tit. 4, 93 Stat. 437, 449-50.
65. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.)
(replacing the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and overriding ten Supreme Court statutory decisions).
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Air Act Amendments of 1977,66 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978,67 and the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.68 All of these
superstatutes overrode multiple Supreme Court decisions.
Additionally, the 95th Congress strongly rebuked the Court for its
stingy interpretation of the jobs title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it
overrode General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,69 and it directed that pregnancy-
based discrimination is unlawful, via the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA) of 1978.70 Before the 1991 CRA, the 1978 PDA was probably the
most politically charged statutory override in the nation's political history.
71
With only a little less heat, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) Amendments of 1978 overrode the Supreme Court's stingy
interpretation of the 1967 ADEA.72
These Congresses opened the floodgates for legislative overrides of
Supreme Court statutory opinions and set important patterns that would
remain in place for the next two decades, even as staff levels stabilized and
in some instances declined. The most important pattern is that, even after
the zealous energy of the post-Watergate Congresses dissipated, legislators
revisited and revised landmark statutes, and in the process cast aside
Supreme Court constructions of those statutes. Among the most important
law revision projects were the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 73
which created the Sentencing Commission and the sentencing guidelines
66. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 42
U.S.C.) (amending the Clean Air Act of 1970 and overriding two Supreme Court statutory
decisions).
67. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 50
U.S.C.) (overriding United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972), an important
statutory surveillance precedent).
68. Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.)
(replacing the Wunderlich Act of 1954, ch. 199, 68 Stat. 81, and overriding four Supreme Court
statutory decisions).
69. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
70. See Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)).
71. At least one politically charged constitutional amendment overrode a Supreme Court
decision interpreting a federal statute as well as the Constitution. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419, 433-38 (1793) (interpreting the Judiciary Act of 1789), overridden by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST., amend. XI. Even more important moments in American public law
have been overrides of Supreme Court constitutional decisions by constitutional amendments. See
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), overridden by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857),
overridden by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV. More recently, the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment, giving eighteen-year-olds the right to vote in state elections, overrode
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
72. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
§ 2, 92 Stat. 189, 189 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012)) (overriding United Air
Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 193 (1977), which interpreted the 1967 ADEA).
73. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (codified as amended in scattered titles of
U.S.C.) (overriding four Supreme Court statutory decisions).
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project74 and amended substantive federal criminal law after more than a
decade of deliberation; 75 the Tax Reform Acts of 198476 and of 1986,
7
which were important revisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,78 updating the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952; and the Sexual Abuse Act of 1986, 79 which
updated the Mann Act of 1910 and other federal regulations of sexual
abuse.
Another significant pattern involved overrides of Supreme Court
statutory decisions that Congress considered not just poor policy, but
serious judicial misreadings of statutory texts and legislative expectations.
These were the restorative overrides described in the introduction: never
more than a fraction of overrides in any given decade, the restorative
overrides have received the lion's share of press attention. Bipartisan
majorities in Congress rebuked the Court in a number of high-visibility civil
rights statutes. Thus, the Voting Rights Act (VRA) Amendments of 198280
not only overrode City of Mobile v. Bolden,8' but subjected the Court's
interpretation to severe criticism. 82 The most aggressive, and perhaps the
most angry, overrides were those found in the 1991 CRA, which kicked off
what we consider the golden age of statutory overrides.
B. The Golden Age of Overrides, 1991-1999
Using just the committee-report method for identifying overrides, the
2013 Hasen study found that "congressional overruling of Supreme Court
cases slowed down dramatically since 1991.,,83 Because congressional
committee reports provided much less on-point discussion of judicial
decisions after the 1980s, we supplemented that mechanism for identifying
overrides with the Westlaw citation history method described above. Not
74. See § 217, 98 Stat. at 2017 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2012)).
75. See William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach
to the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 362-64 (1991) (detailing the
history of the Act).
76. Pub. L. No. 98-369, div. A, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) (overriding four Supreme Court statutory decisions).
77. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) (overriding one Supreme Court decision).
78. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.)
(overriding four Supreme Court statutory decisions).
79. Pub. L. No. 99-654, 100 Stat. 3660 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2245
(2012)) (overriding one Supreme Court statutory decision).
80. Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b
(2006 & Supp. V (2012))).
81. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
82. See Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boeme v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 743, 749-50 (1998) (recognizing that Bolden was denounced "often and ... vigorously").
83. Hasen, supra note 3, at 217.
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only did we find no "dramatic" slowdown of congressional override
activity, but we found so many overrides that we proclaim the period 1991
to 1999 the golden age of overrides.
This was the golden age, both quantitatively and qualitatively. As a
matter of pure counting, the 102nd through 105th Congresses (1991-1999)
overrode eighty-six Supreme Court statutory decisions, an average of more
than twenty per Congress. 84 That eight-year period accounted for twenty-
eight percent of the total overrides identified in our study. Two of the
biggest jumbo override statutes (the 1991 CRA85 and the 1996 AEDPA 86)
were enacted during this period. The 1991 CRA not only overrode twelve
Supreme Court decisions, including the Court's landmark effort to reset
disparate impact liability for employment discrimination in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio,87 but also recast the statutory rules governing
workplace affirmative action.88 While the 1991 CRA is the leading
"liberal" override of the last two generations, the 1996 AEDPA is the
leading "conservative" override.89  Most of the fourteen Supreme Court
decisions overridden by AEDPA had set relatively high hurdles barring
many habeas petitions-and the new statute raised the bar even higher.90
84. See infra Appendix 1.
85. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (overriding twelve Supreme Court statutory decisions).
86. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.) (overriding fourteen Supreme Court
statutory decisions).
87. 490 U.S. 642, 658-60 (1989) (raising the bar for plaintiffs alleging a violation of Title VII
based upon the "disparate impact" of plantation-like employment policies), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act § 105, 105 Stat. at 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006)). The Court
had earlier split on the Wards Cove issue in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
1000-01 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), which was not
counted as an overridden decision because the Court was addressing the same point of law
resolved in Wards Cove. After the 1991 override, circuit courts have updated the mandates of
Watson and Wards Cove in light of their "legislative repeal" in 1991. See, e.g., NAACP v. N.
Hudson Reg 'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 477 n.9 (3d Cir. 2011).
88. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009) (explaining the statutory disparate
impact regime created by the CRA of 1991).
89. See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE
L.J. 1, 4-12 (1997) (describing the background of and motivations for the enactment of AEDPA).
Ironically, the "liberal" override was supported and signed into law by moderately "conservative"
President George H.W. Bush, see Philip S. Runkel, Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A
Continuation of the Wards Cove Standard of Business Necessity?, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1177,
1177 (1994), while the "conservative" override was supported and signed into law by moderately
"liberal" President William Clinton, Presidential Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 719 (Apr. 24, 1996).
90. Many of the overridden decisions had denied relief to prisoners based upon a restrictive
interpretation of the habeas statute. See infra Appendix I for the list including these cases. For
example, AEDPA § 102, 110 Stat. at 1217 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2012)),
largely codified the Burger Court's restrictive standards for certifying habeas appeals, see
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During this golden age, overrides flourished in a variety of subject
areas, not just civil rights and habeas. Among the other important override
statutes adopted were the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992,91 the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,92 the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, 93 the ICC Termination Act of 1995, 94 the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996,95 the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996,96 the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1996,97 the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1995,98 the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 99 the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act Amendments of 1997,100 the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,101
the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,102 the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,103 and an act to throttle the
criminal use of guns in 1998.104 Not only did Congress reverse or adjust the
results or reasoning of many Supreme Court decisions, but legislators
revamped major areas of federal law.
What is perhaps most remarkable is that this steady stream of statutory
overrides occurred during a period of divided government (1991-1993 and
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892-96 (1983), but made the standards more restrictive by
denying certification on the basis of federal statutory rights, see Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
480-85 (2000).
91. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. 102-569, §§ 102(p)(3 2), 506, 106 Stat.
4344, 4360, 4428 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 794 (2006))
92. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.) (overriding five statutory decisions).
93. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
(overriding one statutory decision).
94. Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.)
(overriding one statutory decision).
95. Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) (overriding two statutory decisions).
96. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered titles of
U.S.C.) (overriding three statutory decisions).
97. Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.) (overriding three statutory decisions).
98. Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. 8, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (codified as amended in scattered titles of
U.S.C.) (overriding three statutory decisions).
99. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 47
U.S.C.) (overriding two statutory decisions).
100. Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)
(overriding two statutory decisions).
101. Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) (overriding two statutory decisions).
102. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) (overriding seven statutory decisions).
103. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.) (overriding one statutory decision).
104. Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 924 (2012)) (overriding two statutory decisions).
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1995-1999), when congressional staff levels were stable or declining and
levels of partisan polarization were rising.'0 5 What we find in the 1990s,
moreover, is not just a continuation of the trends of the 1980s but an
acceleration of them. More partisan division-yet many more overrides.
One reason for the flourishing of overrides is that Presidents George
H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton were willing and sometimes eager to make
deals with the opposing party on big issues involving considerable Supreme
Court activity, namely, civil rights, job discrimination, habeas corpus, the
rights of prisoners, intellectual property, taxes, the regulation of litigation,
and immigration reform. 10 6  Liberal-leaning Bill Clinton was President
through most of the 1990s-a decade in which most of the overrides were
conservative-leaning reversals, thanks to GOP domination of Congress after
1994 and the President's willingness to compromise or even abandon
liberal priorities.
In addition, both Democrats and Republicans campaigned on platforms
geared towards reforming and revitalizing the role of the federal
government. Whether it was Vice President Al Gore's campaign to
"reinvent" government through the National Performance Review10 7 or the
Contract with America advanced by House Speaker Newt Gingrich,'0 8 both
parties believed that the road to political success lay in altering
fundamentally the image and substance of federal government regulation.
105. See Geoffrey C. Layman et al., Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics,
Causes, and Consequences, 9 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 83, 90 (2006) (graphing the increasing levels
of party polarization in the United States).
106. See, e.g., Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Now Concedes a Need for 'Tax Revenue Increases' to
Reduce Deficit in Budget, N.Y. TIMEs, June 27, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/27/
us/bush-now-concedes-a-need-for-tax-revenue-increases-to-reduce-deficit-in-budget.htrn
(discussing President George H.W. Bush's compromise with congressional Democrats to raise
taxes); Carolyn Skorneck, Clinton Says He Will Sign Welfare Overhaul; House Passes It,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 31, 1996), http://www .apnewsarchive.com/1996/Clinton-Says-He-Will-
Sign-Welfare-Overhaul-House-Passes-It/id-flla3d867b896908c6c598e31fb94ff8 (reporting on
Clinton's willingness to compromise with congressional Republicans on welfare reform). Our
impression, from leading historians as well as from popular accounts, is that previous Presidents
Carter and Reagan were not nearly as happy to compromise core beliefs as Presidents Clinton and
Bush 41-and that subsequent Presidents Obama and Bush 43 are and were ideological
throwbacks to Presidents Carter and Reagan. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism
and Political Polarization: Why Today's Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop
Presidential Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395, 411-12 (2009) (discussing the Bush 43
Administration's efforts to expand presidential initiative); Martin A. Levin et al., Getting Past No:
Building Coalitions and Making Policy from Clinton to Bush to Obama, in BUILDING
COALITIONS, MAKING POLICY: THE POLITICS OF THE CLINTON, BUSH & OBAMA PRESIDENCIES 1
(Martin A. Levin et al. eds., 2012) (surveying the increasingly unilateral direction of the
presidency since Bush 43). In the new millennium there is even less political space to reach deals.
107. Patricia E, Salkin, National Performance Review: A Renewed Commitment to
Strengthening the Intergovernmental Partnership, 26 URB. LAW. 51, 51-52 (1994).
108. John Copeland Nagle, Review Essay, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter,
143 U. PA. L. REv. 2209, 2212 (1995).
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When combined with more than a decade of pragmatic (or spineless,
depending on your perspective) leadership from the White House, the
accepted need for reform helped produce the sweeping changes to the
statutory schemes discussed above. 109
C. The Decline of Overrides, 1999-2011
Astonishingly, right after overrides reached their peak, in 1995-1998,
they fell off dramatically, as illustrated by Figure 1 above. Overrides have
not been reduced to nothing, however: every Congress between 1999 and
2011 overrode at least three Supreme Court decisions. 0
More important, Congress during this "down" period still enacted a
fair number of overrides, including landmark statutes such as the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act,"' the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,112 the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,1 13 the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005,114 the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005115 and
the Military Commissions Act of 2006,1 16 the Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006,117 the ADA Amendments of
2008,18 the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,119 the Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act of 2009,120 the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act of 2009,121 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
109. See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
110. See supra Figure 1.
111. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12, 15 U.S.C.) (overriding two statutory decisions).
112. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.)
(overriding one statutory decision).
113. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.)
(overriding two statutory decisions).
114. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.)
(overriding five statutory decisions).
115. Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. 10, 119 Stat. 2739 (codified as amended in scattered titles of
U.S.C.) (overriding one statutory decision).
116. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.) (overriding
one statutory decision).
117. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (overriding two statutory decisions).
118. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
(overriding four statutory decisions).
119. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.)
(overriding one statutory decision).
120. Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 31 U.S.C.)
(overriding two statutory decisions).
121. Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 10, 15, 21
U.S.C.) (overriding one statutory decision).
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Consumer Protection Act.122  There has been a decline but not a
disappearance of overrides after a boom in the 1990s. As Appendix 1
documents and Figure 1 illustrates, the 109th (2005-2006) and 111th
(2009-2010) Congresses enacted multiple important overrides of the
Court's statutory decisions.
123
While it is important not to overstate the decline of congressional
overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions, there has
been a very significant fall-off after the 105th Congress (1997-1998).
Figure 2 compares the number of overrides per Congress with the total
number of public laws per Congress. Although the total number of statutes
passed by Congress has declined since the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
decline in the number of overrides has far outpaced the decline in total
number of statutes. 24  Moreover, Figure 2 makes clear that there is no
strong relationship between the total number of acts passed by a particular
Congress and the number of overrides contained in those acts. Indeed, the
104th Congress-by far the most prolific overrider of the Supreme Court-
enacted the fewest number of public laws of any Congress we studied. That
may not be a coincidence. The 104th Congress enacted several major
pieces of legislation, including AEDPA, the PLRA, and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act-endeavors that
consumed significant legislative resources.
122. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.) (overriding
one statutory decision).
123. As explained infra section II(C)(1), the number identified for both of these Congresses,
and especially the 11 th, may grow over the next several years.
124. Compare supra Figure 1, with infra Figure 2. Our findings are consistent with the 2013
Hasen study. Hasen, supra note 3, at 228-31.
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The question then becomes: Why the big decline in overrides? Do the
reasons for the big decline suggest that the fall-off is long term? Consider a
few possible explanations.
1. Our Methodology for Finding Overrides.-Our methodology may
provide a partial, but ultimately incomplete, explanation for the decline. As
noted in Part I, committee reports have become significantly less helpful for
identifying overrides in the years following the 1991 Eskridge study.
Although we continued to review committee reports, we supplemented that
methodology by KeyCiting on Westlaw every Supreme Court case decided
between 1965 and 2010 and investigating the cases indicated as having
been superseded or called into doubt by a statute. Although Westlaw will
sometimes mark a case as superseded directly by statute,1 25 it relies
primarily on judicial decisions and administrative documents that indicate
that the case has been superseded. Obviously it takes time before overrides
are identified; a case will not immediately be marked as overridden the
moment Congress enacts an override. Indeed, one of the most significant
overrides of the past ten years, the override of FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.1 26 by the Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control
125. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by
statute Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered
sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.).
126. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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Act, 127 still did not appear as superseded by statute as this Article went to
print in mid-2014.
To test the potential impact of this phenomenon, for every override we
calculated the number of years between the override's date of enactment
and the date on which the first case or administrative document identified
by Westlaw reported the case as overridden. For all cases in our sample
identified as overridden by Westlaw, 128 the average number of years
between the enactment of the override and its identification on Westlaw
was just under six years. We also suspected that the increased availability
and prevalence of electronic research tools in the last couple decades might
accelerate this process. That turned out to be the case. For cases identified
as overridden by Westlaw during the 100th Congress or later, the number
was just under four years. For the same period, more than half of the
Westlaw overrides were identified within two years of enactment and nearly
three-quarters were identified within five years.
If these numbers hold true, our method should have already uncovered
most of the overrides for the 106th to 110th Congresses and more than half
of the overrides for the 111 th Congress. (The Westlaw method would miss
almost all of the overrides for the 113th Congress (2013-2014), which is
one reason we stopped with the first session of the 112th Congress (2011).)
A little less than a third of the overrides we identified from the 106th
Congress (1999-2000) and later have not yet been identified as overridden
on Westlaw. This is a much higher figure than for the 100th through 105th
Congresses (1987-1998), for which only ten percent of overrides were not
identified on Westlaw. Although our analysis suggests that Westlaw will
identify more overrides from the 106th to 111 th Congresses over the next
several years, many of those yet-to-be-identified overrides are already
included in our sample via the other methods upon which we relied, such as
committee reports. Although a few more overrides may be identified over
the next decade, time alone will not make up the enormous decline in
overrides after the Clinton impeachment in 1998.
2. Polarization and Paralysis in Congress/Committees.-The 2013
Hasen study demonstrates that political polarization has steadily increased
in Congress since the 1970s. That is, the Republicans have become steadily
more conservative and the Democrats have become more liberal, with
diminishing overlap of moderate Republicans and blue dog Democrats.
129
127. Pub. L. No. 111-31, div. A, § 101(a), 123 Stat. 1776, 1783-84 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 321 (2012)).
128. 56 cases are not identified as overridden by Westlaw for the overrides examined by this
study. See infra Appendix 3.
129. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 233-38 (surveying the percentage of moderates and party
polarization in Congress from 1879 to 2011).
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From that, Professor Hasen argues that overrides, especially "bipartisan
overrides" are becoming less common and will remain so for the longer
term, with technical overrides remaining possible. 130  His thoughtful
analysis does not explain the pattern of overrides we have found, however:
Congress in the 1990s was much more polarized than it was in the 1980s or
1970s, yet the 1990s was the golden age of overrides. Were polarization
the entire story, we would expect overrides to decline as polarization
increased, yet we see the opposite: during the 1990s overrides increased
during a time of increasing polarization.13' Even in the new millennium,
when overrides have fallen off dramatically, Congress has managed to enact
many partisan overrides-and in landmark legislation like the voting rights,
disability antidiscrimination, and tobacco regulation laws. David Mayhew
has shown that divided government is just as capable of adopting major
legislation as unified government. 132 Is polarized government unable to
continue this pattern? It is not clear to us that this is inevitably going to be
the case, so we continue to search for explanations.
As discussed above, the big decline is not a consequence of
congressional lethargy, but perhaps it is affected by paralysis at the
committee level. A large majority of the congressional overrides of
Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions originate in bills that are
referred to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. 133 Surely it is no
coincidence, we surmise, that the golden age of overrides ended
immediately after President Clinton was impeached by the House and tried
(and acquitted) in the Senate. The House Judiciary Committee, which had
in 1995-1998 been an engine of overrides under its chair, Henry Hyde,
134
was diverted in the middle of 1998 by its efforts to draft articles of
impeachment, defend them before the full House, and prosecute the
President in the Senate trial. Political exhaustion depleted the Committee
after 1998, and the Committee chairs after Representative Hyde were less
effective chairs beset by new controversies, sometimes of their own
making.
135
130. Id. at 238-42.
131. Compare supra Figure 1, with Hasen, supra note 3, at 235 figs.7-8, 236 figs.9-10, 237
fig. 11 (showing increasing polarization on various dimensions throughout the 1980s and 1990s).
132. DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND
INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-2002 (2d ed. 2005).
133. See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 342.
134. See Adam Clymer, Henry J. Hyde, A Power in the House of Representatives, Dies at 83,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/l1/30/washington/30hyde.html?_ r=0;
supra Figure 1 (illustrating the large number of overrides while Hyde was chairman).
135. Representative Hyde chaired the committee from 1995 to 2001 and was followed by
Representatives Sensenbrenner (2001-2007), Conyers (2007-2011), and Lamar Smith (2011-
2013). Judiciary Committees of the U.S. Congress, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/
history/homensf/page/admin-10.html. None of the successors had the practical skills or political
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Unfortunately, the data do not lend much support to this hypothesis, at
least in its simple form. Figure 3 below reveals that the House Judiciary
Committee under Chairman Hyde was very productive in the 104th
Congress (1995-1996), reporting more bills than average for that
Committee and securing enactment for an abnormally high number of them.
But the Committee was even more productive along these lines in
subsequent Congresses.
To examine the activity by the two judiciary committees we studied
three potential measures of committee activity: (1) the number of bills
referred to the committee, (2) the number of bills reported from the
committee, and (3) the number of reported bills that eventually became
law. 136 Figures 3 and 4 present the normalized137 activity for these three
variables for both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. These
figures reveal that although there was considerable variation in these
measures among the various Congresses, this variation does not appear
correlated with the decline in overrides. That is, if the reason for the
decline in overrides lies with the judiciary committees, it is not because
they simply ceased considering and reporting bills, or even that Congress
stopped passing the bills that they did report.
vision of Hyde or his predecessor as chair, Representative Jack Brooks (1989-1995), see id.
(indicating that Brooks preceded Hyde), and each of the post-2001 chairs was occupied with
controversies distracting the Committee from substantive legislation, such as Sensenbrenner's tiffs
with the minority over the PATRIOT Act, see Mike Allen, Panel Chairman Leaves Hearing,
WASH. POST, June 11, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/
06/10/AR20050610021 10.html (reporting that Sensenbrenner walked out of a committee hearing
on the PATRIOT Act), and the indictment of Conyers's wife, see Nick Bunkley, Detroit Council
Member Pleads Guilty to Accepting Bribes for Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/us/27detroit.html?_r'O (detailing Conyers's wife's
indictment and guilty plea).
136. We gathered this information from the Library of Congress's online database for
legislative information, which is available at thomas.loc.gov. Using the site's advanced search
function, we limited our searches by Congress, committee, stage in legislative process, and type of
legislation, depending on our targeted dataset. Because the search engine does not provide the
user with more than 1000 search results, we restricted our searches by date and performed up to
eight, three-month searches for a single Congress. We then added each of these subsearches
together to produce the total number of results per Congress.
137. To normalize the data, we divided the number of bills referred, reported, etc., for each
Congress between the 93rd and 111 th Congress by the average number of bills referred, reported,
etc., during the entire period. So each column shows whether a particular Congress was more or
less active than the other Congresses in our sample and by how much.
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M Bills Referred to the House Judiciary Committee
M Bills Reported from the House Judiciary Committee
0 Bills Reported from the House Judiciary Committee that Became Law
The record of the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by highly
competent lawmakers (e.g., Senators Biden, Hatch, Leahy, and Specter)
during this period,1 38 is even more perplexing. Figure 4 below reveals that
the Senate Judiciary Committee was, relatively speaking, most productive
during the 97th through 102nd Congresses (1981-1992), but secured
enactment of relatively fewer of its bills after 1992. This pattern of
diminished productivity might help explain the dearth of overrides after
1999-but is strongly contrary to our expectations for the golden age of
overrides, during the 1990s. And on this measure as well, the 104th
Congress-the most prolific overrider-has the lowest measures of activity
of any Congress in our data set.
39
138. Judiciary Committees of the US. Congress, supra note 135.
139. See supra Figure 2.
1346 [Vol. 92:1317
Congressional Overrides, 1967-2011










* Bills Referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee
* Bills Reported from the Senate Judiciary Committee
* Bills Reported from the Senate Judiciary Committee that Became Law
3. The Type of Statutes Enacted.-The numbers alone do not help us
understand why overrides have fallen off, and the increasing partisan
polarization thesis does not sufficiently explain the lumpy data. So we
turned to David Mayhew's dataset on major legislation. Consistent with
our account, the override-happy 104th Congress (1995-1996) enacted
fifteen statutes that Professor Mayhew considers "important enactments of
Congress" (such as AEDPA).1 40 Interestingly, Mayhew's dataset identifies
even more examples of major legislation for the 107th Congress (2001-
2002), which passed very few overrides, and for the 111 th Congress (2009-
2010), which enacted a number of overrides, but not nearly as many as the
104th. 141 This is where the numbers must be supplemented with qualitative
analysis. Examining Professor Mayhew's list of major legislation for each
Congress reveals some important patterns that help explain the decline of
overrides after 2001 (when the Clinton effect had probably run its course).
Consider Table 1.
140. See David Mayhew, Datasets and Material: Divided We Govern, http://davidmayhew
.commons.yale.edu/datasets-divided-we-govern! (listing major legislation adopted in the period
1991 2002).
141. See id. (listing the major legislation for the 111 th Congress under a different link, for
important enactments in the period 2009-2010).
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Table 1. Categories of Major Legislation, 1987-2010
Domestic Laws, War on Terror Domestic Laws,
with Judicial and National Little Judicial
Congress Involvement Security Involvement
111th Ledbetter Fair Pay START Treaty Economic
Congress Stimulus
(2009- Credit Bill of Gays in Military
2010) Rights Repeal Affordable Care
Act
Dodd-Frank 9/11 Responders'
Finance Aid Tax Cuts Deal
Hate Crimes Five Other Laws
Expansion
FDA Tobacco
110th 9/11 Commission Housing Relief
Congress










109th Bankruptcy Three Big Trade Pension Reform
Congress Reform Pacts
(2005- Postal Service
2006) Class Action Mexican Border Reorganization
Fairness
Port Security Gulf of Mexico
Drilling
Military
Commissions Three Other Laws
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108th Partial Birth Intelligence Medicare
Congress Abortion Overhaul Prescription
(2003-




107th Campaign Finance PATRIOT Act Bush Tax Cuts
Congress
(2001- Corporate Afghan Use of Education Reform
2002) Responsibility Force
Election Reform






106th Banking Reform China Trade Y2K Planning
Congress
(1999- Three Other Laws
2000)










































102d Civil Rights Act Persian Gulf Surface
Congress Resolution Transportation
(1991- Cable TV
1992) Regulation START Treaty Omnibus Energy
Ratified
Water Policy





















101st ADA Savings & Loan
Congress Bailout
(1989- Clean Air Act
1990) Amendments Deficit Reduction
Immigration Act Four Other Laws
I00th Family Support Omnibus Foreign Water Quality
Congress (Welfare Reform) Trade
(1987- Surface
1988) Anti-Drug Abuse Nuclear Treaty Transportation
Civil Rights Japanese- Three Other Laws
Restoration American
Reparations
As Table 1 reveals, Congress's agenda has changed significantly in the
new millennium. The most urgent and important issues on the
congressional agenda have shifted away from substantive law reform in the
areas where overrides of judicial decisions proliferate-namely, civil rights,
workplace rules, criminal law and habeas, federal jurisdiction and civil
procedure, immigration, tax, bankruptcy, business regulation, intellectual
property, and antitrust. Conversely, the agenda has shifted toward
terrorism, economic stimulus, international trade, deficit reduction and tax
cuts, congressional ethics and responsibility, and agency reorganization-
all areas where judicial decisions play a marginal role, or no role at all.
We do not discount the importance of partisan polarization as a factor
in the decline of overrides, especially during the Congresses that met during
and right after the impeachment of President Clinton. Nonetheless, our data
suggest that polarization alone cannot explain the drop-off in overrides,
given that overrides have flourished during the exceedingly polarized
stretches of the 1990s. And even after the decline in overrides, Congress
had continued to pass major leglisation in partisan areas of the law, as
Table 1 reveals. More important, in our view, is the new legislative agenda
in the twenty-first century. As a great deal more congressional attention is
devoted to the war on terror, macroeconomic tax and spending policy,
health care and insurance, and international trade and nuclear proliferation,
relatively less congressional attention has been paid to the superstatutes that
the Supreme Court has been interpreting, and Congress has been overriding,
for the last forty to fifty years.
This shift in congressional priorities is, in part, a natural response to
post-2000 events. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, affected the
public's priorities in a way that few events have in the last century. It is
thus unsurprising that the legislative agenda would shift to accommodate
13512014]
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those concerns. Two of the signature achievements of the Bush-Cheney
Administration-the PATRIOT Act of 2001142 and the Military Com-
missions Act of 2006 143_ were directed at this perceived new, almost
existential, threat. Yet those statutes, together, contained just one override.
The legislative shift may also be responsive to underlying structural
developments. The rolling retirement of the baby boom generation has
generated increasing interest in the scope and sustainability of the
entitlement programs. 144  Thus, the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003145 and President Bush's
failed attempt to partially privatize social security146 reflect this concern.
Those efforts, together, produced zero overrides. The shift may also be the
result of a changed political debate. Rather than seeking to update the
superstatutes of the New Deal, the Great Society, and the Nixon-Ford
Administration, the post-9/l1 GOP Congresses and the Bush-Cheney
Administration were skeptical of significant government regulation,
including regulation advancing "conservative" values, and were not eager to
pursue superstatute deals with Democrats. This is a marked change from
the 1990s, when the Gingrich-led Congress was eager to work with-and
even compromise with-President Clinton to achieve its goal of reforming
major areas of federal regulation.
147
It is important to note that when the post-9/1 1 Congress did revisit the
areas of law that depend on the judicial system, such as federal courts and
civil rights, it produced a number of important override statutes: the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005,148 the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and
Amendments Act of 2006,149 the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,150 and the
142. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
143. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18,
28, and 42 U.S.C.).
144. See, e.g., Peter G. Peterson, How Will America Pay for the Retirement of the Baby Boom
Generation?, in THE GENERATIONAL EQUITY DEBATE 41, 41-47 (John B. Williamson et al. eds.,
1999) (proposing ways to prepare and pay for the growing retirement and health care costs of the
rapidly aging population).
145. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.)
(creating Medicare Part D).
146. Elyse Siegel, George W. Bush Reveals His Biggest Failure Was Not Privatizing Social
Security, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2010, 9:50 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/
10/22/george-w-bush-reveals-his_n_772209.html.
147. See generally STEVEN M. GILLON, THE PACT: BILL CLINTON, NEWT GINGRICH, AND
THE RIVALRY THAT DEFINED A GENERATION (2008).
148. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
149. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
150. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,151 included no fewer than twelve
overrides.
For the short term, the combination of the new legislative agenda and
the continuing partisan polarization will depress Congress's inclination and
capacity to enact override laws. In the longer term, however, countervailing
pressures from interest groups, agencies, and the states ought to press
Congress to update aging superstatutes, with the result being a resurgence
of overrides. Moreover, the Obama Administration has produced a pair of
laws that appear to have the potential to become superstatutes in their own
right. As the Court interprets the (vast) expanse of statutory provisions
contained in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010152 and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010,151 it will no doubt produce new decisions with the potential to be
overridden.
The number of overrides may not return to the level the country
enjoyed in the 1990s, but they will be back ....
III. Topography and Politics of Override Statutes, 1967-2011
In this Part, we explore some of the basic facts about overrides in a
systematic way. The systematic analysis, in turn, will illuminate some of
the speculations we offered in the previous Part, our history of overrides in
the last half century. On the other hand, no matter how systematic one's
analysis, the central conclusion that ought to emerge from our survey is that
there is no "standard override." Instead, overrides come in all shapes and
sizes.
Take the 1991 CRA, for example. This is the best known override
statute-and it could not have been more dramatic. Notwithstanding a
presidential veto in 1990 and threatened veto in 1991, an engaged Congress
angrily overrode twelve or more prominent Supreme Court interpretations
of important job discrimination laws, 154 and did so swiftly after the
decisions had been handed down-eight of the twelve decisions were
handed down between 1989 and 1991.155 As symbolically and practically
151. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.).
152. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
153. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
154. See Roger Clegg, Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459, 1465-66 (1994) (describing the concern with ensuring the bill was
veto-proof after the 1990 veto); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REv. 613, 614-15 (1991) (describing
the fierce reaction to the contemporary Supreme Court decisions that prompted the Act).
155. We say "twelve or more" Supreme Court decisions as amended because there is a
difference of opinion as to which Supreme Court decisions were overridden in the 1991 CRA. We
list twelve decisions in our Appendix 1. That is two more than the 2013 Hasen Study. See Hasen,
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important as this override was, it is unrepresentative of congressional
overrides in most respects. In contrast to the 1991 CRA, most overrides are
one-off rejections of judicial constructions, sometimes decades or even a
century after the decisions have been handed down; are as often
conservative as they are liberal policy shifts; and are much more likely to
involve technical policy-updating rather than pointed rebukes of the Court.
Consider the following account of the variety that characterizes our
population of statutory overrides from 1967 to 2011.
A. Timing and Focus of Overrides
The 1991 CRA was exclusively concerned with overruling twelve
Supreme Court interpretations of the nation's job discrimination laws, and
the override was adopted shortly after most of the cases had been decided.
Like the 1991 CRA, three-fifths of the override statutes were adopted
specifically to override the Court, and correction of judicial interpretations
was the main point of the new statutes. 56 But in other important respects,
the 1991 law is not representative of the overrides in our study.
Most obviously, the 1991 CRA was a jumbo override, supplanting the
points of law established in as many as twelve Supreme Court decisions.
Only the 1996 AEDPA and the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act were
comparable to the 1991 CRA: all of these jumbo overrides superseded ten
or more Supreme Court decisions. As Figure 5 below demonstrates, the
typical statutory override affected only a single Supreme Court decision.
(Recall that we do not count Supreme Court decisions applying the leading
decision, unless there is a new point of law in the subsequent decisions.)
supra note 3, app.1 at 255. Through our Westlaw approach, we identified four decisions not
identified by the 2013 Hasen study--offset somewhat by our not including two decisions that
study identified. For example, the 2013 Hasen study includes Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1
(1985), as an overridden decision, and we do not. The Court in Marek interpreted Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 68 to bar a § 1983 plaintiff from recovering counsel fees when he had rejected a
settlement offer that exceeded his ultimate award. Id. at 9-12. Congress in 1991 did not want the
Marek result to apply to Title VII cases-and it knew from the case law that Marek would not
apply if Congress identified counsel fees as a possible award to successful plaintiffs in addition to
"costs" (the Rule 68 term) rather than as an element of "costs." See Gudenkauf v. Stauffer
Commc'ns, Inc., 158 F.3d 1074, 1083-84 (10th Cir. 1998). Because Congress did not amend
Rule 68 itself and because the new Title VII provision would not have affected the result in
Marek, we did not consider this an override-although we cheerfully concede that the 1991
Congress did not approve the Marek result or analysis in any way. Also see Evans v. JeffD., 475
U.S. 717 (1986), which the 2013 Hasen study also identifies as overridden by the 1991 CRA, but
we do not, for similar reasons.
156. Note that this does not include only cases in which Congress asserted that the Supreme
Court case was wrong when it was decided. In many of these cases, especially in areas such as
bankruptcy, intellectual property, and tax, Congress was updating the Supreme Court's holding to
meet new circumstances. Thus many of these overrides were not included in our list of
"restorative" overrides. See infra section IlI(D)(3).
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Just as important, the 1991 CRA was a swift congressional response to
Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes: Eight of the twelve
decisions were rendered less than two-and-a-half years before the override
statute, and all were less than ten years old. 57 Table 2 below suggests,
initially, that the 1991 CRA may have been an extreme outlier, as the
average (mean) period between the Supreme Court decision and the
override is 11.39 years, with the average higher than ten for the 1970s,
1980s, and 2000s and closer to nine years for the 1990s. These statistics,
however, are skewed by a handful of overridden decisions originating in the
early twentieth century and before. The 2000s are especially skewed
because of a few antique decisions overridden in the Class Action Fairness
Act (CAFA) of 2005-for example, Chapman v. Barney158 was decided
more than 115 years before CAFA, and Strawbridge v. Curtiss159 was
decided nearly two centuries before CAFA. If we remove those two cases,
the 2000s fall much more in line with previous decades.
The more useful statistics are the median years between the decision
and the override. Overall, the median for our period of study is roughly
four years. As a perusal of Appendix 1 makes clear, slightly more than half
of the overrides come rather expeditiously, within five years of the
decisions in question. The 1991 CRA is unique as such a speedy override
157. See infra Appendix 1.
158. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
159. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
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of so many decisions, but it is representative of most overrides in that it
delivered a legislative correction sooner rather than later. Overrides that
expressly criticize the Court's decision-as did many of the overrides in the
1991 Act-tend to come especially quickly. For overrides intended
primarily to correct a "bad interpretation," the average time between the
decision and the overrides was four years, while the median was slightly
less than two-and-a-half, both of which are well below the numbers for the
total set of overrides.




Total Decision Decision Decision
Number of and and and
Overrides Override Override Override
AllOrd 286 11.39 4.64 19.32
Overrides
Overrides in
the 2000s1 60  28 20.93 7.84 42.44
Overrides in 104 9.28 4.69 11.53
the 1990s
Overrides in 10.50 4.44 15.74
the 1980s
Overrides in 68 10.76 3.81 17.59
the 1970s
B. Subject Matter of Overrides
Attention to the subject areas where statutory overrides have been
prominent helps us to understand not only the history of overrides but also
the evolution of public law in this country. Figures 6 and 7 below provide
an overview of the subject areas generating overrides. An override can
affect multiple subject areas. For example, we coded the override of
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 16' as involving civil rights and
workplace law, both of which map onto Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
160. Excluding Chapman and Strawbridge-the two overrides of the nineteenth-century
cases-the average for the 2000s was roughly ten years.
161. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
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1964; the precise issue in Ledbetter was a statute of limitations issue, 162
which meant that the case also fit into the procedure category. Figure 6
reports the number of times a subject area was affected by an override.
Figure 7 reports the number of times a subject area was the primary area
affected by an override. With the notable exception of labor and
employment, which is a commonly overridden area mostly because of its
correlation with the civil rights statutes, Figures 6 and 7 are remarkably
similar. But perhaps the most important feature of these figures is what
they do not show, namely, significant override activity in several areas of
public law that are of overwhelming importance to the nation's well-being.
Figure 6. Frequency with Which a Subject Area Is the
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162. See id. at 621.
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Figure 7. Frequency with Which a Subject Area Is
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Thus, in a period covering almost half a century, there have been
surprisingly few override statutes in the areas of telecommunications,
energy, maritime, housing, Indian affairs, pensions, and national security.
In these critical policy arenas, there are numerous Supreme Court decisions,
but most of the law is made by agencies, often interacting directly with
Congress. By contrast, the overrides are concentrated in subject-matter
areas where courts play a more critical role in enforcing the statutory
scheme, such as civil rights, tax, bankruptcy, and intellectual property.
These different levels of override activity illustrate an important
feature of overrides and why they matter. Agencies and Congress
communicate directly, through phone calls and e-mails, budget
negotiations, and congressional hearings; the Court and Congress do not
communicate in this manner; indeed, such communication would be
considered unethical. 63 Instead, the Court and Congress "communicate"
163. Cf MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (2010) (circumscribing the political




through judicial decisions and congressional responses, both codifications
and overrides. 164
Even more important is that there have been very few override statutes
in some of the areas where Congress legislates most vigorously, namely,
federal spending and emergency relief, water rights, federal land use,
federal buildings, international trade, and miscellaneous institutional
matters. These six subject matters constitute a large majority of the public
laws adopted in each Congress and most of the pages in the Statutes at
Large by each Congress in the last generation.1 65 These areas of public law
do not generate overrides in large part because they are what Edward Rubin
calls intransitive statutes: they are not directives to the public but are,
instead, directives to government officials and generally do not create
judicially enforceable legal rights.
166
Figure 6 reveals twenty-nine subject areas where Congress has enacted
multiple overrides of Supreme Court opinions. But this tremendous variety
must be placed in context: most of the work of Congress-appropriations,
the operation of the government, foreign affairs and national security,
federal land and water policy-does not involve overriding the Court at all.
And some of the most important areas of statutory policy, such as energy
and telecommunications, generate only a trickle of overrides. Having said
that, there are some exciting arenas for overrides.
1. Civil Rights and Workplace Equality.-As the 1991 CRA
illustrates, a perennial focus of congressional override activity has been
civil rights/antidiscrimination law, as well as labor and employment law.
16 7
Figure 6 confirms that both civil rights and labor law are two of the primary
subject areas where Congress has been active in overriding the Supreme
Court-but when one focuses on subject areas that were the principal focus
of overrides, one sees that almost all the "labor" overrides involved
antidiscrimination laws, primarily amendments to Title VII of the 1964
CRA but also to the 1967 ADEA and the 1990 ADA. 68 In the House and
164. Note Professor Staudt's important point that as many as one-half of the congressional
responses to unanimous Supreme Court decisions codify rather than override them. See Staudt et
al., supra note 3, at 1388 (making this point for tax cases).
165. Thus, we collected from Volumes 119 and 120 of the Statutes at Large all the public
laws falling under these six categories for the 109th Congress (2005-2006); we found 73.2% of
the public laws fell into one of these categories, and 54.7% of the pages of the Statutes at Large.
For comparison's sake, we also examined the Statutes at Large for the 99th and 104th Congresses
(1985-1986 and 1995-1996) and found similar percentages.
166. See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 369, 381 (1989).
167. See generally Eskridge, supra note 150; J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career
of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-2007, 86 TExAs L. REv. 667 (2008).
168. See supra Figure 7; infra Appendix 1.
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sometimes the Senate, both the Judiciary and Labor Committees have
handled override proposals for workplace discrimination decisions. 169 It is
notable that "labor law" updating has neglected traditional areas of
workplace regulation, such as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of
1935, which occupies a declining role in the Supreme Court's docket, but is
virtually absent in our population of statutory overrides.
2. Federal Jurisdiction and Civil Procedure.-Notwithstanding all the
well-justified attention workplace antidiscrimination overrides have
received, the largest single category of overrides in Figures 6 and 7 is
federal jurisdiction and civil procedure. This may be surprising to some
readers, but not to the experts. Federal jurisdictional statutes and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generate a lot of Supreme Court decisions,
and the legal establishment has for the last half-century understood that
"procedure" rules affect and may alter "substantive" entitlements. 170 As
Stephen Burbank has documented, both plaintiff-side and defendant-side
lawyers, as well as Justice Department attorneys, besiege Congress with
override proposals, which form a significant portion of work performed by
the Judiciary Committees. 171
3. Criminal Law and Habeas Procedure.-Figures 6 and 7 categorize
substantive criminal law and procedure separately from habeas corpus
procedure because those statutes are in different titles of the U.S. Code and
169. Thus, the initial House hearings for the 1990 civil rights override bill were joint hearings.
Hearings on H.R. 4000, The Civil Rights Act of 1990: Joint Hearings Before the H. Comm. on
Educ. & Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101 st Cong. (1990). Chaired by Senator Kennedy, the Senate hearings were conducted
by the Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2104
Before the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 101st Cong. (1989). The 1990 bill was
successfully vetoed by President George H.W. Bush. Steven A. Holmes, President Vetoes Bill on
Job Rights; Showdown Is Set, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/l0/23/us/
president-vetoes-bill-on-job-rights-showdown-is-set.html.
170. This is a lesson of legal realism, see David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433 (2010)
(discussing at length the difficulties and nuances of designing procedural rules that have minimal
impact on substantive rulings), and of strategic thinking by defense as well plaintiffs' bars, see
generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 95 (1974) (examining litigation as an instrument of redistribution).
171. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1723, 1729-30 (2004) (discussing the judiciary committees' roles in
passing legislation affecting the Judicial Branch and the role that lawyers can play in that process).
For a recent dust-up, see the debate among Mark Herrmann and James M. Beck versus Stephen
Burbank in Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck & Steven B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial:
Should Congress Overrule Twombley and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNuMBRA 141 (2009),
where Professor Burbank urges Congress to override certain procedure decisions. As of April
2014, Congress has not done so.
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involve different kinds of values. Each field captures a large percentage of
the total overrides-and altogether criminal law, criminal procedure, and
habeas corpus rules account for almost 13% of the total overrides, making
the combined category among the largest producers of overrides. As with
the previous categories, this one generates a lot of Supreme Court opinions
and great demand for overrides, especially when the Court decides against
the government's interpretation and in favor of the convicted criminal. Like
civil procedure and civil rights (for the most part), criminal law, criminal
procedure, and habeas corpus fall within the jurisdiction of the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees.
72
4. Federal Income Taxation.-It is no surprise that federal income
taxation of individuals and corporations generates a lot of overrides. The
Supreme Court decides several tax cases each term, the stakes are quite
tangible and relatively high in such cases, and powerful institutions (the
IRS and private groups) are poised to secure Congress's attention if they
lose those cases. Not least important, the Senate Finance and House Ways
and Means Committees are powerhouse committees that monitor the case
law carefully and are not reluctant to respond to the Court-with statutes
codifying judicial decisions, overriding them, or both.1
73
5. Bankruptcy.-Rounding out the top five areas for congressional
override activity is bankruptcy law. 174 In light of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act (BRA) of 1978, which was a centerpiece of the 1991 Eskridge study,
75
we were not surprised that bankruptcy law remained an active area of
congressional overrides. The Supreme Court regularly interprets the 1978
BRA, and losing interests just as regularly take their case to Congress,
which sometimes overrides the Court. Like tax, civil procedure, federal
jurisdiction, and most civil rights overrides, bankruptcy matters are handled
by the judiciary committees of the House and Senate. 176 In addition to the
172. See About the Committee, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfin/about-the-committee; Jurisdiction, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE
ON JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/jurisdiction.
173. See Staudt et al., supra note 3, at 1351, 1357-58 (discussing the influence of these
committees and recognizing that they pay close attention to Supreme Court decisions). The tax-
writing committees are widely considered power committees. See, e.g., C. EUGENE STEUERLE,
THE TAX DECADE: HOW TAXES CAME TO DOMINATE THE PUBLIC AGENDA 77-79 (1992)
(explaining structural reasons for the power of the tax-writing committees).
174. See Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism's Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions,
53 VAND. L. REv. 887, 900-10 (2009) (discussing some of the reasons for bankruptcy overrides).
175. See Eskridge, supra note 1, app. 1 at 435-36.
176. See About the Committee, supra note 172; Jurisdiction, supra note 167.
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1978 overrides, Congress again significantly revised the Bankruptcy Code
in 1994.177
6. Other Important Subject Areas.-The judiciary committees also
have jurisdiction over many of the other top subject areas identified in
Figures 6 and 7, namely, antitrust, intellectual property (copyright, patents,
trademarks), immigration, prisons, and some matters of federal government
organization and practices. 178  We were somewhat surprised that
environmental law overrides are not more common; when such proposals
are introduced, they are handled, for the most part, by the Senate
Committee on the Environment and Public Works and the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce. 179  Most entitlement programs,
primarily those included in the Social Security Act of 1935 (as amended),
are handled by the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee. 
180
Another angle for thinking about subject matter is to compare the
portion of the 275 overridden Supreme Court decisions occupied by each
subject matter with the portion that subject matter occupies on the Supreme
Court's docket. Figure 8 below compares the subject areas found within
our population of overridden decisions with the set of Supreme Court
decisions between 1984 and 2006 assembled by the 2010 study by Connor
Raso and William Eskridge. 181  For the most part, prominence on the
177. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
178. See About the Committee, supra note 172; Jurisdiction, supra note 172.
179. See Committee History, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES ENERGY & COM. COMMITTEE,
http://energycommerce.house.gov/about/commnittee-history; Committee Jurisdiction, U.S. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ENV'T & PUB. WORKS, http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction
=CommitteeResources.CommitteeJurisdiction&CFID=71395850&CFTOKEN=57576748. The
committees handle clean air and water as well as environmental cleanup matters. See Committee
History, supra; Committee Jurisdiction, supra. In both chambers, endangered species proposals
originate with natural resources committees. See Committee Jurisdiction, COMMITTEE ON NAT.
RESOURCES, http://naturairesources.house.gov/about/jurisdiction.htm; Jurisdiction, U.S. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES, http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index
.cfn/jurisdiction.
180. See Committee Jurisdiction, COMMITTEE ON WAYS & MEANS, http://waysandmeans
.house.gov/about/jurisdiction.htm; Jurisdiction, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FIN., http://www
.finance.senate.gov/about/jurisdiction/.
181. See Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent:
An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1727 (2010). The dataset only includes statutory cases where there was a federal agency
interpretation before the Court, id. at 1741-but that includes more than 90% of the statutory
cases. The current study coded for more subject areas than the Raso & Eskridge study. For
example, Raso & Eskridge included few state habeas cases because the Department of Justice
rarely filed a brief in those cases. See id. (indicating that agency statutory interpretations were
gleaned in part from amicus briefs). To make the numbers above comparable, the percentages for
the Christiansen & Eskridge data reflect the number of overrides in a given subject area divided
1362 [Vol. 92:1317
Congressional Overrides, 1967-2011
Supreme Court docket paralleled override level. The biggest exception was
bankruptcy, which generated a lot more overrides than would have been
expected from the Court's docket. Tax cases also generated relatively
higher levels of override activity.182 Significantly less representated in our
override population than on the Court's docket were cases involving
business regulation, entitlement programs, and federal government structure
and rules.
Figure 8. Prevalence of Subject Matters:
Override Population, 1967-2011,











" Christiansen & Eskridge
" Raso & Eskridge
A final way of presenting, and understanding, the variety of subject
matters where overrides have been prominent is to focus on the U.S. Code
Titles that have been the situs for most overrides. As Figure 9 illustrates,
six Titles have generated the overwhelming majority of overrides:
by the number of overrides for which both studies coded-i.e., excluding the habeas overrides.
Consequently, the Christiansen & Eskridge numbers for a particular subject matter in Figure 8 are
higher than they would be for the entire override population.
182. See, e.g., Staudt et al., supra note 3, at 1350-51 (noting that the Supreme Court has
heard a disproportionate number of tax disputes). Notice that we make no claims about procedure.
In the 2010 Raso & Eskridge dataset, the main statutory cases where there was not some federal
agency position or submission were state habeas cases, and for that reason we would expect to see
the procedure bars roughly equal.
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(1) Title 28, federal jurisdiction and procedure, including habeas corpus;
(2) Title 42, civil rights and entitlement programs; (3) Title 26, federal
income taxation; (4) Title 18, criminal law; (5) Title 11, bankruptcy; and
(6) Title 15, antitrust, securities, and other forms of business regulation.
Figure 9. Percentage of Overrides by
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C. Overrides and Superstatutes
It is also useful to think about statutory overrides through the lens of
superstatutes. A superstatute is an ambitious law that supersedes common
law baselines with a new public norm or structure, such that that norm or
structure has become entrenched in American public law. 83  An
approximation of what superstatutes are on the Supreme Court's radar is
Nancy Staudt's list of nineteen federal statutes that were the most litigated
laws during the Rehnquist Court.' 84 Table 3 associates each statute on
Professor Staudt's list, starting with the most litigated law, with the
congressional committees having jurisdiction over the amendments and
with the level of override activity during our period of 1967-2011.
183. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 4, at 7 (defining and illustrating the notion of
superstatutes).
184. See Staudt et al., supra note 3, at 1351.
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Table 3. Most Litigated Statutes and Override Activity,
1967-2011
Most Litigated Level of
Statutes (Rehnquist Congressional Committees Override
Court) Having Jurisdiction Activity
Internal Revenue House Ways & Means and
Code of 1954 Senate Finance Committees Very High
Federal Rules of Civil Judiciary Committees Low
Procedure (1938)
Bankruptcy Reform Judiciary Committees Very High
Act of 1978
Employee Retirement
Income Security Act Judiciary Committees Very Low
of 1974
Habeas Corpus Act of Judiciary Committees Very High
1966
Social Security Act of House Ways & Means and
1935, as amended Senate Finance Committees High
Civil Rights Act of Judiciary Committees Moderate
1871 (§ 1983)
Senate Health, Education,
Civil Rights Act of Labor & Pensions Committee;House Education & Labor Very High
1964, Title VII Committee-as well as the
Judiciary Committees
Federal Rules of Judiciary Committees Moderate
Criminal Procedure
Immigration &
Nationality Act of Judiciary Committees High
1952
Senate Health, Education,
National Labor Labor & Pensions Committee; Low
Relations Act of 1935 House Education & Labor
Committee
Voting Rights Act of Judiciary Committees Very High
1965
Securities Acts of Banking Committees Moderate
1933 and 1934




Procedure Act of Judiciary Committees Low
1946
Americans with Judiciary Committees as well as
Disabilities Act of Labor Committees Moderate
1990
Federal Rules of Judiciary Committees None
Evidence of 1974
Age Discrimination in Labor Committees as well as
Employment Act of Judiciary Committees High
1967
Civil Rights
Attorneys'Fees Judiciary Committees Low
Awards Act of 1978
The statutes that generated the most Supreme Court decisions (i.e.,
were most litigated) were, by and large, the ones that saw the most
congressional overrides of those decisions. Among the top ten most
litigated statutes in the Staudt list, six saw high or very high, and another
two moderate, override activity in our period of study. To be sure, this fact
ought not be surprising: As Figure 8 suggested, subject-matter salience on
the Supreme Court's docket will also suggest salience on the congressional
agenda, if for no other reason than the fact that the Supreme Court is the
final word unless Congress overrides it, and frequently the losers at the
Supreme Court level have enough political clout to secure the attention of
the relevant congressional committee-typically the House or Senate
Judiciary Committees. 1
85
Notice also the gaping exception from the top-ten superstatutes,
namely, 1974 ERISA, the landmark pension law. 186 Not only is this law
much-litigated, but the Supreme Court case law is poorly theorized,
impractical, policy deficient, and internally inconsistent.' 87 Yet Congress
has done nothing to clarify and improve this area of law, presumably
because the relevant interest groups (banks versus unions) are politically
185. See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 377; supra Table 3.
186. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
187. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's
Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003) (arguing
that the Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA too narrowly); Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as
an Employer's Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391,
392-93 (2000) (discussing hypotheticals in which justice would seem to require the finding of
fiduciary duty but Supreme Court decisions on ERISA have found no such duty).
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balanced and no agenda entrepreneur has taken on the boring complexities
of ERISA. The same dynamic applies to the 1935 NLRA"' s
An important way to identify superstatutes is through the frequency of
amendment: a statute whose norm or idea becomes entrenched is going to
have to be updated, usually through statutory amendments. Table 4 below
identifies, for each decade and for the population as a whole, how often the
statutory provision at issue has been amended during our period of inquiry
(1967-2011). Thus, statutes that absorbed overrides of the Court during the
1970s have been subject to almost ten amendments, on average (mean); to
be sure, the median number of amendments for such statutes was much
lower (six times). But the point is established that frequently amended
superstatutes are likely to attract increasing numbers of overrides.
Table 4. Frequency with Which Provision Affected by the Override Is
Amended
Average Median Standard Mode
Number of Number of Deviation of Number of
Amendments Amendments Amendments Amendments
AllO rd 7.64 4 12.21 2
Overrides
in the 5.09 3 4.70 1
2000s
Overrides
in the 7.28 3 13.59 2
1990s
Overrides
in the 7.50 3 12.33 0
1980s
Overrides
in the 9.91 6 12.57 6
1970s
The frequency with which override statutes were amended also
declines slightly for overrides in the 1980s and 1990s (slightly more than
seven times on average) and the 2000s (five times). This suggests that
188. A big difference is that the NLRA occupies less of the Court's docket each decade, while
ERISA continues to occupy a big part of the docket. For the country as a whole, the NLRA is of
sharply declining relevance, see Charles B. Craver, The Relevance of the NLRA and Labor
Organizations in the Post-Industrial, Global Economy, 57 LAB. L.J. 133, 133-35 (2006), while




override activity has changed in the last twenty years: the focus has moved
to provisions that Congress has addressed less frequently.
Relatedly, the nineteen most litigated statutes in the Supreme Court
might tell us something about the post-1998 fall-off in override activity.
These nineteen superstatutes were the situs for seven override laws,
reversing twelve Supreme Court decisions, in the dozen years after 1998.189
Compare the output of the last pre-Clinton impeachment Congress (1995-
1996), which amended the same nineteen statutes with six override laws
that reversed or modified a whopping twenty-three Supreme Court
decisions. 190  In other words, in a two-year period right before the
impeachment drama, one Congress amended the most litigated
superstatutes to override twice as many Supreme Court decisions as did the
six Congresses after the Clinton impeachment.
This analysis suggests a new dimension to the fall-off in Congress's
override activity after 1998. Whereas Congress continues to enact big
partisan overrides like the 2009 FDA Tobacco Act, it has been passing
fewer overrides updating the superstatutes that occupy most of the Supreme
189. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5-6
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)) (amending Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act to override one decision); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
§ 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555-57 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102) (amending the 1990
ADA to override four decisions); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7,
120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012)) (amending the 1966
habeas law to override one decision); Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120
Stat. 577, 580-81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006)) (amending the 1965 Voting
Rights Act to override two decisions); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit.
10, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2739, 2741-42 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241) (amending the
1966 habeas law to override one decision); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11 U.S.C.) (amending the 1978 BRA to override two decisions); Job Creation and Worker
Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 402(a), 116 Stat. 21, 40 (codified as amended at
26 U.S.C. § 108) (amending the 1954 Internal Revenue Code to override one decision).
190. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 309(c), 110 Stat.
3847, 3853 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (amending § 1983 of the 1871 Civil Rights
Act to override two decisions); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, §§ 301(a), 304, 604(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-575, 3009-
586, 3009-690 to -94 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (amending the 1952
Immigration and Nationality Act to override three decisions); Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 211(c), 110 Stat. 2105, 2189
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1382) (amending the 1935 Social Security Act to override
one decision); Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat.
1755, 1838-39 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 104) (amending the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code to override two decisions); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101-102, 104-106, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-21 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (amending the 1966 habeas law to override fourteen decisions);
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 737-
49 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending the 1933-1934 securities
laws to override one decision).
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Court's attention: the 1871 Civil Rights Act (no overrides after 1998), the
1935 Social Security Act (no overrides after 1998), the 1938 Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (no overrides after 1998), the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (no overrides after 1998), the 1952 Immigration and Nationality
Act (no overrides after 1998), the 1954 Internal Revenue Code (one
override after 1998), Title VII of the 1964 CRA (one override after 1998),
the 1967 Age Discrimination Act (no overrides after 1998), the 1978 BRA
(two overrides after 1998), and there have been no overrides in any of the
major environmental statutes (Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, etc.). 191
While the post-Clinton impeachment Congresses have updated the 1990
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the 1965 VRA in important
ways, and the 1966 habeas corpus law in minor ways, it is remarkable how
many important areas of federal statutory law have been left unattended by
Congress during this period, especially in light of the attention that
Congress has historically paid to these laws.
D. Purposes of Overrides
Why does Congress override the Court? One way of thinking about
this question is to figure out the stated purpose of the override: Did the
Supreme Court botch the decision making in an important case, deciding it
the wrong way or announcing a point of law contrary to congressional
expectations? Even if correct as a legal matter, was the result or point of
law poor and perhaps outdated policy by the time Congress overrode the
Court? Was there confusion as to the rules of law, and so need for
clarification?
Based upon the committee hearings and reports, we coded all the
overrides to reflect the stated justifications for upending a Supreme Court
interpretation of a statute. Figure 10 below reports our findings. Consistent
with the tenor of the legislative history that we read, the primary conclusion
to be drawn from Figure 10 is that overrides are usually not the contentious
process that characterized the 1991 CRA and other dramatic overrides of
great interest to the media, law students, and many academics. Instead,
overrides reflect the complex interactive process by which the three main
organs of government-the legislative, executive, and judicial branches-
cooperate as well as compete, all the time.'
92
191. See infra Appendix 1.
192. For a theoretical statement of this point, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26
(1994). For an even stronger focus on the cooperative relationship between the Court and
















Correcting a Bad Responding to Resonding to Updating Policy
Interpretation Confusion in the Supreme Court
Law Concerns
U]Main Reason MA Reason
Drawing from the research reflected in Figure 10, we offer the following
categorization of the overrides in our study.
1. Policy-Updating Overrides.-About two-thirds of the overrides we
studied were primarily policy updating: Congress treated the Supreme
Court decision without a great deal of negative judgment about the Court's
performance, but replaced its point of law with a new one that Congress
considered more equitable, more efficient, more consistent with current
political values, or better suited to changed circumstances. These overrides
generally correspond to the pair of columns on the right in Figure 10. In
policy-updating overrides, Congress treats the judicial decision, often an
older one, the same as it would treat a statutory provision that no longer
meets the needs of the modem regulatory state. Just as a Congress
repealing an obsolete statute is usually not making a harsh judgment about
the competence of the enacting Congress, so a Congress overriding an
obsolete Court decision is usually not making a harsh judgment about the
competence of the deciding Court. And even where Congress was critical
of a decision in this category, it criticized primarily the effects of the
decision rather than the decision itself.
The 1978 BRA is the classic policy-updating override. The old
bankruptcy law. no longer met the needs of a dynamic society, including





structure that would allow them to have a "fresh start" in their financial
lives. 193 A Bankruptcy Reform Commission recommended a comprehen-
sive overhaul of the entire statutory scheme. 194  Congress, after years of
hearings and negotiations, enacted the 1978 superstatute, which overrode
many Supreme Court interpretations of the old law, as well as several lower
court constructions. 195 Although many of the overrides were a direct
response to the Supreme Court, they were incidental to the primary task of
modernizing American bankruptcy law or, more precisely, recalibrating
bankruptcy rules to reflect efficiency concerns raised by creditors, the fresh
start idea favored by debtors and their advocates, and the practicalities of
the modern market. 196 The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,197 which
created supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367) and significantly
modified Title 28's venue provisions (28 U.S.C. § 1391), is another
archetypal updating override.
Consider a more controversial example. The 1996 AEDPA is regarded
in some circles as a congressional rebuff to the Supreme Court,' 98 but that is
not the way we read this particular superstatute. Since 1969, a Supreme
Court dominated by Republican Justices had been setting new rules
restricting prisoner access to habeas corpus, especially state prisoners who
filed repeated habeas petitions.199 Typically, the new restrictions were
adopted over fierce dissenting opinions and reflected judicial compromises
needed to secure the votes of moderate conservatives. 200  In 1996, with
193. See infra notes 359-63 and accompanying text.
194. See Richard E. Mendales, Intensive Care for the Public Corporation: Securities Law,
Corporate Governance, and the Reorganization Process, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 979, 989-90 (2008)
(describing the creation of the Commission and some of its recommendations).
195. See Eskridge, supra note 1, app. 1 at 435-36 (listing the Supreme Court and lower court
decisions explicitly discussed in the legislative history and overridden by the 1978 BRA).
196. For an excellent history of bankruptcy law, situating the 1978 BRA in a broader political
setting, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMrNION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 131-59 (2001).
197. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
198. See Padraic Foran, Note, Unreasonably Wrong: The Supreme Court's Supremacy, the
AEDPA Standard, and Carey v. Musladin, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 588-91 (2008) (discussing
three theories of the genesis of AEDPA, including one which argues that "the passage of
the AEDPA was retaliation against judicial activism").
199. See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2353-57
(1993) (documenting Nixon era proposals for legislative cutbacks to the broad 1966 habeas law
and explaining how the legislative proposals found their way into Burger and then Rehnquist
Court interpretations of the 1966 law).
200. The dissenters often had excellent legal arguments, based upon the Warren Court
statutory precedents that not only bound the Court but that had been the premise of the Great
Society Congress's codification of habeas corpus procedures in 1966. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 507-09 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's departure from stare
decisis); see also Yackle, supra note 199, at 2377 (suggesting that Warren Court principles
influenced the 1966 habeas law).
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Republican critics of broad habeas in control of Congress, and an
ideologically flexible Democrat in the White House, Congress adopted
AEDPA. In our view, AEDPA reflects the synergy of cooperation and
competition between the branches. Focusing on efficiency and federalism
and deemphasizing factual claims of innocence, Congress approved of and
codified the Supreme Court's doctrines barring most habeas claims-and in
the process added new restrictions and abrogated some of the Court's due
process-inspired exceptions and loopholes.2 °' The policy update was
responsive to a political climate hostile to prisoner litigation, even when
such lawsuits raised claims of actual innocence. Every one of AEDPA's
fourteen overrides was a direct response to a Supreme Court decision, but
we identified only one override that was aimed at correcting a bad
interpretation of the 1966 habeas corpus statute.20 2 The other thirteen
overrides were all updates to the habeas law that Congress justified based
on policy grounds rather than the need to correct the Court's errant
interpretation. 3
Altogether, two-thirds of the overrides are policy-updating overrides.
Almost all of the Court's overridden bankruptcy, tax, intellectual property,
habeas, federal jurisdiction, and civil procedure decisions are policy
updates-often reflecting new political values, responses to practical
problems, or both. In each of these areas, Congress administers a coherent
body of law (indeed, Congress administers the only bankruptcy law), and
the Supreme Court is the court of last resort on a statute's meaning. And in
almost all of these areas, the circumstances have changed significantly over
the course of our study. For instance, copyright laws designed for books
and recorded music have evolved to account for the challenges of cable
broadcasting 2°4 and digital technologies.20 5  It should thus come as no
201. Compare, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (explaining that the
compromise due process test for a properly presented habeas petition based on innocence is
whether the rational trier of fact could reasonably have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt),
with Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat.
1214, 1218-19 (adding 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which provides that the new test is whether the
state court's determination that evidence supported a conviction is objectively "unreasonable").
202. See § 104, 110 Stat. at 1218-19 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012))
(overriding Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992)).
203. The overrides justified on policy grounds were Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99
(1995), Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987), Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477
U.S. 436 (1986), Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983), Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979),
Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542 (1967), Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), and
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
204. See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (using copyright laws from
1909), overridden by Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 111, 90 Stat. 2541, 2550-58
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 111); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392
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surprise that a greater deal of Congress's override efforts have been directed
at keeping current these areas of the law.
2. Clarifying Overrides.-Some congressional responses to Supreme
Court statutory decisions are primarily clarifying overrides, where Congress
is responding to confusion in the law or is fine-tuning statutes in ways that
have few policy consequences. (Often, it is more important that a statutory
rule be clear and be settled than that it reflect a particular policy.) A
number of the clarifying overrides were Congress's response to Supreme
Court decisions that summarily affirmed a lower court statutory
interpretation but without creating a national rule, which Congress then
provided in the form of the override.2 °6  These overrides generally
correspond to the middle-two pairs of columns in Figure 10. For example,
in Agsalud v. Standard Oil Co. of California20 7 the Supreme Court issued a
summary affirmance of the Ninth Circuit's holding that a Hawaii health
care law was preempted by ERJSA.2°8 Congress responded a year later with
a statute that provided a universal, nationwide rule governing the exemption
of certain local health care laws from preemption under ERISA.2 °9
On other occasions, the Court delivers a complete decision on the
merits that Congress finds problematic because it does not provide an
understandable rule of law. Thus, the Court in United States v. Santos
210
interpreted the money laundering statute narrowly2 l '-but there was no
majority opinion, leaving the lower courts with difficulty figuring out how
to treat pending prosecutions. To provide a rule of law that the Court could
U.S. 390 (1968) (same), overridden by § 111, 90 Stat. at 2550-58 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 111).
205. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) ("In a
case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our course, we must be circumspect in
construing the scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which never contemplated [new
technological developments]."), overridden by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No.
105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863-76 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-
1205).
206. See, e.g., Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, § 3(b)(2), 102 Stat. 4677, 4680 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4a) (overriding Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), where an equally divided Court had failed to resolve the
important issue whether the purveyors of insider information can be prosecuted under the
securities laws, and authorizing the SEC to go after such purveyors).
207. 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
208. Id. (affirming Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 763 (9th Cir. 1980)).
209. Act of Jan. 14, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-473, tit. 3, § 301, 96 Stat. 2605, 2611-12 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144).
210. 553 U.S. 507 (2008).
211. See id. at 513-14 (plurality opinion).
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not, Congress overrode Santos with a clear command in the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009.212
Although a number of overrides are publicly justified in part as
resolving "confusion" in the law, fewer than one in ten overrides are
primarily justified along these lines.
3. Restorative Overrides.-Congress sometimes goes beyond
tweaking statutes to reflect recent congressional values or to clean up
confusing legal rules and adopts overrides in response to what it considers a
bad interpretation by the Supreme Court. Frequently, but not always, these
overrides restore the policy Congress vested in the original statute or as
implemented by an agency and lower courts before a dust-clearing Supreme
Court decision. About one-fifth of the overridden Supreme Court decisions
fall under this category. These overrides generally correspond to the
leftmost pair of columns in Figure 10.213 Appendix 1 marks the overrides
that restore the previous rule of law in italics because these are the overrides
that garner the most attention and most obviously reflect institutional
conflict.
When Congress claims to be "restoring" the proper rule of law, it
sometimes makes the legislative rule retroactive, the way a court decision
would be.214 Most of the restorative overrides are not retroactive, however.
An earlier version of the 1991 CRA retroactively overruled the Court's
stingy decisions cutting back on workplace discrimination protections,21 5
but the 1991 Act did not contain those provisions, and the Court found none
of the overrides retroactive. 21 6 Nonetheless, the 1991 CRA was primarily
restorative, and its proponents were harshly critical of the Supreme Court,
not just because conservative Justices read their own values into the
statutory language but also because the leading override proponents
212. Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 2(f)(1)(B), 123 Stat. 1617, 1618 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(c)(9)); see also United States v. Abdulwahab, 715 F.3d 521, 531 n.8 (4th Cir. 2013)
(explaining that the 2009 override cleared up the confusion among lower courts).
213. But not all cases. Sometimes Congress criticized an opinion as a bad interpretation, but
then enacted a different legal rule, which would not qualify as a restorative override.
214. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236, 2387 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l) (overriding Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), and doing so retroactively);
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, §§ 2, 5, 100 Stat. 796, 796-
98 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415) (overriding Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883
(1984), and doing so retroactively).
215. S. 2104, 101st Cong., § 15 (1990), discussed in Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244, 255 & n.8, 256 (1994).
216. See Landgraf 511 U.S. at 263-86 (generating and applying a strong presumption against
retroactivity of statutory provisions); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 309-14
(1994) (applying a strong presumption against retroactive application of the 1991 CRA as well).
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complained that "the Supreme Court's recent rulings represent an effort to
renege on history. 21 7 The supporters of restorative overrides not only want
to reverse a statutory policy they do not like and to clarify the law but also
to rebuke the Supreme Court for, basically, not doing its job.
Significantly, most of the decisions overridden in this manner involved
civil rights and antidiscrimination statutes, where people's preferences are
strongly held and, increasingly, separated by a partisan divide, with
Republican representatives and judges taking politically conservative
positions and Democrat representatives and judges taking politically liberal
ones.21 8 Among the most prominent restorative overrides are the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,219 the 1991 CRA, the Voting
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, the ADA
Amendments of 2008, and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. Except
for the Ledbetter Act, the earlier restorative overrides were at least
somewhat bipartisan: although Democrats supplied most of the votes for
enactment, each of the earlier overrides had significant GOP support, and
five of the seven were signed into law by conservative Republican
Presidents.
One payoff of our categorization is suggested by this analysis. Recall
the big fall-off in overrides after the 1998 Clinton impeachment-and
notice that Congress in the recent era of fewer overrides has still managed
to adopt a good many restorative overrides. 22 Conversely, the fall-off in
updating and clarifying overrides becomes all the more dramatic. This
bodes ill for Court-Congress cooperation-but also for updating statutory
policy in an informed and orderly manner. In the last fifteen years, and
probably also for the immediate future, Congress has all but dropped out of
the business of updating statutory policy in the areas identified in this Part.
E. Politics of Overrides: The Government Wins-But So Do Women and
Minorities
Why does Congress override the Court? Another way of thinking
about this question, complementing our analysis above, is to focus on which
interests and institutions participate in the override process and what
217. 136 CONG. REC. 1,657 (1990) (statement of Sen. Jeffords); see also id. at 1,653
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("The fabric ofjustice has been torn.").
218. By "conservative" we mean constructions of statutes that favor the status quo (generally
benefiting white males) and otherwise vest a lot of faith and discretion in decision making by
companies and local governments. "Liberal" decisions are the flip side, supporting broad
protections for women, racial minorities, and sexual and gender minorities and expressing
skepticism of broad antidiscrimination needs for white males.
219. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
220. See infra Appendix 1.
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positions they take. The primary take-home point is that the Executive
Branch of the federal government is the biggest player, and usually the big
winner, in the override process. As Figure 11 shows, the federal
government is the institution or interest most often affected by override
statutes, followed by state and local governments (when considered
together); business and the plaintiffs' bar are often affected, but not nearly
at the level as the United States. This is not too surprising. The Solicitor
General takes a position in a large majority of the statutory interpretation
cases heard by the Supreme Court, including most cases where the United
States is not a party, 2 ' and the federal laws that form the basis for overrides
frequently implicate fundamental interests of the national government.
Figure 11. Number of Times Affected











The legal position of the United States prevails in more than two-thirds
of the statutory cases decided by the Court,22 and the United States is
221. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General's
Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2010) (noting the
Solicitor General's involvement in the majority of Supreme Court cases and its increased
participation in cases in which the United States is not a party).










usually a winner in the override process as well: a large majority of the
overrides adopt the policy or legal position advanced by the United States
during the congressional deliberation process. Figure 12 reflects some of
what we learned through a massive study of the legislative committee
hearings and reports for every one of the overrides adopted during our
223period of inquiry.
No group or institution enjoys the attention of Congress more than the
Executive Branch of the federal government: its officials testified, in depth,
in a large majority of overrides and supported the large majority of those
overrides. The federal government took an explicit position in just under
three-quarters of the overrides, supporting the override in 75% of those
224instances. 2 State and local governments had a similar record of success,
just on a smaller scale, as did the American Bar Association. Business
interests were widely heard but not usually followed, either because
Congress enacted overrides business opposed or because business-oriented
testimony was on both sides of the issue. The latter result is largely a
function of the business groups' opposition to many of the employment-
related civil rights statutes.
223. Christiansen quarterbacked this effort and did many of the legislative histories, but the
bulk of them were accomplished through a herculean effort by Yale law students Peter Chen,
Christopher Lapinig, Jacob Victor, Sam Thypin-Bormeo, and Amanda Elbogen, under the general
supervision of Christiansen and Eskridge.
224. Some overrides were not discussed at the hearings before either house of Congress. In
these cases we coded for the supporters and opponents of the statute generally, unless there was a
compelling reason to deviate from this rule, such as when the override departed markedly from
overall politics of the statute. Figure 12 does not include the overrides coded in this fashion. It




Figure 12. Number of Times













E Support U Oppose U Mixed
Figure 13 below offers a dramatic graphic demonstrating which
institutions prevail in the override process. As suggested by the foregoing
analysis, the United States leads the pack by a huge margin: the Department
of Justice, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Health and
Human Services, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the
Departments of State and of Defense, and the Federal Trade Commission
are among the most prominent agencies providing important congressional
testimony. As Figure 13 reveals, their position usually prevails. But even
when it does not, the Executive Branch's position often affects the
compromise ultimately reached.225 For example, the Department of Justice
225. One reason is the bargaining power the President has because of his veto authority,
which could impose a two-thirds majority requirement on the override coalition that it could rarely
achieve. See CHARLES M. CAMERON, VETO BARGAINING: PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF
1378 [Vol. 92:1317
2014] Congressional Overrides, 1967-2011 1379
supported several of the overrides in the 1991 CRA but pointedly opposed
the override of Wards Cove, whose result Solicitor General Charles Fried
had urged the Court to adopt. 26 Not coincidentally, the override of Wards
Cove was much more modest than the overrides of decisions the
Administration had not supported before the Court.227
Figure 13. Number of Times the
"Main Winner" vs. "Main Loser"








* Main Winner UMain Loser
NEGAIIVE POWER (2000); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article ,
Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 528-33 (1992) (examining the bicameral presidential model of
legislation and how statutes incorporate presidential preferences).
226. See William T. Coleman Jr., Op-Ed., A False Quota Call, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1990,
http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=562870 (observing
Fried's opposition to the override bill).
227. Decisions the Department of Justice agreed were wrong, such as Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), were overridden more completely than Wards Cove, which
remains a citable and influential precedent. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S.
228, 240 (2005) (following Wards Cove when interpreting a similar text in the ADEA); NAACP
v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 477 (3d Cir. 2011) (relying on a line of
precedent including Wards Cove to explain a rule for statistical comparison in racial
discrimination); Phillips v. Cohen, 400 F.3d 388, 397-400 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting the statutory
overrides of parts of Wards Cove but also citing to the opinion for the proper disparate impact
standard).
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Contrast the success of federal agencies and departments with the
mixed record of organized business in the override process. Like the
federal government, business interests usually prevail at the Supreme Court
level-but very much unlike the agency and department interests, business
interests fare poorly in the override process. Business leaders testify more
than any other group, outside the Executive Branch, yet often to no avail:
their record in blocking override laws they oppose is not impressive.228
Figures 12 and 13 also confirm that state governments and local
prosecutors have great success in the politics of federal overrides. Surely
their greatest success was the 1996 AEDPA, which made it much harder for
state prisoners to secure even a federal judicial hearing of habeas claims
that their convictions violated federal constitutional and civil rights.
229
Interestingly, although the Department of Justice supported the idea of
habeas reform, it remained largely neutral on the individual overrides
contained in AEDPA, just as the Solicitor General had declined to file
amicus briefs in most of the Supreme Court cases determining the
procedural rights of state habeas complainants. 230  AEDPA also illustrates
the stunning lack of success of prisoners and criminal defendants in the
override process: they almost never succeed in securing overrides that
protect their interests and routinely lose when state governments,
prosecutors, or prisons assemble coalitions in support of serious law-and-
order overrides.
The foregoing are some general observations about the politics of
overrides. Just as important, however, are local observations about the
operation of overrides in particular subject areas. Each area is distinctive
228. Our findings do not foreclose the notion that business interests are successful in
preventing most of their Supreme Court "wins" from serious consideration on Congress's override
agenda. The Court, for example, has expanded the preclusive effect of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) of 1926 against consumer and even discrimination claims, see, e.g., Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (evincing vigorous debate between the majority and
dissenting Justices concerning the proper application of the FAA in the context of a consumer
arbitration agreement), but there has been no congressional pushback against this important
business-friendly judicial activism. Hence, the many rights-protecting overrides of probusiness
employment discrimination decisions might be swallowed up by rights-denying arbitration
agreements that, the Court has held, trump judicial enforcement of Title VII. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991). For support for this hypothesis,
consider Figure 8, supra, showing that business regulation is a much more significant percentage
of the Court's ordinary statutory interpretation docket than it is of the override population. The
relatively few overrides in the area of business regulation is consistent with the theory that
business groups succeed in keeping many of their Supreme Court victories off the congressional
agenda.
229. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
230. Cf David Blumberg, Habeas Leaps from the Pan and into the Fire: Jacobs v. Scott and
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 61 ALB. L. REV. 557, 577 (1997)
(discussing two studies, the latter commissioned by the Department of Justice, refuting statistics
underlying the positions of many habeas reform proponents).
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because of the different institutional judicial and legislative preferences,
different agencies involved (or not), and different arrays of private interests
and values.
1. Civil Rights and Workplace Equality: An Inversion of Carolene
Products. -Although Congress in our forty-four year time frame has
bounced back and forth between conservative Republican and liberal
Democrat control, it is on the whole highly sympathetic to the equality
demands of women, racial minorities, and people with disabilities. As
Figure 11 illustrates, those groups are not directly affected by most override
statutes-but Figure 13 shows that Carolene groups and women have been
highly successful in pursuing overrides of Supreme Court decisions
rejecting their equality claims.231 Some of the most dramatic restorative
overrides of the period-such as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987, the 1991 CRA, the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and
Amendments Act of 2006, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, and the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009-were statutes claiming to "restore"
rights to minorities and women that the Supreme Court had erroneously
"taken away" by stingy constructions of antidiscrimination laws.
Perhaps our most dramatic finding is that the override process reveals
the inversion of Carolene Products: no longer does the Supreme Court go
out of its way to protect the interests of "discrete and insular minorities"
(and women) against denigration in the political process-instead, those
groups go to Congress to protect their equality interests against denigration
in the judicial process. This inversion of Carolene Products is nothing
new; it has been going on since the 1970s. What drives it is the fact that
feminist and civil rights social movements have transformed American
political culture, which once discriminated against women and racial
minorities but now supports measures that penalize private discrimination.
Compared to Congress, the Supreme Court is relatively libertarian (i.e.,
231. We call these "Carolene groups," after United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144 (1938), which suggested an exception to deferential judicial review when laws harm a
"discrete and insular minorit[y]" subject to "prejudice" in the political process. See id. at 152 n.4.
Racial minorities were of course the classic Carolene groups, and people with disabilities fit the
bill as well because they are marked by discrete traits and have often been ghettoized (isolated) in
American society. While women are discrete, but neither insular nor a minority, the ACLU's
campaign for their equal rights analogized them to the traditional Carolene groups. See Serena
Mayeri, The Strange Career of Jane Crow: Sex Segregation and the Transformation of Anti-
Discrimination Discourse, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 192, 229 (2006). Ironically, the Supreme
Court has never provided equal protections for Carolene groups until they showed puissance in
the political process. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 187, at 53-56 (discussing how the
Supreme Court recognizes minority groups only when they become key players in national
politics and have the resources to challenge a lack of equality).
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antiregulatory). As a result, once Carolene groups become the beneficiaries
rather than the targets of government regulation, the Court will give way to
Congress and the President as the primary forum for advancing their
proregulatory agenda.
2. Federal Jurisdiction and Civil Procedure: Congress Gives What
the Court Will Not Take.-While the Supreme Court's stingy approach to
equality mandates is a phenomenon of the last generation, its cautious
approach to congressional grants of jurisdiction to federal courts is a
longstanding regime.232 This regime is defensible not only because of its
longevity and stability but also because it represents an institutional refusal
to take on more authority than the democratic process has knowingly given
it. It may be virtuous for an organ of government to decline to seize
additional power and authority, but as a practical matter the regime also
reflects judicial concerns that the limited capacity of the federal courts
would be strained by a liberal application of the jurisdictional provisions.
Congress, of course, is happy to delegate authority, especially when
interest groups push for it. And the plaintiffs' bar, increasingly powerful
because of the boom in plaintiffs' tort judgments and settlements,233 is a
strong voice for expansion of federal jurisdiction. Although trial lawyers
have been associated with the Democratic Party, one of their most
important overrides was signed into law by Republican President George
H.W. Bush-the landmark Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, which
overrode four important jurisdictional precedents, greatly expanding federal
courts' ancillary jurisdiction.234 The business defense bar is puissant as
well, and it was successful in securing enactment during the Bush-Cheney
Administration of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which partially
overrode a landmark Marshall Court decision, as well as four other
jurisdictional precedents, in order to allow class action defendants to seek
removal from unfriendly state courts.23 5
232. The approach dates back to the Marshall Court. See, e.g., Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (interpreting the grant of jurisdiction based upon diverse citizenship to
require complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants). Congress has partially
overridden the Strawbridge baseline in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2,
§ 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9-12 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012)), which makes
Strawbridge our oldest overridden Supreme Court decision.
233. See Sara Parikh & Bryant Garth, Philip Corboy and the Construction of the Plaintiffs'
Personal Injury Bar, 30 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 269 (2005) (detailing the growth of the plaintiffs'
tort bar by surveying the life of a prominent Chicago tort lawyer).
234. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 3 10(a), 104 Stat. 5089,
5113-14 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367) (overriding four restrictive jurisdictional precedents); see
also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549 (2005) (announcing a broad
application of the 1990 override).
235. See Class Action Fairness Act § 4, 119 Stat. at 9-12.
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3. Criminal Law and Procedure (Including Habeas): Criminal
Defendants and Prisoners Almost Always Lose.-Congress in the last half
century has been increasingly punitive, with little pushback politically, as
Democrats fall over Republicans in a rush to add or expand crimes, enhance
punishments, and restrict access to the writ of habeas corpus for both
federal and state prisoners. In contrast, the Court applies due process
values to read criminal sanctions and penalties restrictively and sometimes
to craft loopholes to allow prisoner challenges to their confinement in
violation of federal statutory or constitutional rights. The Court's liberal
application of the rule of lenity is perhaps the most concrete example of this
236 tinstinct. Notice that these are the same kinds of governance values noted
for civil rights and federal jurisdiction: the Court is restrictive, cautious, and
libertarian, while Congress is more aggressively regulatory. As our coding
reflects, however, the same kinds of values have the opposite political
valence: in criminal law and procedure, the GOP-dominated Court is
relatively "liberal" on the conventional political spectrum, while Congress
under either Democrat or Republican control is relatively "conservative."
The politics of criminal law overrides is decidedly one-sided, even
more so than the politics of civil rights overrides. If the Department of
Justice believes the Court's stingy interpretation of a criminal prohibition,
penalty, or procedural rule stands in the way of effective implementation of
a criminal law regime, it can typically gain the attention of Congress and
can often secure an override. Of concern is the fact that when the
Department presses for an override, there is often no effective group to
resist such a push, and legislators of both parties are loathe to stand in the
way of throwing the book at criminals. Being tough on crime is a political
stratagem with few electoral risks, while showing mercy for those who
have-or may have-transgressed the law is replete with such risk.
Because there is no effective interest group capable of standing up to these
tough-on-crime legislators, the process has for decades resembled what the
late Professor William Stuntz memorably termed "an auction, not a political
compromise," where congressmen bid up the penalties associated with
various crimes.237 The consequence is a proliferation of overrides further
penalizing these much-maligned groups and virtually no overrides
protecting them.
4. Federal Income Taxation: Highly Diverse Array of Winners and
Losers.-Unlike the first three subject areas, tax law overrides are
politically balanced. The IRS enjoys great success persuading the Supreme
236. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360-61 (1987) (applying the rule of
lenity to interpret the statute in question against the government).
237. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 173 (2011).
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Court to accept its interpretations of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, but
many of its victories are taken away by Congress, which also reverses many
of the agency's defeats. While the IRS certainly has the ear of Congress, it
is not alone and is often countered by other institutions and interests,
including state and local governments. Although they work closely with
the agency, the tax-writing committees are not afraid of rebuffing the IRS.
Contrary to the 2007 Staudt study, which found congressional
overrides of tax decisions unrelated to general law reform,238 we find a
strong correlation. The large majority of tax overrides came in
comprehensive reform statutes that were not focused on the Supreme Court
but that overrode its decisions as part of a larger revision in the 1954 IRC or
in the operation of the IRS. The leading measures were the Tax Reform
Acts of 1976,239 1984,240 and 1986;241 the Small Business Job Protection
Act of 1996;242 the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act
of 1998;243 and the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002.2
44
These five law-reform statutes overrode more than twenty Supreme Court
tax decisions, the large majority of which had confirmed the IRS position.
Interestingly, the United States, either through the Treasury Department or
the IRS itself, supported roughly half of these overrides and opposed only
one-fifth, even though most tax-related overrides resulted in a victory for
the taxpayer. This result likely reflects the peculiar politics of the tax code:
Congress and the Executive Branch are both eager to show their support for
the taxpayer even while the federal government litigates against the
taxpayer in order to enforce the IRC. No other area of overrides exhibits as
much federal government support for overrides that would appear to make
the federal government's job more difficult.
5. Bankruptcy: Creditors Sometimes Trim Back the Fresh Start Policy
of the 1978 BRA.-Although there is no federal agency dominating
238. Staudt et al., supra note 3, at 1381.
239. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.)
(overriding eight Supreme Court decisions, all but one of which expansively approved the IRS's
authority).
240. Pub. L. No. 98-369, div. A, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) (overriding four Supreme Court decisions, two favoring the IRS and two favoring
taxpayers).
241. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) (overriding only one Supreme Court decision, but a big one, Gen. Util. & Operating Co. v.
Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935)).
242. Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) (overriding two Supreme Court tax decisions, both in ways that favored the IRS).
243. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) (overriding seven statutory decisions).
244. Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) (overriding one Supreme Court tax decision, which had favored the taxpayer).
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statutory policy the way the IRS does in the field of tax, the politics of
bankruptcy decision overrides are strikingly similar to the politics of tax
decision overrides. Like the 1954 IRC, the 1978 BRA forms the rock-solid
foundation for bankruptcy policy, but both superstatutes have been
periodically updated with comprehensive and balanced revisions that
provide some relief to creditors and some rules favoring debtors. Those
laws include the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,245 the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,246 and the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.247 The politics of
bankruptcy overrides are surprisingly balanced. Both financial institutions
(the main group we assigned as creditors) and debtors win a significant
number of cases, although debtors do slightly better as a result of the
generally liberal 1978 BRA.
6. Environmental Law, Transportation, Communications, Energy, and
Other Areas.-Another set of override statutes affects the regulatory regime
for a specific industry or economic sector, such as energy, transportation,
telecommunications, and environmental law.248 Although overrides in these
areas have often disapproved of a particular decision, 249 each such override
was frequently motivated by the need to update the regulatory paradigm as
a whole rather than to rebuke the Supreme Court. Thus the override of Fri
v. Sierra Club250 was part of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
Program enacted by the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments. 251 The overrides
of MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT& 2 52 and Louisiana Public
Service Commission v. FCC2 53 in the Telecommunications Act of 1996
were part of the total restructuring of communications regulation.254 Even
245. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.) (overriding five Supreme Court bankruptcy decisions).
246. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.)
(overriding one Supreme Court bankruptcy decision).
247. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.)
(overriding two Supreme Court bankruptcy decisions, which had favored creditor interests).
248. Although environmental law affects many industries, we include it here because the
critical override statutes in this area (the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act) disproportionately affect large industrial entities.
249. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), overridden by Endangered Species Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 7, 92 Stat. 3751, 3762 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 1540 (2012)).
250. 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
251. See Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685, 731-42 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7472-7479 (2006)).
252. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
253. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
254. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 47 U.S.C.).
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the override of Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,255 which corrected a narrow
preemption holding, was part of the sweeping Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986.256 The few instances in which Congress did
intervene to make a piecemeal change to one of these areas are notable
primarily for the override's limited application and predictable effects.
2 5 7
Notably, there have been no overrides in any of these subject areas since
1996.258
There are several possible explanations for this pattern, in which
Congress is relatively hesitant to enact one-off updating overrides to
complex regulatory schemes. The most simple explanation may be that
Congress hesitates to address these complex areas in a piecemeal fashion,
perhaps in part out of the entirely reasonable concern that addressing a
single provision might alter the rest of the complex scheme in ways that a
legislature struggles to anticipate.
Another possibility that we find even more useful is that many of these
industries are overseen by a federal agency, often one with broad
rulemaking authority, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), or the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). During litigation, the rulemaking
authority often results in the agency having a significant Chevron deference
advantage, meaning that the agencies governing these sectors are likely to
prevail before the Court, reducing the need for overrides. This phenomenon
seems especially likely in technically complex industries, such as energy or
communications.2 9  After litigation, the broad rulemaking authority
frequently afforded to these agencies may allow them to mitigate the
adverse effects of a decision without the need for new legislation. We find
this a particularly compelling explanation in the wake of the Court's
decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X
Internet Services, which held that an agency may effectively reverse
255. 475 U.S. 355 (1986).
256. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
257. For example, the Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, § 102,
106 Stat. 1505, 1505-07 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (2006)), overrode United States
Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992), which exempted federal facilities from
certain permitting requirements under state environmental laws, id. at 611. The override simply
required the government to comply with those permitting requirements. § 102, 106 Stat. at 1505-
07.
258. The sunset of the Interstate Commerce Commission provides an obvious explanation for
why there have been no overrides in the transportation area. The other areas, however, present a
more interesting puzzle, especially given the considerable public attention accorded to
communications, energy, and the environment.
259. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 49, at 1145 tbl.16 (reporting win rates in technical subject
areas, energy and transportation, are among the highest government win rates, 93.3% and 78.6%
respectively). But see id. (reporting that environmental regulation has a relatively low government
win rate of 68.4%).
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through rulemaking a judicial decision resolved at Chevron Step Two
(where judges defer to reasonable agency interpretations within their realm
of discretion) but not ones resolved at Chevron Step One (where judges
announce a rule of law binding on the agency and the population).
260
The litigation and postlitigation benefits accorded to an agency
overseeing one of these areas may reduce the urgency of an override,
allowing Congress to address the decision only when it has already taken up
comprehensive reform of the subject matter.
IV. Supreme Court Opinions Overridden
What features of a Supreme Court decision render it particularly
susceptible to an override? Perhaps surprisingly, there has been a shortage
of rigorous empirical studies to that effect. Focusing on Supreme Court
decisions whose subject matter fell under the jurisdiction of the
congressional judiciary committees during the period 1978-1984, the 1991
Eskridge study compared (1) characteristics of overridden decisions with
(2) those of decisions scrutinized by the committees but not overridden and
(3) those of decisions not scrutinized or overridden.2 61 The study reported
that overridden decisions were, relatively speaking, much more likely to be
nonunanimous and to reflect a close (5-4 or 6-3) and ideologically
identifiable division within the Court; more likely to have relied centrally
on a statute's plain meaning or the canons of construction; and more likely
to have been decided against the interests of local, state, and (especially)
federal governments.262
Also examining Supreme Court decisions subject to judiciary
committee review, Virginia Hettinger and Christopher Zorn's 2005 study
confirmed that decisions rejecting interpretations taken by the federal
government and including a dissenting opinion were significantly more
likely to be overridden.263 Most notably, they found no correlation between
divergent congressional and judicial preferences (e.g., conservative
Supreme Court decision rendered when Congress is dominated by liberals)
and the odds of an override.26
260. 545 U.S. 967, 980-83 (2005). As we shall explain in subpart VI(B), the Court in
Brand X acknowledged that agencies operating within the discretionary boundaries of Chevron are
sometimes not confined by judicial precedents handed down without the benefit of the agency's
views. Of course, the agency remains limited by judicial precedents that define the limits of its
discretion under Chevron.
261. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 350 tbl.8, 351 tbl.9.
262. Id. at 350 & n.41, 351. The study also found that women, racial minorities, and people
with disabilities were, relatively speaking, much better able to secure overrides than business or
even governmental institutions, but the numbers were too sniall to draw strong conclusions. See
id. at 351 tbl.9.
263. Hettinger & Zorn, supra note 3, at 22.
264. See id. at 19-21.
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Examining tax decisions subject to the jurisdiction of the congressional
tax and finance committees, the 2007 Staudt study reported modest effects
for media coverage and nonunanimous decisions: each renders a tax
decision more likely to be overridden.2 65 The big finding of the 2007 Staudt
study was that an invitation by the Court, explicitly urging Congress to take
up the statutory issue, was strongly and significantly correlated with a
statutory override.2 66 Lori Hausegger and Lawrence Baum's 1999 study
found that the Supreme Court is most likely to issue invitations for
overrides when the case generates a lot of amicus briefs, is of low interest to
the Justices, or when the result is one that some or all of the majority
Justices find objectionable or unjust.
267
Our study permits the most ambitious effort to date for creating a
model identifying the features of Supreme Court statutory decisions that
render them most likely candidates for a congressional override. Our
methodology is simple. We have coded overridden Supreme Court
decisions along a variety of dimensions, as reported in Appendix 2 to this
Article. We compared the data for the 275 overridden decisions with
comparable data for the 1,014 Supreme Court statutory decisions identified
and coded in the 2010 Raso & Eskridge study.268
Based upon previous studies and our own views, we focused on the
following variables and posed the following hypotheses:
o Division in the Court. Existing studies make it clear that
nonunanimous decisions are significantly more likely to generate
overrides, but results are less conclusive beyond that finding.
Hypothesis 1: Closely divided decisions (five- or six-Justice majority
or four-Justice plurality) are significantly more likely to be
overridden than unanimous or even lopsided decisions.
o United States Loses. The 1991 Eskridge study finding that the
Court's rejection of an interpretation set forth by the United States
made an override more likely is treated as the conventional
wisdom269 but has not been tested for the period after 1990.
Hypothesis 2: Decisions rejecting the statutory interpretation offered
265. See Staudt et al., supra note 3, at 1400 tbl.5.
266. Id. For an important theoretical model suggesting this result, see Spiller & Tiller, supra
note 3, at 503-05.
267. Hausegger & Baum, supra note 42, at 181-82.
268. We made two comparisons between our dataset and that in Raso & Eskridge. The first
was a comparison of all 275 decisions in our dataset with the 1,014 decisions in Raso & Eskridge.
The second was a comparison of only those decisions in our dataset handed down between 1984
and 2006 (inclusive), the same period covered by Raso & Eskridge. As the figures below will
demonstrate, the two comparisons do not differ markedly for any test we ran.
269. See BARNES, supra note 4, at 44 (inferring the increase in overrides has been caused at
least in part by congressional responses to groups, particularly governmental entities, displeased
with disadvantageous judicial decisions).
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by a federal agency are significantly more likely to be overridden
than decisions accepting agency interpretations.
* Amicus Brief Activity. The 2005 Hettinger and Zorn study found
ambiguous evidence as to whether amicus brief activity is positively
correlated with override activity. Hypothesis 3: The more amicus
briefs, the greater likelihood of an override, especially if the balance
of amicus briefs favored the party that lost the Supreme Court case.
e Congressional Versus Court Preferences. No study has found that
override activity is positively related to diverse congressional and
judicial preferences, measured in terms of the conventional political
indices, but no study has considered systematic institutional, rather
than raw political, preferences that differentiate Congress and the
Court. Although Congress has rotated between the two parties, its
relatively stable preference is proregulatory while the Court's
baseline has tended to be prolibertarian for the last two generations.
Hypothesis 4: Overrides are more likely to be of libertarian (i.e.,
antiregulatory) than nonlibertarian decisions, either overall or in
particular subject areas.
* Methodology of the Court. The 1991 Eskridge study found
decisions more likely to be overridden (1967-1990) if they followed
a plain meaning or textualist methodology. Hypothesis 5: Decisions
relying primarily on textualist canons are significantly more likely to
be overridden than decisions relying primarily on legislative context,
stare decisis, or deference to agency interpretations. As a corollary,
we also hypothesized that archtextualist Justices Scalia and, perhaps,
Thomas would lead the Court in writing decisions later overridden.
e Invitations to Override. All the studies assume, but none has
comprehensively tested, the thesis that an invitation to override
produces a significant bounce correlated with higher override
activity. Hypothesis 6: Majority decisions inviting Congress to
override the Court are significantly more likely to be overridden
than decisions without such an invitation.
We confirmed most of the hypotheses, as modified in the discussion
that follows. 27 0 As a general matter, Supreme Court statutory decisions
most likely to be overridden are ones where the decision attracted only five
or six Justices, where the Court rejected the interpretation offered by the
United States, where the Court found a plain meaning based in significant
part on whole act or whole code canons, and where one or more Justices
invited Congress to override its interpretation.
270. The main falsification went to the fun fact that Justices Scalia and Thomas were only
middle of the pack in terms of overrides; we were surprised at who led the pack. Can you guess?
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An excellent example of a decision ripe for override was the Court's
ruling in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.271 Rejecting the position offered
by the United States and the nuclear power industry, a closely divided Court
ruled that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 did not preempt state punitive
damages for a worker injured by power-plant recklessness. 272  A
complementary example was the Court's decision in West Virginia
University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,273 which interpreted the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Act of 1976 (itself an override statute) as not shifting fees
for expert witnesses to prevailing civil rights plaintiffs.274  Silkwood and
Casey were statutory decisions raising most of the "red flags" that increase
the odds of a congressional override-and indeed Congress overrode both
decisions within a few years.275 Consider the red flags in light of the data.
A. Closely Divided Court: Red Flag
One of the most widely accepted override variables is whether the
Court was unanimous in deciding the statutory issue. If the Court was
unanimous, that is a signal not only that the legal issue was one-sided but
also that lawyers from different political perspectives found the result
unproblematic. While Congress for its own reasons may choose to override
such decisions, it is not likely to do so in the short term: such overrides
would be harder to achieve and more costly to enact because they would
disrupt the settled rule of law.27 6 Figure 14 illustrates this point graphically:
compared with the general run of statutory cases decided by the Court
between 1984 and 2006, overridden decisions were significantly less likely
to be unanimous-unanimous decisions made up only 28.3% of the
decisions overridden (with a similar number, 28.8%, for the overrides
between 1984 and 2006, the period examined by Raso & Eskridge), but
those same decisions constituted 35% of the general set of statutory
decisions. This difference was statistically significant at the 95%
confidence level.
271. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
272. See id. at 249-50, 258.
273. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
274. See id. at 102.
275. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)) (overriding Casey); Price-Anderson Amendments Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-408, § 14, 102 Stat. 1066, 1078 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s))
(overriding Silkwood).
276. For this settled-law reason, the 2007 Staudt study found that Congress was much more













" Raso & Eskridge
" Christiansen & Eskridge (All)
* Christiansen & Eskridge (1984-2006)
We also expected to see a significant difference for closely divided
Courts. Silkwood, for example, was a 5-4 decision, with the four dissenters
arguing that the regulatory scheme of the Atomic Energy Act preempts state
punitive damages because they are inconsistent with the liability cap for
nuclear power plants.277  The close vote, and the fact that the dissenting
Justices included one judicial liberal (Justice Marshall), one conservative
(Chief Justice Burger), and two moderates (Justices Blackmun and Powell),
suggested much greater vulnerability than if the Court had voted 8-1 for the
same result. The political science literature suggests that a whistleblowing
dissent can get the attention of institutions with override authority, which
was the strategy followed by the Casey dissenters, also in a closely divided
278(6-3) vote on the merits.
The data lend stronger support to this hypothesis. Figure 15 reveals
the following progression: for Supreme Court decisions handed down
between 1965 and 2010, close decisions (defined as those with either five-
or six-Justice majorities or four-Justice pluralities) constituted 40% of all
Supreme Court cases. In contrast, close cases accounted for 49% of the
277. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 283 & n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting). There were two dissenting
opinions: one by Justice Blackmun joined by Justice Marshall, the other written by Justice Powell
and joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Marshall. Id. at 258, 274.
278. 499 U.S. at 115 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In the domain of statutory interpretation,
Congress is the master. It obviously has the power to correct our mistakes ....").
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overridden decisions and a whopping 63% of the restorative overrides for
decisions.






U 6-Justice Majority M 5-Justice Majority U 4-Justice Plurality
Notice here the contrast between restorative overrides and the rest of
our data set. Even for relatively recent Supreme Court decisions,
restorative overrides occur much more quickly than all others. As Table 5
shows, restorative overrides occurred in less than one-third of the time it
took to enact other overrides.
Table 5. Time Between Decision and Override for Restorative
Overrides




This result is not surprising. For the restorative overrides, the disfavored
Supreme Court decision provided a galvanizing moment for the affected





consequently had an incentive to act quickly in a way that was absent from
many other overrides, a large component of which were enacted in response
to changed circumstances many years after the decision.279 And because
many of these restorative overrides were disproportionately likely in
decisions that sharply divided the Court, as was the case for many of the
overrides in the 1991 CRA, the set of closely divided cases bears many of
the characteristics of its restorative-override subset.
B. Significant Amicus BriefActivity: No Red Flag
That a Supreme Court decision is a close case, legally, is often a clue
that it will stir up political interests as well. Another indication of
institutional interest in an issue is the presence of amicus briefs. Thus, we
coded each overridden decision to determine whether amicus briefs had
been filed, what institutions filed briefs, and whether briefs supporting the
losing position before the Court outnumbered the winning briefs. In
Silkwood, for example, there was some amicus activity, with five briefs
filed, including one for the Atomic Industrial Forum. 280 (In Casey, there
were two significant amicus briefs. 281) The significance of amicus briefs is
that the interests and institutions that lose a Supreme Court statutory case
not only have an incentive but are more likely than the average party to
have enough political clout to catch the attention of a congressional
committee.
Can the Silkwood point be generalized? There is no dataset for amicus
briefs filed before the Court, though everyone knows that such briefs have
proliferated like wildfire in the last generation. So we assembled our own
dataset of amicus briefs filed in every Supreme Court statutory case for
every fifth Term after 1965. Overall, the average case attracted 5.3 amicus
briefs while the overridden decisions averaged 3.5 amicus briefs. Of course
this reflects the fact that the overridden decisions were clustered in the
1970s and 1980s and the filing of amicus briefs has grown tremendously
throughout the 1990s and 2000s. To adjust for this phenomenon, we
created a weighted average 282 of our baseline data to reflect the distribution
279. Recall, for example, the consensus that eventually developed around the 1978 BRA. See
supra notes 193 97 and accompanying text.
280. Brief of the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance,
Silkwood, 464 U.S. 283 (No. 81-2159), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1571.
281. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of the
Respondents, Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (No. 89-994), 1990 WL 10022365; Brief of Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Casey, 499
U.S. 83 (No. 89-994), 1989 WL 1128056.
282. Specifically, we calculated the percentage of overrides in each decade (1970s, 1980s,
1990s, and 2000s; we ignored the pre-1970s overrides when amicus activity was relatively low)
and then weighted our baseline data by the measure for each corresponding decade. Thus if a
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of our overrides. The weighted average of the baseline data was 3.5 amicus
briefs. The difference between the average number of amicus briefs in
overrides and in our composite figure was far from statistically significant.
We repeated this analysis for the briefs supporting the winning party, the
losing party, and neither party. Again we found no statistically significant
difference. Thus, we conclude that the population of Supreme Court
decisions overridden by Congress does not look very much different from
the typical decision in terms of overall amicus activity. Figure 16 reports
these results by decade.
Figure 16. Number of
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In Silkwood, there were more amicus briefs and more amici on the side
of the prevailing party, Karen Silkwood's father, the tort plaintiff, than on
the side of the losing party, Kerr-Magee, the power company. In Casey,
there was one important amicus brief on each side.283  For overridden
decisions as a whole, there were, on average, more amicus briefs for the
losing party before the Court, but the margin was not statistically
significant. Again, we can make no generalization about the balance of
amici.
quarter of the overrides were in the 1970s, our composite weighted the 1970s baseline by 0.25.
We then added all the weighted averages to establish our composite figure.
283. One brief represented the views of the ACLU and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law-favoring fee shifting-and the other represented the views of the Equal
Employment Advisory Council, a business group opposed to fee shifting. See supra note 281.
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C. Federal Agency Position Loses: Red Flag
One of the amicus briefs that failed to persuade the Silkwood Court
was filed by the Solicitor General, who made a powerful submission
supporting preemption in that case.284  When the government's legal
arguments failed to carry the day, the government became a powerful ally
in the nuclear-power industry's campaign for an override. As we have seen
above, federal agency officials often generate override proposals, typically
participate in override deliberations, and enjoy an unparalleled record of
success in persuading Congress to enact override legislation. Hence, it is
no surprise that Supreme Court statutory decisions that reject the views of
the federal government, whether expressed as a party to the case or in an
amicus brief (as in Silkwood), are significantly more likely to be overridden
than statutory decisions that accept the views of the federal government.
When the federal government advances an interpretation before the
Supreme Court, it prevails almost 70% of the time.285 In the cases that are
ultimately overridden, however, the agency is a winner only about the half
the time, as Figure 17 reports.
284. See Brief for the United States as Amieus Curiae, Silkwood, 464 U.S. 283 (No. 81-2159),
1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 969.
285. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 49, at 1142 tbl.15 (finding a 68.8% overall win rate
across deference regimes). The Eskridge & Baer study ended in 2006, and we believe that the
Executive Branch's impressive win rate has apparently declined in recent Terms of the Court.
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Figure 17. Federal Government Success
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The federal government thus fared far worse before the Court in the
cases that led to overrides than in the general population of Supreme Court
statutory cases. And the government often succeeded in getting Congress
to overturn these disfavored results through the legislative process. Recall
Figure 13, which showed that the federal government was the main winner
in roughly three-quarters of overrides. This should come as no surprise
given our findings on the federal government's involvement in the override
process before Congress, 286 where it was by far the most involved
nonlegislative player.
Our data also reveal that this phenomenon was particularly acute for
the restorative overrides discussed in conjunction with Figure 15. The
federal government was the primary loser before the Court in two-thirds of
the cases in which it was affected that went on to become restorative
overrides (and nearly 60% of all restorative overrides). These overrides
were the most direct and forceful rejections of the Court in our study. Thus,
we conclude that a loss for the government is not only a red flag for an
override, but it may also be a red flag for an especially forceful override.
286. See supra Figure 12.
[Vol. 92:13171396
Congressional Overrides, 1967-2011
D. Court Narrows Government Regulation: Red Flag Except in Tax and
Intellectual Property Cases
Previous studies have not found an ideological component to
overrides. As Congress did in the 1991 CRA, which overrode Casey,287
most overrides do in fact move policy in a politically liberal direction. This
difference is slight, but statistically significant. The ideological split is
much more striking when we consider individual subject-matter areas.
Figure 18 breaks down the political valence of overrides by subject area and
thereby helps explain the variety we see in the overall data. Indeed, much
of the trend in the political valence of overrides is the result of the extreme
ideological disparity in two areas: federal jurisdiction and procedure and
civil rights. Remove these areas and not only does the statistical
significance disappear, but there are almost as many conservative overrides
as there are liberal.
Figure 18. Political Valence








M Liberal U Conservative U Mixed or Unclear
One generalization that emerges from Figure 18 is that "political"
valence is not so much the key variable as "regulatory" valence. Relative to
Congress, the Supreme Court tends toward libertarian, regulation-narrowing
interpretations of federal statutes across a wide variety of subject areas
which means defendant-friendlier constructions in cases pitting a variety of
persons and institutions against aggressive regulation. Thus, when the
287. See infra Appendix 1.
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Supreme Court sets precise statutory rules, there is a much greater tendency
for criminal defendants to get the benefit of the rule of lenity, prisoners
seeking habeas corpus to face fewer obstacles, employment discrimination
defendants to enjoy more defenses, civil defendants to avoid federal
jurisdiction, polluting firms to face less severe regulations, creditors to
enjoy more debt-collection rights in bankruptcy, and so forth. Conversely,
when Congress resets the statutory rules through an override, it tends to
support a more regulatory baseline than the Court had set. Figure 19
represents this point graphically.
Figure 19. Regulatory Valence
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In short, overrides share a familiar pattern. In many of the cases that
produce an override, the Court reaches a libertarian outcome, which
Congress supplants with a regulatory solution. Again, Casey is a classic
example-and Silkwood is exceptional in this respect, perhaps because it
does not fall within one of the main arenas for overrides. As before,
consider how the libertarian-regulatory dialectic between Court and
Congress plays out in different subject areas.
1. Criminal Law and Habeas Corpus. Congress Expands Punitive
Sanctions and Limits Prisoner Access to Courts.-Recall from our earlier
Figure 8 that criminal law decisions represent a slightly lower proportion of
overridden decisions than they do of the Court's statutory docket-but
when they are overridden, they follow a predictable pattern: the Court's
relatively libertarian positions are often overruled by law-and-order
overrides that reset the legal rule in favor of prosecutors and the state. The
1398 [Vol. 92:1317
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results are even more dramatic for habeas corpus overrides, all fifteen of
which went against prisoners, and in favor of prosecutors and the states, in
the period we studied (1967-2011). Furthermore, many of the
congressional responses in these areas overrode decisions where
prosecutors or prisons won the Supreme Court case and Congress revised
the point of law to narrow further the rights of criminal defendants and
prisoners. This is a breathtaking imbalance. Some of the imbalance can be
explained by the credibility of the Department of Justice and the dearth of
powerful interests opposing the Department when it seeks an override. We
suspect that more of the imbalance, however, is a feature of the popularity
of anticrime and antiprisoner measures in our political culture since 1967.
2. Civil Rights and Workplace: Congress Expands Employer
Liability.-Recall from Figure 8 that civil rights decisions are about the
same portion of overridden decisions as they are of the Court's statutory
docket-but when they are overridden, they too follow a predictable
pattern: overrides are disproportionately more likely to involve civil rights
and workplace decisions favoring defendant employers and state
institutions, such as Casey, than decisions favoring racial minorities,
women, and people with disabilities (the primary complainants). This is the
reverse-Carolene effect discussed earlier.288  Whether controlled by
conservative Republicans or liberal Democrats, or whether control is split,
Congress is more responsive to Carolene groups and women than the
Supreme Court is. One reason for this responsiveness is that the
Department of Justice and the EEOC tend to be supportive of minority
groups and women, but Congress is even more supportive over the long
haul, and the support has been bipartisan. The Civil Rights Act of 1991,
easily the most sweeping civil rights legislation covered in our study,
passed by a vote of 93 to 5 in the Senate289 and 381 to 38 in the House,
290
despite much more balanced numbers of Democrats and Republicans in
both chambers of Congress. 291 We surmise that our political culture has
reached a consensus that racial and disability minorities must be treated
fairly. And the culture seems to have reached a similar consensus with
respect to women, although that consensus is also supported by the obvious
288. See supra section III(E)(1).
289. Senate Vote on S. 1745 (102nd Congress): Civil Rights Act of 1991, GovTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/102-1991/s238.
290. House Vote on S. 1745 (102nd Congress): Civil Rights Act of 1991, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/102-1991/h386.
291. During the 102nd Congress, the Democrats controlled the Senate 56 to 44 and the House
267 to 167. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives: 1935-Present, HIST., ART &
ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-




political calculus that women are more than half the population and a
majority of voters.
3. Immigration: Congress Expands the Authority of Officials to
Exclude and Discipline Immigrants. -Recall from our earlier Figure 8 that
the percentage of immigration decisions in our override population is
slightly greater than its representation in the general population of Supreme
Court statutory decisions. Traditionally, immigration decisions favoring the
rights of immigrants are more likely to be overridden than decisions
favoring the government. This is consistent with the previous subject-
matter areas just discussed. Overall, the Supreme Court follows a
moderately libertarian path in criminal, workplace, and immigration
cases-and Congress usually responds with more regulation. The political
valence varies, with increased criminal and immigration regulation being
conservative and increased workplace regulation liberal, but for these three
areas each institution does follow a somewhat different approach to
regulation. Other areas of law do not follow this pattern, however.
4. Tax. Congress Often Gives Relief to Taxpayers. -Recall from
Figure 8 that the percentage of tax decisions in our override population is
much greater than its representation in the general population of Supreme
Court statutory decisions. And Figure 18 reveals that decisions favoring the
government are slightly more vulnerable to overrides than decisions
favoring taxpayers. This is one major area where the Court is more
regulatory and Congress more libertarian. (As a matter of political valence,
we coded tax decisions as liberal if the taxpayer won, conservative if the
government won.) Although Congress does sometimes override the Court
in order to address abusive tax shelters or to close loopholes opened up by a
particular holding,292 the majority of tax overrides either made it easier for
taxpayers to sue for a refund or extended favorable tax treatment to an asset
or expense. Note also that the agency involved, namely, the IRS, is
considered a powerhouse in policy and judicial circles but not in the media
and political circles, where it is a pifiata.293
5. Federal Jurisdiction and Civil Procedure: Congress Gives More
Power and Authority to Federal Judges.-Like tax and bankruptcy, the
percentage of civil jurisdiction and procedure decisions in our override
292. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121(b), 83 Stat. 487, 537-45
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 512 (2012)) (overriding Comm'r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563
(1965)).
293. Cf Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and Enhancing




population is very much greater than its representation in the general
population of Supreme Court statutory decisions. Reflecting the centuries-
old bias against expansive views of federal court authority, the Supreme
Court tends to interpret jurisdiction statutes narrowly-and Congress
typically responds with statutory expansions of federal jurisdiction and
judicial authority. With some caution, we characterize the Court's bias here
as libertarian and Congress's bias as regulatory because the existence of
federal jurisdiction typically entails additional opportunities for litigants,
like Karen Silkwood, who seek to impose duties on institutions, like the
Kerr-Mcgee Corporation.
As a matter of political valence, however, the statutes expanding
federal jurisdiction include both classically "liberal" and "conservative"
statutes. For example, the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 included
several overrides that expanded federal courts' ancillary jurisdiction,
making it easier to bring multiple claims or involve multiple plaintiffs in a
single lawsuit.294  In contrast, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
produced "conservative" outcomes by making it easier to remove class
actions from plaintiff-friendly state courts to federal courts thought to be
more skeptical of class litigation.295  Although both expanded the
jurisdiction of federal courts, the political motivations and regulatory
effects were very different.
6. Intellectual Property: Congress Often Curtails Intellectual
Property Rights.-Figure 18 suggests political balance in bankruptcy
overrides, one of the greatest areas for congressional override activity, but a
surprising imbalance for intellectual property cases. We coded intellectual
property cases as liberal if the rule narrowed intellectual property rights and
left more opportunities for the general public; the result was conservative if
it increased property protection. As Figure 18 reflects, override activity in
this area, as in tax, was deregulatory, in contrast to the pattern found for
criminal law, habeas corpus, workplace equality, and federal jurisdiction.
E. Hyper-Textualist Court Relies on Whole Act and Whole Code
Arguments: Red Flag
The 1991 Eskridge study found that Supreme Court decisions applying
a textualist methodology were most amply represented among the
population of override statutes.296 Although handed down too late to be
294. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
296. See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 351 (finding overridden decisions were more likely to
have relied on plain meaning or canons of construction arguments); accord Bussel, supra note
174, at 900-18 (finding textualist interpretations of bankruptcy statutes to be strongly susceptible
to overrides and criticizing the new textualism for derailing bankruptcy policy).
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included in the earlier study, Casey is an excellent example of this point:
the Court's "literalist" interpretation of the 1976 fee-shifting law was
assailed by the dissenters for missing Congress's purposes and policy
choices,2 97 and Congress swiftly overrode the decision. In some contrast,
the Court's methodology in Silkwood was far from "literalist." Ruling that
state punitive damages penalizing a nuclear power plant for reckless
endangerment of its workers were not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, the Court relied on its own precedents; 298 the statutory scheme
created by the 1954 Act and its amendments; 299 and the legislative history
and debates surrounding the amendments to the statute.300  The current
study finds that Silkwood is more representative of the override population
than has been previously understood.
It is important to note that plain meaning decisions will most often be
overridden because a large majority of Supreme Court statutory decisions
rely critically on the plain meaning of the statutory text. In previous
figures, we sought to provide a baseline for our override statistics through
comparison with the Raso & Eskridge data for statutory decisions from
1984 to 2006. As Figure 20 below illustrates, we found that the Supreme
Court relied on statutory plain meaning more than two-thirds of the time in
decisions later overridden, in contrast to just under three-fifths of the
decisions overall. 30 1 The modest differential accounted for in Figure 20 is
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. But as Figure 21
shows, the differential widens when we compare the overridden plain
meaning decisions for 1984-2006, the period covered by the Raso &
Eskridge data. This difference was also statistically significant, this time at
the 99% confidence level. In other words, during the ascendancy of Justice
Scalia's "new textualism," after Silkwood, textual plain meaning has
emerged as a significant indicator that a statutory decision is more prone to
an override. Casey is an example of that phenomenon.
297. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113-15 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
298. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248-50 (1984) (analyzing Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983)); see also id.
at 252 n.14 (relying on dicta in a landmark precedent, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), which sustained an amendment to the 1954 Act against
constitutional attack).
299. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249-52 (discussing the statutory history of the 1954 Act and its
amendments in 1957 and 1959).
300. Id. at 251-54, 255 & n. 16, 256 (discussing legislative history in depth, including Atomic
Energy Commission testimony that it did not believe state tort law to be preempted by the 1954
Act).
301. By "relied" we mean cases in which plain meaning was "a" or "the" determining factor
in reaching the Court's interpretation or cases in which the Court had a positive reaction to the
plain meaning when reaching its interpretation.
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No Reference Some Reference Genuine Positive "A" or "The"
Reaction Determining Factor
M Christiansen & Eskridge U Raso & Eskridge
Figures 22, 23, and 24 below report similar comparisons for Supreme
Court decisions, like Silkwood, that critically relied on legislative history,
statutory purpose, and stare decisis. We were particularly interested in the
cases in which a particular methodology was "a" or "the" determining
factor in the majority's decision. As Figures 22 through 24 show, all three
methodologies were "a" or "the" determining factor at a greater rate than
the mine-run of Supreme Court statutory cases. And these differences were
all statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Viewing Figures 22
No Reference Some Reference Genuine Positive "A" or "The"
Reaction Determining Factor
U Christiansen & Eskridge E Raso & Eskridge
Figure 21. Comparison of Cases Decided Between









through 24 together, moreover, we conclude that the typical decision that is
overridden enjoys a thicker reasoning process, with more evidence
assembled by the majority opinion, than for the typical Supreme Court
statutory decision-an outcome suggesting that the cases ultimately
overridden were more difficult than the average statutory interpretation
case.
Although Figures 20 and 21 make clear that the Court did not deploy
legislative purpose, legislative history, and stare decisis entirely to the
exclusion of plain meaning, the higher reliance on the latter three
interpretative methodologies in overridden cases suggests that the Court
may have felt the need to supplement its plain meaning analysis in some of
those cases. One interpretation of this phenomenon is that overrides may be
more likely in those "plain meaning" cases where the meaning is really not
so plain as the majority opinion might suggest.
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Figure 23. Comparison of All Cases
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Figure 24. Comparison of All Cases
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An interesting twist is provided by Figures 25 and 26 below. Only one
in ten Supreme Court statutory decisions critically relies on the whole act
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rule30 2 as a determining factor justifying an interpretation-but more than
four in ten overridden decisions, including Silkwood, critically rely on such
evidence.303 This is the most striking contrast we discovered. Only slightly
less dramatic, and still highly significant, was the contrast in decisions
relying on the whole code rule, of which Casey is the leading example.30 4
Roughly 8% of Supreme Court statutory decisions rely on the whole code
rule as "a" or "the" determining factor, but the whole code canon is "a" or
"the" determining factor in just under a quarter of Supreme Court
overrides.30 5 Both differences are statistically significant at the 99%
confidence level.
Together, these canons rest upon the assumption that Congress uses
terms consistently, whether within a single statute or across the entire U.S.
Code-an assumption ungrounded in congressional practice or even
congressional capabilities. 30 6  Moreover, neither canon is generally
considered as reliable as plain meaning or as perceptive as a key piece of
legislative history. The fact that decisions in which these canons are "a" or
"the" determining factor are disproportionately likely to be overridden may
suggest that the Court relies on these canons only when the more reliable
means of interpreting congressional intent produce no clear outcome-or at
least not the desired outcome.
302. The whole act rule supports an interpretation that is more consistent with the statutory
scheme as a whole or with other parts of a statute. Thus, if the Court interprets a term in one part
of the statute, it will pay attention to how that term is used elsewhere in the statute. See Abbe R.
Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REv. 901 (2013) (using
the whole act concept in this way).
303. See infra Figure 25.
304. The whole code rule supports an interpretation that is more consistent with the U.S.
Code. Thus, if the Court interprets a term in Statute 1, it will pay attention to how that term is
used in Statute 2 and to meaningful variations in Statute 3. See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v.
Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 87 & n.3, 88, 89 & n.4, 90, 91 & n.5, 92 (1991) (analyzing and comparing
uses of the terms "attorney's fees," "costs," and "expert witness fees" throughout the U.S. Code).
305. See infra Figure 26.
306. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 302, at 936-37 (asserting that while consistent
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Overall, our study concludes that methodology does not drive statutory
overrides as strongly as other factors. Supreme Court decisions later
overridden, like most Supreme Court statutory decisions, follow a
heterogeneous methodology-indeed, probably a thicker array of sources
than the average decision invokes. The variable that stands out the most is








scheme, or various whole act or whole code canons, it is much more likely
to be overridden. Again, both Silkwood (whole act) and Casey (whole
code) are excellent representatives of overridden decisions.
The 1991 Eskridge study considered textualist Justices like Antonin
Scalia the culprits for a lot of the override activity. As the author of
Casey,30 7 Justice Scalia might appear to be the ideal override object.
Examining forty-four years of data, however, we were surprised to learn
that the Justice most prone to write for the Court in statutory cases later
overridden by Congress was Byron White, a resolute centrist and (as it turns
out) the author of Silkwood.3°8 Figure 27 reports the results, normalized for
the number of years each Justice served on the Court.30 9 While liberal,
purpose-loving Justices Brennan and Marshall were near the top of the list,
conservative, textualist Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas were pretty
far down. Four of the other most overridden Justices were methodo-
logically eclectic centrists like Justice White (especially Justices Powell and
O'Connor). The dominance of centrists highlights an important take-home
point of our study: The large majority of overrides are routine policy-
updating changes and not the dramatic responses to highly charged cases
that dominate the headlines.
The relative paucity of overrides among the Justices appointed in the
1990s and 2000s may be more a function of the decline in overrides than
any of their judicial characteristics. As Part II of this Article explained,
overrides declined precipitously after 1998, likely explaining a significant
part of the decline in overridden opinions among more recent appointees.
Even though Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg were on the Court
during the Golden Age of overrides, they were all relatively junior and
therefore unlikely to be assigned to write the close cases, those with five-
and six-Justice majorities that make up a disproportionately high number of
overrides. 310 The prominence of Justice O'Connor as the author of over-
ridden decisions is all the more striking in comparison with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, for example.
307. 499 U.S. at 84.
308. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 240 (1984).
309. This figure includes only Justices who served their entire term during the period 1965-
2010 or who are currently sitting on the Court. Although the 1991 Eskridge study found overrides
before this period, we performed the Westlaw Keycite analysis for cases decided between 1965
and 2010. Thus to enable an apples-to-apples comparison, we have included only those Justices
for whom we have looked at committee reports and Westlaw Keycites. The only major author of
subsequently overridden decisions omitted by this limit is Justice William 0. Douglas, who during
his 37 years on Court wrote the opinion underlying nine overrides.
310. See supra Figure 15 and accompanying text.
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Figure 27. Number of Decisions
Overridden Per Year on the Court











F. Invitation to Override: Red Flag
Most political scientists who have written about overrides assume that
invitations from the Court or from dissenters will increase the odds of an
override, 31 and there can be no doubt this point has an intuitive appeal.
Thus, in Casey, the majority opinion noted the possibility for an override, 12
while the dissenters closed their assault on the Court's analysis with the
claim that in individual rights cases, judicial literalism constantly
misinterpreted statutes and imposed undue burdens on Congress, as it had
to spend scarce resources correcting the Court.313 It hardly seems a
coincidence that Casey was one of the most swiftly overridden Supreme
Court decisions in our nation's history.
Although we found suggestions that Congress might override the
Court's statutory interpretation as early as 1908,314 affirmative invitations
for Congress to override the Court did not become explicit and fairly
regular until the Warren Court (1953-1969). Direct as well as indirect
invitations for Congress to supplant the Court's interpretation flourished
311. See, e.g., Spiller & Tiller, supra note 3, at 503-04 (describing, generally, the process by
which the Court may insulate its decisions from congressional override and correlatively implying
that invitations to override are not so insulated).
312. 499 U.S. at 101 n.7.
313. See id. at 113-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
314. White-Smith Music Publ'y Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908) (suggesting that
policy arguments were better addressed to the Legislative, rather than Judicial, Branch); see also
FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 355 (1941) (suggesting that certain decisions with "far-
reaching" impact should be left to Congress).
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during the Burger Court (1969-1986), especially in the 1970s. The Court's
most famous override invitation came in the Snail Darter Case, TVA v. Hill,
where the majority opinion applied statutory plain meaning to halt
construction of a $100 million dam and positively implored Congress to
override its result, as did the dissenting opinion.315 Exactly as the Justices
expected, Congress did so quickly, creating an administrative process to
exempt particular federal projects from the absolute protections identified
by the Court.316 TVA v. Hill is something of a landmark for our study: it
was probably the most explicit plea for an override up to that point in the
Court's history.
The Snail Darter Case is also a model for override invitations: When
the Court majority, or a few Justices within the majority, do not like the
policy consequences flowing from a statutory interpretation they believe
compelled by the legal considerations, they acknowledge that fact and, with
varying degrees of explicitness, suggest that Congress might override the
Court's interpretation. Conversely, dissenting Justices very unhappy with
both the majority's result and its legal analysis might call for a
congressional correction, as the dissenters did in both TVA317 and Casey.318
How significant is this phenomenon? We coded all 275 overridden
Supreme Court statutory decisions to determine whether any Justice noted
the possibility of an override or invited Congress to override the Court's
interpretation. We were surprised to find a great deal of judicial prodding,
usually near the end of the decision. In one-third of the total, there was
some discussion of the possibility of a congressional correction in one or
more of the published opinions, and in roughly a fifth of the total, the
opinion for the Court or a concurring opinion (or both) explicitly invited
Congress to override its result. In slightly more than a tenth of the total, a
dissenting opinion either suggested the possibility or (typically) invited an
override of the majority's interpretation. Although concurrences may play
an important role in prodding Congress to act, we found that majority or
dissenting opinions imploring Congress were far more common. Figure 28
reports the breakdown of opinions imploring Congress for an override. All
told, in nearly one-third of the overridden decisions at least one member of
the Court addressed Congress's authority to override the point of law, and
roughly one-fifth expressly urged Congress to override the statutory
holding.
315. 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978); id. at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting).
316. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat.
3751, 3752-60 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012)). See generally Elizabeth
Garrett, The Story ofTVA v. Hill: Congress Has the Last Word, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
STORIEs 59 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al. eds., 2011).
317. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
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We were impressed as well as surprised by these high numbers. But
the critical question is how they compare with the typical Supreme Court
statutory interpretation decision. Again, we created a dataset for
comparison purposes. We followed a sampling methodology, examining all
statutory decisions for seven Supreme Court Terms, between 1960 and
2005.319 The difference is striking. Whereas 30% of the overridden
decisions either invited an override or discussed the possibility, less than
10% of the Court's statutory decisions in those seven Terms did so. More
important, one in five of the majority or concurring opinions in our
population of overridden decisions explicitly invited an override (i.e., they
did more than simply mention the possibility), while only one in fifty of the
nonoverridden decisions had an explicit invitation in a majority or
concurring opinion in the seven Terms that we surveyed. Stated another
way, there were very few override invitations (and almost none by a
majority opinion) among the Court's decisions in those seven Terms that
did not yield an override.
We also examined the force with which the Court implored Congress
to override its decision. As Figure 29 shows below, roughly half of the
opinions mentioning the possibility of an override invited Congress to
override the holding but did not go so far as to say that Congress
319. For purposes of determining override invitations that were both accepted and not acted
upon, we read every statutory decision for the following Terms of the Court: 2005, 1995, 1990,
1985, 1975, 1970, and 1960.
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necessarily should override the Court. This is where concurrences played
an important role. Although concurrences imploring Congress were far less
frequent, they were typically more aggressive; concurrences made up all
four opinions whose main point was to beseech Congress for an override.
Figure 29. The Extent to Which the








Court notes that Explicit invitation "A" main point is "The" main point is
Congress has the to Congress to that Congress that Congress
power to override override should override should override
An intriguing payoff of this approach comes when we compare our
"imploring" data with the time between the decision and the override.
When the majority or a concurrence issues a strong invitation for Congress
to override its decision (i.e., the three rightmost columns in Figure 29), the
average time between the decision and override is roughly 8.5 years320 as
opposed to nearly 11 years without an equivalent opinion imploring
Congress. When the dissent issues a similarly strong opinion the difference
is somewhat starker: 5.5 years versus just under 11. Although both
differences fell just shy of being statistically significant, they tend to
reinforce our intuition that a strong opinion from the Court beseeching
Congress to act tends to prod the Legislature into motion. Further
confirmation comes when we consider the median time to override. When
the majority or concurrence strongly implores Congress to act there is
almost no difference in the median time between the decision and the
override: roughly 4.5 years with such an opinion and without. But a very
different story emerges when the dissent strongly implores Congress to act.
320. In calculating the numbers in this paragraph, we excluded the Class Action Fairness
Act's override of Strawbridge and Chapman-the overrides of the nineteenth-century decisions-
neither of which had an imploring opinion.
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In those cases the median time between the decision and override is just 1.5
years as opposed to 5 years without a strong imploring opinion from the
dissent.
Of course, there may be other explanations here, and we stop short of
proclaiming a causal relationship. It may be that topics that produce strong
imploring dissents are high-salience issues that are already on the
congressional docket-although we note that the strong imploring dissents
are in a diverse set of subject areas 321 and not concentrated among a few
prompt congressional responses, such as the 1991 CRA (one of our initial
hypotheses). Nonetheless, we can confidently say that the story painted by
the time between the decision and the override is highly consistent with the
hypothesis that a dissent that strongly implores Congress to act (such as
Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Ledbetter) may catalyze a speedier
congressional response.
Having examined several characteristics among Supreme Court
statutory decisions that are overridden by Congress, we are prepared to
suggest a model for identifying decisions most likely to be overridden in a
given Term of the Court. Under this model, a statutory decision (1) by a
closely divided Court, (2) rejecting the views of a federal agency,
(3) finding a statutory plain meaning based upon the whole act or whole
code rules, (4) construing regulatory authority narrowly, and (5) accom-
panied by an invitation for Congress to respond is vastly more likely to be
overridden than an average statutory decision. A statutory decision handed
down (1) by a unanimous Court, (2) following the views of a federal
agency, (3) employing an eclectic and legislatively attentive methodology,
(4) applying a broad interpretation of Congress's or the agency's regulatory
authority, and (5) ignoring the possibility of a congressional override will
almost never be overridden in the short term and rarely in the long term
either. Silkwood waves three or perhaps four red flags, Casey waves five.
To be sure, that would not have guaranteed that either decision would have
been overridden, only that those decisions were much more likely to
generate overrides than the average Supreme Court decision. Under this
model, the Court's recent decision in Vance v. Ball State University,
furiously waving all five red flags (including an override-inviting dissent),
ought to be a prime candidate for an override. The failure of Congress to do
so in this decade will provide some confirmation that overrides have dried
up for the near future.
321. The twenty-five strong dissents were spread among ten primary subject-matter areas:
intellectual property, jurisdiction and procedure, bankruptcy, civil rights, criminal law and
procedure, banking, education, business regulation, immigration, and habeas corpus.
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V. What Are the Potential Values for Overrides? Do They Serve Those
Values?
Congressional overrides are expensive for the political system to pass
and implement, for they gobble up scarce congressional resources and they
may interfere with reliance interests based upon the overridden judicial
decisions. Do they serve valuable functions that might justify the costs?
The most obvious goal of overrides, democratic legitimacy, is a big one,
though not easily quantified. We demonstrate through examples that this is
a powerful role that overrides actually perform. A major policy decision
rendered by the democratically accountable Congress is more legitimate
than the same outcome handed down by the unelected Supreme Court. A
vast array of interest groups participates in the override process, seizing the
opportunity to be seen and heard before Congress. As explained in
Appendix 3, we coded each override to identify institutions and interest
groups that participated in the deliberative process before Congress. We
were deeply impressed at the diversity of interests represented and the level
of public participation in that process.
The override process also gives Congress an important opportunity to
update public policy to reflect current norms, to correct outdated
assumptions, and to address unforeseen problems. Even if it were
democratically legitimate for agencies and courts to make important policy
decisions, they often lack the expertise (especially judges) or resources to
improve upon established statutory policies. To be sure, statutory overrides
might make policy worse-they might be rent-seeking measures that
sacrifice the common good in favor of narrow private interests. The
judgments entailed in such evaluations are not easily subjected to empirical
methods, but our study demonstrates that for the vast majority of overrides
the committee(s) in charge of the statute expressed genuine public-
regarding goals for the new statute. And those committees usually
subjected the fit between ends and means to public scrutiny, soliciting
inputs from a range of constituencies.
Finally, overrides might contribute to rule of law values by creating
more clarity, predictability, and transparency in legal rules. Before
assembling and analyzing our data, we expected that overrides would on the
whole represent a "cost" rather than a "benefit" from the perspective of the
rule of law because overrides by their very nature change the statutory point
of law, potentially introducing ambiguities and unanticipated difficulties.
Nonetheless, we were surprised at how often overrides clarified confusing
rules and standards created by the Supreme Court and replaced the Court's
holdings with clearer legal regimes. As a caveat to this judgment, however,
we note that the effectuation of these rule of law values depends critically
on how courts apply new legislated rules. Although courts are sometimes
resistant, we found, on the whole, that judges faithfully implement those
rules and usually reach consensus as to their application.
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Perhaps no override better encapsulates these values than the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009.322 Nine years
earlier, the Supreme Court had ruled that the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) did not have the authority to regulate tobacco or tobacco products
and so invalidated the agency's rule barring the sale of tobacco products to
323minors. Although many academics, as well as ordinary citizens,
supported the FDA's move to protect public health generally and young
people in particular,324 the 2009 Tobacco Control Act was, in our view, an
even better regulatory regime. It was more democratically legitimate,
advanced a better mix of policies, and even created a clearer and more
workable legal regime than the one contemplated by the FDA. Those
considerable benefits suggest that many overrides represent an important
political contribution, both in theory and in practice.
A. Democratic Legitimacy
Every time the Supreme Court interprets a federal statute, the decision
impacts public policy; in the FDA Tobacco Case, the Court invalidated
rules against sales of cigarettes to minors.325 If Congress disagrees with the
Court's interpretation, however honestly arrived at, and if Congress passes
a statute implementing its preferred interpretation, the statute has a
legitimacy quotient that the Court's interpretation does not. Consider the
2009 Tobacco Control Act, which had the enormous virtue of reconciling
an aggressive regulation of tobacco products with the array of previous
tobacco-related statutes now considered too mild.32 6
As a formal matter, Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution provides a
process whereby Congress, with the President, creates federal statutes
327
that are entitled to supremacy under Article VI.328 That formal supremacy
has a functional feature as well. Article I, Section 7 requires that any
override legislation satisfy the House of Representatives, whose members
represent small districts and face the voters every two years, and the Senate,
322. Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
323. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000). See
generally Theodore W. Ruger, The Story of FDA v. Brown & Williamson: The Norm of Agency
Continuity, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES, supra note 316, at 334.
324. E.g., James T. O'Reilly, Tobacco and the Regulatory Earthquake: Why the FDA Will
Prevail After the Smoke Clears, 24 N. KY. L. REv. 509, 530 (1997); David C. Vladeck & John
Cary Sims, Why the Supreme Court Will Uphold Strict Controls on Tobacco Advertising, 22 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 651, 659-63 (1998); Allison M. Zieve, The FDA's Regulation of Tobacco Products,
51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 495 (1996).
325. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161.
326. See id. at 137-39, 143-56 (providing a detailed history of statutory regulation of
cigarettes).
327. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
328. Id. art. VI.
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whose members represent state-wide constituencies and have longer terms,
and the President (who has a conditional veto authority), who represents a
national constituency and is term-limited.329 This structure not only assures
that democratically elected and accountable officials must sign off on the
policy decisions of an override statute but also that officials with different
terms of office and representing different kinds of constituencies must sign
off. This is a process that invests an override statute with an exquisitely
democratic form of legitimacy.330
Any override statute that passes through the many Article I, Section 7
vetogates has a democratic as well as formal lawmaking legitimacy that
agency and court decisions cannot match. The 2009 Tobacco Control Act
was unusually robust in this respect, as tobacco regulation was an issue
espoused by Senator Barack Obama and his party during the 2008
presidential election. Only after Senator Obama was elected President and
his party won sweeping majorities in Congress did tobacco legislation
proceed through the legislative veto gates. Hence, there was a plebiscitary
feature to this override that renders it an exemplar for the legitimacy value
of overrides. That legitimacy was especially important in the tobacco
context; after all, Justice O'Connor's majority focused heavily on how the
FDA had upset the settled expectations of both Congress (as evidenced by
any number of statutes relying on assumptions that seemed to contradict the
FDA's actions) and important segments of the public.
Acutely aware of the "countermajoritarian" nature of its policy-
affecting statutory decisions, the Supreme Court tends to be cautious and
liberty-respecting when it interprets federal statutes. Hence, the Court's
decision in the FDA Tobacco Case is far from exceptional: as Part IV of our
study documents, the Court tends to underenforce statutory duties, and the
regulatory goals underlying them, when compared with Congress. 331 Thus,
the pattern we have uncovered in our forty-four-year survey is typically one
where the Court interprets a statute in a manner that some institutions and
329. Cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-59 (1983) (examining the requirements of
Article I, Section 7 and the legitimacy and democracy reinforcing values that Section embodies).
330. See generally Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the
Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119 (2011) (arguing
that democratic legitimacy is increased if the judiciary takes a more liberal approach to
determining congressional intent); Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE
L.J. 749 (1999) (detailing how political factors can affect the structural distribution of powers
among the branches).
331. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 111-40
(1994) (suggesting that liberal theories of statutory interpretation press the Court to underenforce
rather than overenforce statutory duties); Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of
Statutory Interpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative
Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767, 768 (1991) (outlining the differences between overenforcement
and underenforcement through the lens of the theory of legislative supremacy).
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political interests believe underenforces the statute, those institutions and
interests take their case to Congress, and Congress enacts an override law
that provides broader federal regulation than the Court decision found under
then-current law. As illustrated by the 2009 Tobacco Control Act, this is a
legitimate process that reflects a high degree of democratic input into and
accountability for the expansion of federal policy.
An additional reason the Court tends to underenforce statutory
purposes is that judges in our tradition follow statutory precedents. Stare
decisis helps protect against judicial usurpation of the policymaking
primacy of Congress and the President. It also respects public as well as
private reliance interests-but at the risk of policy stagnation. Overrides
are the safety valve that allows statutory policy to expand and adapt to new
circumstances, but with the imprimatur of the various electorates reflected
in the Article I, Section 7 process. Indeed, the Court has reasoned that the
possibility of congressional override justifies the stronger stare decisis
effect the Court says it gives to statutory precedents.332
The Supreme Court was not bound by precedent in the FDA Tobacco
Case, but some of the other overridden decisions did involve Supreme
Court decisions applying statutory precedents to deny regulatory solutions
to new problems.333 Indeed, the most (in)famous example of the super-
strong presumption of correctness the Court accords statutory precedents is
an example of the legitimacy benefits of the override process.
In 1922, the Supreme Court interpreted the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1891 to be inapplicable to professional baseball contests because its
business was not in "interstate commerce" (a jurisdictional requirement for
antitrust liability).334 After the business of baseball had grown significantly,
with pervasive interstate commercial features, the Court revisited the issue
332. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)
("Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here,
unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and
Congress remains free to alter what we have done.").
333. E.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5-6
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)) (overriding Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)); Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-259, § 3, 108 Stat. 694, 694-97 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248) (overriding Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, §§ 101, 113, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72, 1079 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § § 1981,
1988) (overriding Patterson, 491 U.S. 164, and W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83
(1991)).
334. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
209 (1922). This case was reaffirmed and applied to insulate the reserve clause from antitrust
scrutiny in Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (per curiam).
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in Flood v. Kuhn.335  Curt Flood, a beloved star player, challenged the
reserve clause, whereby baseball teams could trade players like baseball
cards. 336  The league objected to the lawsuit on grounds of the sport's
exemption from antitrust regulation.337 To the surprise of the pundits and
the everlasting amazement of law students, the Court reaffirmed the
exemption-even though the Court had refused to exempt any other
professional sport from the Sherman Act and recognized that the exemption
was at odds with both antitrust policy and modem views about the reach of
Congress's Commerce Clause power.338 A central concern of the Court was
that Congress had acquiesced in the longstanding exemption and, indeed,
had ignored pleas to terminate baseball's special treatment in favor of
legislation modestly expanding the exemption to other athletic endeavors.339
As odd a decision as it was, Flood v. Kuhn fits snugly within the
framework of our Article. Not only would overruling the earlier precedents
(exempting baseball) have been a policymaking move on the part of the
Court, but it would have been a big policy shift, requiring a complete
restructuring of contracts with major league baseball players and exposing
the owners to a wide array of antitrust lawsuits for price-fixing and market-
sharing. Indeed, as the majority opinion expressed poetically, major league
baseball had come of age under the protection of the antitrust exemption,
which had pervasively influenced its practices and perhaps even its appeal
as a popular part of our culture.34° Under those circumstances, the Court
insisted that only Congress could properly untangle generations of practice
under the umbrella of antitrust immunity.341 Although Congress took a
generation to respond, it did finally address the issue in the Curt Flood Act
of 1998, a narrow response which removed baseball's antitrust immunity
only for reserve clause issues.
342
As the 2009 Tobacco Control Act and the 1998 Curt Flood Act reflect,
the override process has particularly strong legitimacy advantages when the
335. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). See generally BRAD SNYDER, A WELL-PAID SLAVE: CURT
FLOOD'S FIGHT FOR FREE AGENCY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS (2006) (providing an absorbing
account of Flood v. Kuhn and its aftermath).
336. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 259 & n.1.
337. See id. at 282 (acknowledging the anomalous exemption for baseball).
338. See id. at 282-85.
339. See id. at 272-73, 281-82. For a skeptical analysis, see Stephen F. Ross, The Story of
Flood v. Kuhn: Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, At the Time, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
STORIES, supra note 316, at 36.
340. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 260-64. Justice White and Chief Justice Burger pointedly
refused to join that part of the Court's opinion, depriving it of a majority. Id. at 285.
341. See id. at 273-74, 277, 280-82, 284 (stating repeatedly that any remedy for the
anomalous treatment of baseball had to come from Congress); see also id. at 285-86 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (insisting that "it is time the Congress acted to solve this problem").
342. Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 3, 112 Stat. 2824, 2824-26 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2012)).
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federal government is called upon to make a big policy decision, especially
one that would unsettle strong and justified reliance interests. Even
agencies, operating under the eye of the President, are not considered
legitimate policy organs under such circumstances.343 Because coding
would have been unusually subjective, we do not try to quantify this
point-but we do offer a rather tentative quantification of another feature of
the legitimacy benefit of overrides.
To the formal and democratic legitimacy of overrides, compared with
judicial or even agency policy shifts, we add a third feature of legitimacy,
one that rests upon the open, deliberative, and pluralist process by which
statutes are supposed to be enacted. That is, a policy adopted after open
public debate, in which interested persons and institutions believe their
perspectives have been considered, is a more legitimate policy than one
adopted through a less open and less pluralist process.344  Examining a
sample of 100 overrides, political scientist Jeb Barnes found that most of
those overrides reflected precisely such a process. 345 To figure out whether
Professor Barnes's findings can be generalized, we coded each of our 286
override statutes based upon an examination of the committee reports and
hearings that preceded enactment of those overrides.346
To determine whether an override was "open" we reviewed the
committee reports to see whether the override's purpose and effects were
clearly articulated by the relevant committee(s). We reasoned that an
override is open when the members of Congress and other interested parties
are put on notice that Congress is contemplating a substantive change to
Supreme Court precedent, even where the report does not portray the law as
a response to a decision by the Court.
To determine whether an override was "deliberative" we examined
both the reports and hearings to see how thoroughly members of Congress,
the Executive Branch, and private parties identified and debated the costs
and benefits of the proposed override. Based on the level of debate, we
gave each override a score ranging from not deliberative (e.g., where a
single report identified that an override would affect a provision of the U.S.
Code) to highly deliberative (e.g., where the committee reports identified
the reasons for the override and interested groups testified on the wisdom of
the override in the committee hearings).
343. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 225, 231-32 (1994) (over-
turning an FCC rule that made a major, rather than "moderate," change in statutory policy).
344. Cf TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3-4 (1990) (theorizing that the more
legitimate and respect-worthy a law is perceived by the public, the more likely the public is to
adhere to the law's prescribed behavior).
345. BARNES, supra note 4, at 187.
346. This was a herculean process, quarterbacked by Christiansen and carried out primarily
by our research assistants Peter Chen, Jacob Victor, and Sam Thypin-Bermeo.
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Finally, to determine whether an override was "pluralist" we looked at
which of the affected groups testified on the override. Most overrides-
roughly 54%-were highly pluralist, generating testimony from both
supporters and opponents of the override. About one-third of the overrides
generated testimony from groups on one side of the debate, usually only
from supporters. And roughly 15% of the overrides did not produce
testimony from any of the affected groups. These were usually when the
override was a modest change contained in a large or complicated statute.347
Using these determinations, we then divided each override into one of
six categories based on whether it was open and the extent to which it was
deliberative and pluralist. Figure 30 below reports our findings. Although
an increasing number of federal statutes are adopted through a process that
involves party or interbranch "summits," and not the traditional committee
hearings and debate process, we found very few overrides that were not
open, deliberative, and pluralist. More than half the overrides were highly
open, deliberative, and pluralist, with their purposes and effects being
clearly identified and their costs and benefits being debated by both sides.
The next major group involved overrides that were "open" but less
deliberative and pluralist either because the costs and benefits were debated
less thoroughly or certain affected parties (almost always the losers) did not
participate in the hearings. Only a small minority of overrides-less than
10%--was not open and at least somewhat deliberative and pluralist.
347. For example, the override of Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975), was buried in the
hearings on the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2312(a), 95
Stat. 357, 853 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 606 (2006)). We found no testimony related to
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Unsurprisingly, the most high-profile overrides were also among the
most open, deliberative, and pluralist. In these instances, committee reports
clearly identified the override as a response to a specific Supreme Court
holding, and most, if not all, interested groups discussed the pros and cons
of the override at the hearings. Every override in the 1991 CRA, for
example, was open and all but two were also highly deliberative and
pluralist. But this category also included much lower profile overrides
scattered across subject areas such as civil procedure, tax, and bankruptcy.
At the other end of the spectrum, overrides involving crime control and
prisoners were disproportionately represented among the overrides we
found to be not open, deliberative, and pluralist. These included overrides
in AEDPA,3 48 the Crime Control Act of 1 9 9 0 ,349 the Controlled Substance
Act amendments of 1974,350 and all three overrides contained in the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.31' Although we were not surprised by this
348. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (2012)) (overriding Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987)).
349. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2509, 104 Stat. 4789, 4863 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663(a)) (overriding Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990)).
350. Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-481, § 2, 88 Stat. 1455, 1455 (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 321) (overriding Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653
(1974)).
351. Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. 8, §§ 803, 804(a)(5), 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-70 to -75
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28,42 U.S.C.) (overriding Denton v. Hemandez, 504
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last finding, given the results reported in Figures 11 and 12 (showing that
inmates and prisoners were frequently affected by overrides but almost
never testified), we nonetheless found it troubling insofar that a major
benefit of the override process is absent in statutes affecting an already
maligned segment of society.
Thus, the 2009 Tobacco Control Act is, again, representative, for it
was enacted only after thousands of pages of committee hearings across
several Congresses and with significant input from smokers and tobacco
companies, some of which ultimately supported the legislation. Indeed, we
found that both the Tobacco Control Act and the Curt Flood Act were open
and highly deliberative and pluralist. Because these overrides are
representative of the majority of the overrides we uncovered, this is further
evidence that overrides carry with them a large legitimacy bonus. Such a
finding has big implications for our doctrinal recommendations in the next
Part.
Stepping away from the data, we conclude this discussion with another
intangible legitimacy point. When all relevant interests and institutions are
consulted as part of the legislative process, the resulting statute is usually
going to represent a compromise. Many compromises will enhance the
legitimacy of the new policy. The 2009 Tobacco Control Act, for example,
cleared up a point that had troubled the Supreme Court in the FDA Tobacco
Case: If nicotine is a drug under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), and if science shows that tobacco products are always harmful
when used as intended (i.e., smoking), doesn't the FDA have to ban tobacco
products? The practical problem with a ban is that the (addicted) public
would not go along with it, generating some of the same difficulties
associated with Prohibition, such as evasion, criminal rings, and a loss of
respect for legal rules. Also bearing on legitimacy is the obvious problem,
identified by the Court,352 that Congress never envisioned that the FDCA
would be interpreted to prohibit use of tobacco. As part of the pluralistic
deal with at least some tobacco companies, the 2009 override provided that
the FDA cannot ban the sale of tobacco products altogether, nor can it
require a doctor's prescription to secure those products.353 This is the type
of deep compromise that best comes from the democratically accountable
branches of government. Had the Court engaged in a similar effort to
address these practical concerns, it would have been roundly, and rightly,
denounced for acting beyond the prerogative of the Judicial Branch.
U.S. 25 (1992); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992); and Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319 (1989)).
352. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 146-47 (2000).
353. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Sec. 101(b),




In our view, legitimacy is the most pervasive net benefit of statutory
overrides, and sometimes, as with the 2009 Tobacco Control Act, that
benefit is quite substantial. Another potential value overrides might serve is
to modernize statutory policy so that it better serves the purposes of
government. This might take many forms, including an updated solution to
collective action problems, advancement of public/community values,
removing inefficiencies (including discriminations) in the market and other
institutions, etc. Thus, the tobacco law sought to modernize our nation's
public health campaigns to include tobacco abuse, to educate the citizenry
about the dangers of smoking tobacco products, and to offset biases of
immature or addicted decision makers.354 These are worthy public-
regarding goals that had not, before 2009, been deeply reflected in the
statutes regulating tobacco.
355
Most of the overrides in our study are what might be considered retail-
level updates-congressional responses to particular issues. This includes
many of the famous overrides discussed here-including the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) Amendments of 1978, which overrode TVA v. Hill by
creating an administrative mechanism to recognize cost-benefit exceptions
to the endangered species protections for public projects. 356  This is an
excellent example of how overrides can create better policy. Almost no one
believed that the Court's rule (i.e., stop any public project that threatened
critical habitat for an endangered species) represented the best public
policy, and it was reasonable to think, as the Justices in the majority did,35 7
that a regime of judge-created exceptions would be unwieldy and would
generate too much litigation. By creating an administrative committee to
evaluate cost-benefit claims, the 1978 override produced a better policy
outcome than the judiciary ever could.358 In addressing this narrow issue, it
presented a retail fix, although one with potentially larger consequences.
The 2009 Tobacco Control Act exemplifies a more wholesale
approach, as it tackled a major public policy problem and created a
comprehensive new statutory structure for the regulation of tobacco
354. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 3, 123
Stat. 1776, 1781-82 (2009) (listing these aims as the Act's purpose).
355. The dominant regulatory approach was a mild disclosure regime mandated by the 1965
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and subsequent laws. See Brown & Williamson,
529 U.S. at 143-56. As the FDA reported in 1996, this was an ineffective regime. See id. at 134-
35.
356. See supra notes 315-16 and accompanying text.
357. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1978) (declining to create a special remedy for
the TVA and describing such an exercise as beyond judicial authority).
358. For a useful examination of the exemption process, see Jared des Rosiers, Note, The
Exemption Process Under the Endangered Species Act: How the "God Squad" Works and Why,
66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 825 (1991).
14232014]
Texas Law Review
products. Consider an even better example, the Bankruptcy Reform Act
(BRA) of 1978, which replaced the obsolete Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and its
encrusted case law with a more up-to-date set of integrated bankruptcy
rules.359 Unlike the 2009 Tobacco Control Act or the 1991 CRA, or the
1978 ESA Amendments, the purpose of the 1978 BRA was not to override
Supreme Court decisions-of the eleven overrides, only two were a direct
response to a Supreme Court decision. The many overrides in this
superstatute were by-products of Congress's systematic rethinking of
federal bankruptcy policy and of its creating a structure that would best
carry out that policy. Bankruptcy law has long been understood as a
mechanism to solve collective-action problems with debt collection,36 ° and
a major feature of the 1978 BRA was to make that process more efficient.
More than prior law, moreover, the new statute emphasized the fresh start
policy for debtors, allowing companies as well as individuals to restart their
economic lives relatively unencumbered after going through bankruptcy.
361
In addition to more efficient debt collection and wealth-maximizing debt
relief, the 1978 BRA also provided rules for debt adjustment that the
political culture felt were more equitable and justified by risk-spreading
precepts.362
Bankruptcy reform illustrates several of the different ways that
override statutes can update and improve public policy. Inspired by this
superstatute, our research assistants and one of us pored through the
committee reports for each override to determine which, if any, public
policy the sponsors represented that the override would advance. Among
the public policies were (1) solving collective-action problems (such as how
to regulate air pollution); (2) ameliorating market or institutional
inefficiencies; (3) advancing public values; (4) redistributing government
power to create a better regulatory regime; (5) redistributing resources or
orienting rules to protect ordinary persons or minorities; (6) redistributing
resources or orienting rules to benefit powerful groups or business; and
(7) creating new rules to prevent unfair or arbitrary action by the
government. Categories (1)-(5) and (7) represent public-regarding, wealth-
maximizing public policies, at least in aspiration. Category (6), classic
rent-seeking, is not wealth-maximizing for the population as a whole.
359. For background of the 1978 BRA and its reforms, see SKEEL, supra note 196, at 131-59.
360. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10-19 (1986);
Alan Schwartz, Essay, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807,
1807 (1998).
361. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 115 (6th ed. 2009); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1985).
362. See G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., The Three Faces of Bankruptcy Law 300-46 (Feb. 2014)
(unpublished J.D.S. dissertation, Yale Law School) (on file with author) (discussing the equity and
efficiency functions of modem debt-adjustment policies).
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Figure 31 below maps what we found-not only a legislative process that
was procedurally open and pluralistic, but also one that was substantively
focused on wealth-maximizing public policies.
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At least in aspiration, congressional overrides are public-regarding in
an impressive variety of ways. The devil, however, is in the actual
consequences of the overrides. And there we must confront the fact that
overrides enacted for assertedly public-regarding goals do not necessarily
advance the public interest. At the most general level, the ambitious
regulatory regime created by the 1978 BRA has been sharply criticized for
distracting bankruptcy policy away from what some critics believe to be its
only defensible goal, namely, efficient debt collection.3 63 If the critics are
363. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed, 109 YALE L.J. 343, 343
(1999) (critiquing bankruptcy reformers' focus on improving mandatory bankruptcy rules);
Schwartz, supra note 360, at 1810 ("[T]his Essay's... claim is that the better arguments hold that
bankruptcy systems should solve only the creditors' coordination problem."). Although we are
dubious that a pure contracting approach would be optimal for determining bankruptcy policy,
see, e.g., Brunstad, supra note 362, at 57-84 (criticizing Professor Schwartz's contract-based
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right about that, the 1978 law may have been a step backward in many
respects rather than an overall rational policy update. To be clear, we are
not persuaded by this criticism of the 1978 BRA, for we embrace the
notion, supported by a wide array of scholars, that debt relief and debt
adjustment policies can be wealth-maximizing, even when they sacrifice the
goal of efficient debt collection.
Moreover, the updating override must itself be applied by judges or,
sometimes, agencies--often the same institutions and players whom
Congress is overriding. As we report in more detail in the next subpart,
judges for the most part faithfully applied overrides to new problems, but
this is no guarantee that the well-motivated override in the hands of the
same judges who were overridden is going to yield better public policy.
And sometimes the override process misfires, not only wasting the
tremendous process and opportunity costs Congress incurred in passing the
statute but also creating bad public policy. Recall the 1978 override of TVA
v. Hill, which set up an administrative process to grant exemptions to ESA
obligations when justified by a cost-benefit analysis. 365 When the Tellico
Dam came before that process for evaluation, the Endangered Species
Committee created by the 1978 override refused to grant TVA the requested
exemption, on the ground that the value of the completed dam was not
nearly as high as TVA represented it to be.366 Members of Congress
representing Tennessee remained determined to see the dam completed and
secured a second override statute, specifically authorizing the dam's
367completion. In retrospect, the completed dam did not spell doom to the
endangered snail darter, which had a thriving habitat elsewhere and
graduated from the endangered species list in 1984, but neither did the dam
have the economic and other benefits its sponsors claimed.368 Overall, the
second override of TVA v. Hill was an example of rent-seeking legislation
and probably a modest waste of the taxpayers' money.
C. Rule of Law Values
Our assumption when we started this project was that the main value
of overrides would be democratic legitimacy, with many overrides also
improving or at least updating public policy. Recognizing the public value
of objective, easily determinable legal directives, we expected that over-
critique of bankruptcy reforms), we do not wade into the fierce normative debate among
bankruptcy scholars.
364. See, e.g., WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 361, at 895-96 (presenting arguments to
this effect).
365. See supra notes 315-16 and accompanying text.
366. See Garrett, supra note 316, at 85-88.
367. Id. at 88-89.
368. Id. at 89-90.
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rides would on the whole impose costs rather than benefits on the rule of
law. As it turns out, the matter is more complicated-and overrides
actually offer positive opportunities for the orderly evolution of clear and
helpful rules of law.
1. Rule of Law Benefits.-We coded all 286 override statutes to
determine what kind of rule the Supreme Court had devised and how that
compared with the rule Congress created in the override. The following
grid reflects the possibilities, crudely put:
Table 6. Rule of Law Possibilities When Supreme Court Opinions Are
Overridden
Supreme Court Rule = Supreme Court Rule =
Clear Muddy
Override Rule = (1) (2)
Clear Rule of Law Wash Rule of Law Benefits
from Override
Override Rule = (3) (4)
Muddy Rule of Law Costs from Rule of Law Wash
Override
Category 2 overrides represent a potential rule of law contribution of the
override process-and they were much more common than we expected.
Figure 32 below reports the superficial rule of law effects from an override.
Notice that nearly two-thirds of the overrides produced what we considered
a "clear" rule of law-and almost a quarter of the overrides replaced a
muddy Supreme Court rule with a clear override rule. Many of the
overrides falling into Category 2 were what we earlier called clarifying
overrides, where the main point of the override was to provide a rule of law
that the Court had not provided satisfactorily.
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Figure 32. Relationship Between








Unclear Category 1: Category 2: Category 3: Category 4:
Clear to Clear Muddy to Clear to Muddy to
Clear Muddy Muddy
Some of the clarifying overrides displaced decisions of evenly divided
Courts, and others displaced decisions where there was no Court majority
for a point of law.36 9 In United States v. Santos,37 ° the Court interpreted the
federal money laundering statute, which makes it a crime to use the
"proceeds" of criminal activity in otherwise legal business ventures.37' The
issue was whether the government had to prove the defendant was using the
"profits" of crime, as the defense lawyers argued, or just "receipts" from
criminal activities, as the government maintained. 372 The Court split 4-4 on
this issue, with the critical fifth Justice (Stevens) opining that "proceeds"
meant profits as applied to most cases but could mean receipts in cases
involving large-scale organized crime. 373 Although the Court was deeply
divided, the division did produce a point of law-but one that depended on
precisely what kind of enterprise was being prosecuted.374  Santos is an
excellent example of the rule of lenity in action, but the sometimes narrow,
sometimes broader interpretation was hard for prosecutors and lower court
369. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, § 327, 119 Stat. 23, 99-100 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2012)). Section 327
overrode Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004), in large part because there was no
majority opinion yielding a clear rule of law for bankruptcy courts to apply. See id. at 468.
370. 553 U.S. 507 (2008).
371. See id. at 510-11 (plurality opinion).
372. Id. at 514-19.
373. Id. at 524-28 (Stevens, J., concurring). Neither the government nor the defendant, nor
any appellate court, had endorsed this interpretation. Id. at 522-23 (plurality opinion).
374. See id. at 522-24.
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judges to apply. When Congress overrode Santos the next year, it adopted
the rule favored by the dissenters (and the government), which lower courts
have been relieved to apply in future cases.375
Santos saw Congress legislate the legal rule that federal prosecutors
had worked out to their satisfaction, a common phenomenon in our history
of overrides: criminal prosecutors have great success in securing overrides
of Supreme Court decisions denying them the defendant-grabbing, bright-
line rules they prefer. 376 This pattern shows up in civil legislation as well.
In Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 37 7 the Court ruled that immigration
authorities evaluating an application for refugee status might consider as
one factor whether the refugee had firmly resettled in a third country after
fleeing his country of persecution and before seeking asylum in the United
States. 378 The Court's flexible balancing approach was one that the agency
ultimately rejected by regulations in 1990, when it announced that firm
resettlement would simply bar asylum applications.379 Codifying the
agency's bright line rule, Congress formally overrode Yee Chien Woo
six years later (and a quarter-century after the Supreme Court's
interpretation).380
Yee Chien Woo reflects a large group of overrides whose rule of law
benefits derive in large part from Congress's decision to codify or reinstate
an agency's regime of rules that had been invalidated by the Court. A
dramatic illustration of this phenomenon involved social security disability
benefits for children; when awarding such benefits, the Social Security
375. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 2(f)(l)(B), 123
Stat. 1617, 1618 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9) (2012)); see also United States v.
Abdulwahab, 715 F.3d 521, 531 n.8 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that the 2009 override had created a
workable rule for money laundering prosecutions).
376. For example, when the Court overruled a statutory precedent, established by United
States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955), that prosecutors had been using for decades, the
Department of Justice persuaded Congress that the new Hubbard rule, Hubbard v. United States,
514 U.S. 695 (1995), was unworkable, and Congress simply reinstated the earlier precedent in the
False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-292, § 2, 110 Stat. 3459, 3459
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1001). A similar process of accommodating prosecutors and
providing clearer rules for lower courts occurred in Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386,
§ 1(a), 112 Stat. 3469, 3469-70 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), which overrode
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), and Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137
(1995); and in Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-325, § 411(c)(1), 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)),
which overrode Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
377. 402 U.S. 49 (1971).
378. Id. at 56.
379. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(2)(i)(B) (2014) (requiring the denial of asylum applications
filed before April 1, 1997, when the applicant had firmly resettled in a third country).
380. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-




Administration must determine whether the child's disability is comparable
to one that would prevent an adult from gainful economic activity.381  In
Sullivan v. Zebley,382 the Court invalidated agency regulations that
streamlined the determination along categorical lines; the Court ruled that
the Administration had to make individualized determinations.38 3 This was
a fair point, but Congress reinstated the agency's categorical approach in
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996.3s4 Although one might debate Congress's policy choice, making it
harder for the most vulnerable group in our society (i.e., disabled children)
to secure federal assistance, the override reduced the costs of administration
and instantiated a regime of rules that was easier for the agency to apply
and families to predict.
2. Rule of Law Costs.-Although two-thirds of the override provisions
were rules rather than standards, the remaining third were the latter. When
override standards replaced judicial rules, they imposed potential costs on
the rule of law. Typical is the 1998 override of United States v.
Brockamp.38 5  A unanimous Supreme Court flatly rejected any kind of
equitable exception for the three-year limitations period within which
386taxpayers can file for refunds. Responding to taxpayer outrage, Congress
created a tolling exception applicable when taxpayers are "financially
disabled."3 7 This strikes us as a less clear rule of law; it has offsetting
policy advantages, but the new standard represents a (modest) cost from a
rule of law perspective.
Most of the rule of law costs imposed by overrides are the result of
those overrides falling within Category 3 of Table 6. But a small cluster of
overrides imposed a different kind of rule of law cost because they
traversed constitutional limits. 388  The most dramatic example of this
381. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i) (defining disability for a person under the age of
eighteen using essentially the same language as for a person over the age of eighteen); 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.924a (2013) (setting forth the agency guidelines for determining disability for a person
under the age of eighteen).
382. 493 U.S. 521 (1990).
383. Id. at 539-41.
384. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 211(c), 110 Stat. 2105, 2189-90 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1382c (2006)); see also Colon v. Apfel, 133 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(recounting the statutory response to Sullivan v. Zebley).
385. 519 U.S. 347 (1997).
386. Id. at 352-54.
387. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, § 3202(a), 112 Stat. 685, 740-41 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6511 (h) (2012)).
388. For example, when Congress overrode Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236, 2387 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1), it not
only made the override retroactive but also authorized the reopening of judgments based upon a
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process arose out of the Bush-Cheney Administration's constitutional
activism in the post-9/1 1 War on Terror. The Administration's detention of
suspected terrorists in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, without hearings or reliable
determinations of enemy status, was subjected to habeas review by the
Court in Rasul v. Bush.389 Congress responded with the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005, which cut off habeas review for Guantanamo detainees. 390 In
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,39' the Court interpreted the habeas cutoff not to apply
to pending habeas petitions, which Congress immediately rejected in the
Military Commissions Act of 2006.392 Finally, in Boumediene v. Bush,393
the Court invalidated the abrogation of habeas corpus on the ground that
Congress acted outside the Suspension Clause authorization found in the
Constitution.394 The War on Terror habeas overrides imposed some of the
most important rule of law costs upon our system of any set of overrides in
this study.
Consider another example of the rule of law costs sometimes posed by
overrides. A regular, even if small, portion of the Supreme Court's docket
in the last generation has involved the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965."'5
Most of its provisions apply nationwide, but § 4(b) identifies a subset of
mostly southern states with traditions of low minority voting, and § 5
requires those jurisdictions to preclear any changes in their voting rules or
jurisdictions.396 Because the VRA has a sunset feature, Congress regularly
revisits the law, always reauthorizing it and expanding its ambit in some
Supreme Court opinion Congress considered erroneous. The Court invalidated the judgment-
reopening allowance in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217-18 (1995). Another
example is the 1974 override, Act of Aug. 7, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-368, § 5, 88 Stat. 420, 420-21
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g) (2006)), of Employees of the Department of Public
Health & Welfare of Missouri v. Department of Public Health & Welfare of Missouri, 411 U.S.
279 (1973), which was invalidated in Humenansky v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, 152
F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 1998) under the Eleventh Amendment and Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
389. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
390. Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. 10, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2739, 2741-42 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2241).
391. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
392. Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241).
393. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
394. Id. at 732-33.
395. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Court has repeatedly addressed constitutional issues
concerning the VRA, starting with South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), and
culminating in the 2013 showdown in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Even
more frequent has been the Court's restrictive interpretation of the VRA, to which Congress has
responded with overrides. See generally Kousser, supra note 162.
396. Voting Rights Act of 1965 §§ 4(b), 5, 79 Stat. at 438-39 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973b-1973c (2006)).
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way.397 The most recent renewal came in 2006.398 Witnesses told Congress
that minority voting in § 5 jurisdictions had approached or exceeded
national averages, yet Congress reauthorized § 4(b) without change and,
instead, expanded § 5,399 overriding a few mildly restrictive Supreme Court
decisions in the process.40 ° In Shelby County v. Holder,4°' a closely divided
Supreme Court invalidated § 4(b) on constitutional grounds and essentially
left § 5 unenforceable.40 2 One reason advanced by the Court for striking
down § 4(b) was Congress's unwillingness to revisit its long-outdated
formula, even as Congress eagerly overrode the Court's efforts to trim back
§5:
In 2006, Congress amended § 5 to prohibit laws that could have
favored [minority] groups but did not do so because of a
discriminatory purpose even though we had stated that such
broadening of § 5 coverage would "exacerbate the substantial
federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already exacts,
perhaps to the extent of raising concerns about § 5's
,,403constitutionality.
Another way of considering the rule of law effects of overrides is to
focus only on the effect the override had on the ultimate legal rule.
Figure 33 below reports the same data, but based only on its rule of law
costs and benefits-i.e., whether it clarified muddy rules, replaced clear
rules with muddy ones, or did not meaningfully alter the level of clarity in
the law.
397. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620.
398. Id. at 2621.
399. See id. at 2625-26 (summarizing the information garnered from witness testimony
during hearings in the House and explaining Congress's strengthening of the Act's remedies).
400. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 580-81
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c) (overriding two decisions).
401. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
402. Id. at 2648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
403. Id. at 2626-27 (majority opinion) (citation omitted) (quoting Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch.
Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000)).
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Figure 33. Ultimate Effect of the










Rule of Law Wash Rule of Law Benefit Rule of Law Cost
Although the overrides we studied generally produced clear rules,
404
they did not as a whole improve the clarity of the law. Indeed, as Figure 33
demonstrates, overrides imposed rule of law costs as often as they created
rule of law benefits. But while predictably it is an important feature, it is
not an end in itself. After all, the override of Zebley clarified the rule of
law, but at a high, and arguably unacceptable, social cost.405 And half of
the decisions overridden by the 1991 CRA replaced the Court's efforts to
establish clear legal rules with muddier standards, but ones that Congress
believed would more effectively remedy employment discrimination. For
example, it overrode the Court's clear holding in Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union416 that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which provides all persons the right
to "make and enforce contracts,, 40 7 does not prohibit racial discrimination
during the performance of the contract 4°8 with a rule that applies § 1981 to
"the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and
the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship. ' 4°9 The new extent of § 1981 may be harder to
404. See supra Figure 32.
405. See supra notes 383-84 and accompanying text.
406. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
407. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006).
408. 491 U.S. at 176-78.
409. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2006)).
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determine in the wake of the override, but it also, no doubt, better served
the goals of the 102nd Congress.
3. Implementation and the Rule of Law.-Homing in on the relative
clarity of the point of law, Figures 31 and 32 present a calculus that is too
simple, without further investigation. If judges are determined to create
exceptions, relatively clear override rules might not advance a predictable
rule of law, while under other circumstances, open-textured override rules
might do so-for example, where judges or agencies create detailed rules to
fill out the standards created by Congress. To address this issue, albeit in a
limited way, we examined published judicial opinions (easily searchable
through WestlawNext) interpreting the provision added or amended by each
of the 286 overrides in our study. For the large majority of overrides, we
found judicial cooperation in neutrally applying the new point of law and
only occasional disagreement among judges as to important points of law.
As we shall now explain, judicial and agency implementation made a big
difference in the rule of law impact of a fair number of our overrides.
We examined two different qualitative measures of how the judiciary
treated the new rule or standard provided by the override. First, we looked
at how courts applied the new provision(s). Did they apply the override
broadly, perhaps by extending it to cases and questions covered by
Congress's purpose in passing the override but that were not clearly
included in its text? Or did courts give the override a narrow application,
applying it to resolve only those cases similar to scenarios overruled in the
prior Supreme Court cases? Figure 34 reports our findings on how the
judiciary implemented the new override rules. Although an important set of
cases were given a surprisingly broad or narrow interpretation, the vast
majority (more than three-quarters of all overrides) were given what we
determined to be a "normal" application.
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Second, we examined the extent to which courts reached similar
interpretations of the override. Did courts generally apply the override in a
similar fashion, thereby reaching consensus about its meaning and effect?
Did courts initially disagree about the override's meaning but then settle
into a consistent interpretation? Or have courts continued to disagree about
how to apply the override? Figure 35 shows that courts immediately
reached a judicial consensus on the override's application for most
overrides and within five to ten years for the vast majority of overrides.
Indeed, courts reached judicial consensus on the application of the override
immediately for two-thirds of overrides and within five to ten years in a
staggering 99% of overrides for which there was adequate data to make a
determination-i.e., excluding overrides that have not been applied by a





Unclear/Too No Federal Judicial Judicial Ongoing
Early Court Opinions Consensus Dissensus, 5-10 Judicial
Years Dissensus
Thus, even when the override statute falls within Category 3 (i.e., it
transforms a clear rule into a muddy standard), the legal regime it creates
might still represent a predictable one if the implementing officials create a
detailed and precise regulatory regime. In Mahon v. Stowers,410 for
example, the Supreme Court unanimously held that nothing in the Packers
and Stockyards Act of 1921 gave livestock producers debt priority in a
bankrupt packing company as against the claims of the packer's secured
creditor.41' Mahon's simple rule (secured creditors come first) served the
rule of law quite well; when Congress overrode the point of law two years
later, it legislated a period in which packers were deemed to hold livestock
in trust for the producers, which gave the latter some protection in the event
of a packer's insolvency.412 Given the relative complexity of the new rule,
we placed the override in Category 3. The statutory point may have
advanced the public interest in a stable meat industry, as Congress claimed,
but apparently with some sacrifice in predictable legal rules.
When we examined the post-override history of the new provision,
however, our view about the rule of law effect changed. In the wake of the
410. 416 U.S. 100 (1974).
411. Id. at 111-14.
412. Act of Sept. 13, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-410, § 8, 90 Stat. 1249, 1251-52 (codified at 7
U.S.C. § 196 (2012)).





statute, the Department of Agriculture promulgated detailed regulations
setting forth the particular rules and procedures the parties needed to
follow. 4 13 Even though the override itself offered a set of standards in place
of the Court's bright-line rule, agency implementation turned the standards
into a set of clear rules.414 There were a number of examples where
Category 3 overrides did not undermine the clarity of a legal regime, partly
because an agency established a clear set of rules within the broad
parameters the override law had set.4 15
Of course, implementation has also sometimes had the opposite effect,
undermining the rule of law clarity and predictability of Category 2
overrides. An example comes from AEDPA, the 1996 habeas reform law.
In Vasquez v. Hillery,416 the Supreme Court had taken an equitable
approach to the timing of state habeas petitions,41 7 to which Congress
responded with a provision in AEDPA that set a limitations period of one
year, with a minor exception, for such petitions.41 8 In the next fifteen years,
almost every court of appeals recognized an equitable tolling exception to
the limitations period, an interpretation ratified by the Supreme Court in
2010.4 " Although the override rule remained the presumptive limitation
period, the judiciary, for standard due process reasons, transformed a clear
bright-line rule into a presumptive rule with a hard-to-determine equitable
exception. 42 While Congress enacted AEDPA in order to substitute stricter
congressional rules for softer Supreme Court rules or standards, the
413. See 9 C.F.R. § 201 (2014).
414. See First State Bank of Miami v. Gotham Provision Co. (In re Gotham Provision Co.),
669 F.2d 1000, 1006-07 (5th Cir. 1982) (following Department of Agriculture regulations).
415. For another example, the Court's decision in U.S. Department of Transportation v.
Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597 (1986), ruled that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
prohibiting discrimination against disabled individuals in programs and activities receiving federal
funds, did not extend to commercial air carriers. Id. at 599, 610-13. Congress provided an
antidiscrimination rule in the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2006)), a classic example of a rule replaced by a
standard. But the Department of Transportation gave rule of law teeth to that standard through
detailed rules it developed to guide carriers and their passengers. See Gilstrap v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 709 F.3d 995, 999-1002 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing the duties air carriers now owe disabled
passengers, the training required for personnel, and the administrative enforcement mechanisms,
including investigatory hearings and fines).
416. 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
417. See id. at 264-65.
418. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 101, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d) (2012)).
419. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010).
420. See id. at 654-55 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (objecting
that the majority's equitable exception is too broad); id. at 660, 671 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(objecting to any exceptions beyond the ones adopted on the face of the override provision and




judiciary has the chief responsibility for applying the AEDPA rules and has
done so in light of equitable or constitutional principles that have repeatedly
introduced equitable exceptions to those bright-line statutory rules.42'
The same process has accompanied Congress's override of some of the
Court's prison reform cases in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of
1995, part of the same omnibus statute as AEDPA. PLRA's purpose was to
purge the federal courts of excessive (i.e., frivolous or intrusive) prison
reform lawsuits; 422 this was perhaps a harsh purpose, but one that judges
have ameliorated in practice. For example, the PLRA overrode a Supreme
Court decision that required lower courts to treat informa pauperis (usually
pro se) prisoner complaints leniently; the override imposed a rule requiring
dismissal of complaints that do not clearly state a legal basis for relief.423 In
practice, however, many federal judges have routinely allowed prisoners
leave to amend their faulty complaints.424 This all but restores the
overridden regime in those circuits and creates a disagreement among the
circuits, which the Supreme Court has not addressed. Indeed, the Supreme
Court itself has interpreted the PLRA narrowly, sustaining intrusive federal
remedies a majority of the Justices believed necessary to protect the Eighth
Amendment rights of inmates.425
Overall, as the gentle reader can see, one cannot say what the net rule
of law effects are for the general run of congressional overrides. Our only
goal here is to demonstrate that overrides do have potential rule of law
benefits, that the actual rule of law effect depends on the process of
implementation, and that the rule of law consequences (including costs)
421. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 433-34 (2000) (narrow interpretation of
AEDPA § 104); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644 (1998) (undertaking a
precedent-based application of AEDPA § 105); United States v. Shipp, 589 F.3d 1084, 1087-88
(10th Cir. 2009) (allowing statutory issues to be certified for habeas appeal based on due process
precepts and notwithstanding AEDPA § 102); Noble v. Kelly, 246 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2001)
(narrowing construction of AEDPA § 104); Rogers v. Artuz, 524 F. Supp. 2d 193, 200-01
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (reporting that circuit courts have narrowly construed AEDPA § 102, which
limited certificates of appeal in habeas cases); see also Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 89, at 2-3
(predicting, quite accurately, that the judiciary would take some of the edge off of AEDPA's hard
rules).
422. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002).
423. Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 804(a)(5), 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-74 (1996) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)) (overriding Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)).
424. E.g., Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding the case to the
district court in order to give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint).
425. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011), for an intense debate among the Justices as
to the interpretation of the PLRA (as well as of the Eighth Amendment). See, e.g., id. at 1951
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he mere existence of [an] inadequate system does not subject to cruel
and unusual punishment the entire prison population in need of medical care .... "); id. at 1959




include the broader operation of constitutional review as well as more
routine statutory implementation.
VI. Doctrinal and Institutional Implications
Our data and normative analysis support a robust role for statutory
overrides in American public law. In the republic of statutes in which we
live, it is remarkable and admirable that Congress follows Supreme Court
decisions interpreting federal statutes (and superstatutes) and responds to
many of them with overrides and codifications. Ours is the first large-scale
empirical roadmap for how the congressional override process actually
works. In this Part, we consider the implications of our findings for each of
the three branches of the federal government (i.e., Congress, the Executive
Branch, and the Supreme Court). At the meta-level, our findings and
analysis suggest the need for major revisions in how scholars think about
the three branches of government, especially the Supreme Court. In the
Conclusion that follows, we modify those implications if it turns out that
the decline of overrides is a permanent phenomenon.
A. The Role of Congress and Mechanisms to Render Statutory Overrides
More Effective
Most academic articles in the field of legislation, including most of the
articles by one of the authors of this Article, focus entirely on the Supreme
Court and judges. At the behest of scholars such as Peter Strauss and Jerry
Mashaw,426 more articles in the last generation have discussed statutory
interpretation by agencies and responses to agency interpretations. But, to
this day, few articles have anything much to say to Congress. Given the
central role that Congress plays in the field of legislation, this phenomenon
is bizarre. A major reason Congress does not play more of a role in the
field is that very few legislation professors have served in Congress.
Neither have we, but we do believe that Congress ought to be an important
audience for our findings.
Indeed, it really should be the most important audience. That
Congress frequently overrides Supreme Court statutory interpretation
426. See generally, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference:
A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADM1N. L. REV. 501 (2005)
(posing and exploring numerous questions about agency statutory interpretation post-Chevron);
Peter L. Strauss, Essay, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and
"Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012) (arguing for conceptions of the seminal
cases that account for "Chevron space" as an area of authority for agencies to make rules and
"Skidmore weight" as describing situations in which courts should yield to agency statutory
interpretation); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093 (1987) (theorizing that in the absence of frequent Supreme Court review, agency statutory
interpretation is a mechanism for uniform national rules).
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decisions ought not to surprise most members of the House and Senate
judiciary committees and their staff, but many other important participants
in the nation's legislature would be surprised at the significant role
overrides play in the evolution of statutory policy for so many areas of
regulation. And many participants would be surprised at how swiftly and
dramatically the policy-updating override process dried up after President
Clinton's impeachment.
1. Process for Override Certifications.-Almost a hundred years ago,
Judge Cardozo proposed the creation of a Ministry of Justice to advise the
Legislature regarding law-reform ideas that ought to be considered.427 "The
duty must be cast on some man or group of men to watch the law in action,
observe the manner of its functioning, and report the changes needed when
function is deranged. ''421 Within fifteen years of Cardozo's proposal, New
Jersey, California, and New York had created Law Revision Commissions
to advise their legislatures of areas of law in need of updating. 429 The idea
never caught on at the national level, and there is little interest in Congress
(so far as we are aware) to set up such a commission or ministry.43°
Administratively, however, Cardozo's Ministry of Justice has been
replicated within the Executive Branch. Thus, the Department of Justice
has an Office of Legislative Affairs; the Treasury and other departments
431have similar offices. In the Department of Justice, for example, any
official may propose consideration of override legislation; such proposals
are discussed within the Department and, if pressed, are subject to an
interagency review process quarterbacked by the White House's Office of
Management and Budget.432  Proposals passing this extensive
administrative review process are presented to the relevant congressional
427. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REV. 113, 123-25 (1921).
428. Id. at 114.
429. See Dominick Vetri, Communicating Between Planets: Law Reform for the Twenty-First
Century, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 169, 174, 175 & n.25 (1998).
430. Judge Katzmann has been developing a more modest process by which lower courts
refer statutory issues to congressional committees, mainly to inform them of issues relevant to
statutory drafting. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript ch. 6) (on file with author); Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Be-
tween Courts and Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 656-57
(1992).
431. About the Office, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST., http://www
.justice.gov/ola/ (last updated Apr. 2013) (describing the duties of the Office, including generating
and defending legislative proposals); Legislative Affairs, About, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Legislative-Affairs.aspx
(last updated Feb. 28, 2014) (same for the Treasury Department).
432. Our understanding of the Department of Justice process is based upon communications
with departmental officials and congressional staff who have coordinated with those officials.
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committees, which have traditionally taken them very seriously, as
documented in our own study.
Because the Department of Justice and federal agencies participate in a
large majority of the Supreme Court's statutory cases as well as Congress's
overrides, the Executive Branch is already an effective participant in the
override process. The feedback loop of judicial decisions-executive
proposals-congressional overrides does not operate effectively when there
is acrimony between the President and Congress, however. One lesson of
our present study is that the Supreme Court is an underutilized institution
for bringing Congress's attention to override possibilities. Recall our
finding that Supreme Court decisions suggesting the need for an override
have been highly correlated with overrides (until the recent override
drought). The Justices have deep knowledge of the difficult statutory issues
and often have strong personal interest in engaging Congress to override
interpretations they regret having to reach (as in TVA v. Hill).
This process can be regularized, and overrides encouraged as well as
facilitated, if Congress were to create a statutory certification process. The
proposal would entail three stages: (1) Six or more Justices in a statutory
case certify the issue to the appropriate substantive committees in
Congress.433 (2) If the substantive committees declined to act on the
certified proposal, it would die. But if either committee reports the
proposal to the chamber, the report triggers a fast-track process for the
override legislation in that chamber. With a positive report, the override
proposal would receive priority consideration, with an expeditious vote.
(3) The override proposal would become law only if both chambers voted
in favor of the same statutory language, and the President signed it (or it
was passed over a presidential veto). While any role in the law revision
process might seem to be a major change for the Court, our suggestion is
less revolutionary than it appears. Recall that a vastly disproportionate
number of overrides occur in cases where one or more Justices implore
Congress to act and that these overrides tend to come more quickly than
other overrides, especially when a dissent loudly proclaims the need for
congressional action. 34 Our proposal would give structure to these
tendencies-structure that we believe is sorely needed in the face of the
steep decline in policy-updating overrides that we have documented.
433. There might be a concern that a certification process would represent an intrusion into
Congress's ability to set its own agenda. See Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the
Canons, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1389, 1409-10 (2005) (raising this concern for judicial canons
pushing Congress to override the Court). But the requirement of a supermajority on the Court
would prevent merely partisan matters from being sent to Congress. More important, the fact that
neither the House nor the Senate would have to fast-track any proposal not reported out of
committee assures Congress that its agenda will not be hijacked by the Justices.
434. See supra Figure 29 and accompanying text.
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Even if adopted by Congress, such a certification process would hardly
be a panacea, but it would contribute to a more efficient override process.
As we have seen in this study, the Justices themselves often see a conflict
between the rule of law and good policy, so they have informational
advantages. And the Court is properly motivated because it has an
institutional interest in passing controversial policy moves to the political
process.
2. The Lilly Ledbetter Problem of Judicial Resistance to Restorative
Overrides.-Interestingly, restorative overrides have not dried up nearly as
dramatically as policy-updating overrides. Restorative overrides pose a
different dilemma for Congress, one to which legal academics might have
something to contribute. We call it the "Lilly Ledbetter problem," after a
recent Supreme Court decision. In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., the Court ruled that women complaining of unequal pay under Title
VII had to file their claim 180 or 300 days (depending on the state) after the
first paycheck reflecting unequal pay-a difficult requirement for most
complainants to meet because they did not have ready access to comparable
pay information for male employees.435
The majority opinion relied on the Court's earlier decision, Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies, Inc.,436 which had imposed a similarly hard limitation
on female employees complaining about the imposition of new seniority
rules that they claimed were tainted by discriminatory intent: the Court
ruled that they had to file an EEOC charge 180 or 300 days after the new
seniority rules took effect.437 In Ledbetter, Justice Ginsburg's dissenting
opinion complained that Congress had overridden Lorance in the 1991
CRA based upon Congress's finding that Lorance was a faithless
interpretation of Title VII and that another line of more permissive
precedents should have been the Court's guide.438 Yet the Ledbetter
majority not only persisted in its reliance on Lorance-but added that the
override confirmed the futility of Lilly Ledbetter's claim. 439  That is,
Congress in 1991 amended Title VII to provide a more permissive
limitations period only for seniority claims and not for all sex or race
discrimination claims-thus confirming Lorance's viability for all other
kinds of Title VII claims.440
435. See 550 U.S. 618, 623-24, 628-29 (2007).
436. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
437. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 626-27 (summarizing Lorance).
438. Id. at 652-54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).




Red flags were flying all around the Court the day Ledbetter was
handed down: the decision divided the Court 5-4, narrowed a regulatory
scheme in an important way, disadvantaged a politically potent group
(working women), rejected the longstanding position of the EEOC,44 '
followed a plain meaning and whole code approach that denigrated
legislative history arguments, and generated a plea for an override from the
442 4four dissenting Justices. As advocated in Justice Ginsburg's dissent," 3
Congress swiftly and angrily overrode Ledbetter in the first statute enacted
during the Obama Administration. 4
The Lilly Ledbetter problem is that restorative overrides usually do not
accomplish as much as Congress expects them to accomplish: when
Congress corrects a disapproved Court rule with new statutory language,
not only does the Court continue to apply the disapproved precedent (albeit
not to the situations covered by the new statutory language), but the Court
sometimes, as in Ledbetter, relies on the override as confirmation that the
narrow rule applies everywhere outside of the narrow arena carved out by
the override language.445 Professor Widiss has documented that the Lilly
Ledbetter problem is a recurring one,4 6 though we would add that it is
largely confined to restorative overrides and finds as its most dramatic
illustrations workplace discrimination controversies that have proven highly
polarizing within both the Court and Congress.
Professor Widiss urges the Supreme Court to reconsider what she
argues is a misguided approach to statutory interpretation in cases like
Ledbetter.447 What we contribute to her argument is the normative point
that the 1991 CRA represented an important moment in American statutory
law, for a Democrat-controlled Congress and the GOP President joined to
441. Ledbetter rejected the EEOC's understanding of when charges need to be filed with that
agency, id. at 655-66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)-but the Solicitor General also rejected the
EEOC's views and filed an amicus brief supporting Goodyear, Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618 (No. 05-1074).
442. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 643, 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating, in an opinion joined
by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, that "[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress' court").
443. Id
444. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 2009,
http://wwwnytimes.com/2009/0 1/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html.
445. See supra notes 439-40 and accompanying text. For another example of the Court
construing a statute in this way, with arguably even more perverse results, see Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174-76 (2009), where the Court read the ADEA less liberally than
Title VII, followed the overridden decision, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989),
and adopted the reasoning of the dissenters, see id. at 281-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), whose
approach was even more distant from that approved by Congress.
446. See Widiss, supra note 42, at 549 & n. 175 (providing cases in which Price Waterhouse
was applied as a "shadow precedent"); Widiss, supra note 4, at 860-62 (discussing Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc.).
447. See Widiss, supra note 42, at 515-17.
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support legislation crafted in an open, fact-based, and pluralistic process
that repudiated the Court's treatment of Title VII cases. The democratic
legitimacy of the 1991 override ought to have contributed something more
than the Court majority recognized in Ledbetter. But our admonitions to
the majority Justices will not necessarily affect their votes in the next
Ledbetter-like case.448
When Congress revamps whole areas of law in a relatively
nonpoliticized manner, as it did in the 1978 BRA and the 1976 Copyrights
Act,449 the Supreme Court has been pretty cooperative when implementing
the congressional plan, as well as the particular rules of law inserted into
the U.S. Code. The Lilly Ledbetter problem has arisen when a libertarian
Court majority confronts a relatively partisan restorative override that
changes particular rules in a proregulatory direction but without rethinking
the general plan of the statute or of similar provisions in other statutes.
There are three conditions undergirding the Lilly Ledbetter problem: (1) the
issue is a partisan and politicized one; (2) a Court majority is libertarian on
that issue, for a variety of reasons; and (3) Congress expands a particular
regulatory rule, but without revising the statute or other statutes more
broadly.
There is nothing that Congress can do about condition (1).
Theoretically, Congress has political weapons at its disposal to address
condition (2), such as budgetary pressure on the judiciary. Although it is
rare for Congress to exert direct budgetary or other political pressure on the
independent judiciary, Professor Ferejohn and Dean Kramer have argued,
persuasively in our view, that the cooperation required from the political
branches does exercise some overall constraint on the Supreme Court's
willingness to thwart Congress in big ways. 450  The Lilly Ledbetter
problem, however, does not rise to this level of Court-Congress conflict.
The Lilly Ledbetter problem is one that Congress might better address
when it adopts override legislation (assuming an override is politically
possible). When a political coalition is working on legislation to override
the Court and restore what it believes was always the proper rule of law,
there need to be mechanisms within Congress to make the coalition aware
448. See, e.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2465-66 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority's adoption of a narrow reading of Title VII over the objections
of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, who called for Congress to override the
Court).
449. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
450. See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 984-86 (2002) (arguing that
individual Article III judges are independent but that as a practical matter they are not inclined to
take their independence "too far" because the Judicial Branch is highly dependent on the political




of the limitations in statutory language that it plans to enact. Specifically,
the coalition needs to be aware that the current Court majority, and future
Courts as well, will not be eager to infer and implement a general policy
based upon the insertion of narrow language doing nothing more than
addressing the issue the Court had mishandled. Indeed, as in Ledbetter,
Congress's curative language might be used as a justification for reading
uncorrected statutory language exactly the same way the Court did in the
overridden precedent, which thus survives and might even flourish. Thus,
not only might broader language be necessary in the original statute, but the
coalition needs to be aware that the Court's precedents will be applied to
other statutes. Hence, Congress might want to revisit those statutes.
Is Congress even capable of such foresight? Yes indeed. In overriding
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,451 which held that the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 had not adequately abrogated state sovereign immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment,452 Congress wisely provided a clear statement
abrogating immunity under several similar statutes.453  To be sure, this is
the exception that proves the rule that Congress generally does not exercise
such foresight. But we suggest that Congress redouble its efforts in this
area. Congressional staff groups are in place to engage in the sort of
analysis and drafting that we suggest. On the analysis side, a great deal of
untapped potential is available from the Congressional Research Service
(CRS), the nonpartisan research arm of Congress.454 CRS today has over
451. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
452. Id. at 247.
453. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003(a)(1), 100 Stat.
1807, 1845 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (2006)) (abrogating state immunity under "the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the provisions of any other
Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance"); see also
S. REP. No. 99-388, at 27-28 (1986). The Senate report stated:
In order to make certain that the States are covered by Section 504, the Rehabilitation
Act Amendments of 1986 provide that states shall not be immune under the Eleventh
Amendment from suit in Federal court for violations of Section 504. In addition,
since language similar to that of Section 504 is contained in Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975, these statutes have also been included in the specific
abrogation of state immunity in the Committee bill.
Id. (citations omitted).
454. See Walter Kravitz, The Advent of the Modern Congress: The Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1970, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 375, 383 (1990) (explaining that the objective, nonpartisan
Congressional Research Service was created in response to members' complaints "to the 1965
Joint Committee that their committees lacked the resources necessary for comprehensive and
continuous reviews"); Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of
Legislative Drafting (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (providing an excellent
analysis of the drafting and research divisions that assist Congress).
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700 employees from a variety of different fields of expertise. 455  The
American Law Division does excellent statutory analysis at the behest of
committees and members of Congress, and that part of the CRS might
provide a systematic analysis of how a disapproved Supreme Court decision
might apply beyond the facts of the case that got to the Supreme Court,
including how it might apply to other statutes.456
On the drafting side, the matter is more complicated. The House and
Senate Offices of Legislative Counsel, which began their work in 1916 and
1919, 457 respectively, do most of the major bill drafting in both chambers,
taking up policy proposals and preliminary drafts from other staff and
working them into professionally sophisticated bills.458 The offices have a
sophisticated understanding of the canons of statutory construction and are
well aware of the text-based and structural (whole act and whole code)
canons that are now popular with the Supreme Court.459 Moreover, each
Legislative Counsel is a specialist in one or a few areas of law, and so these
Counsel are excellent resources for thinking about how the addition of one
new provision to Title VII might relate to other problems arising under
455. See MARY B. MAZANEC, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONG-
RESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 1, 24
(2013); Shobe, supra note 454, at 24-27.
456. The CRS seems to be underutilized in general, and the deployment suggested above is
one that has probably not been done in the past. See Shobe, supra note 451, at 27-32 (discussing
the work of the American Law Division of the CRS, which is more concerned with constitutional
analysis than statutory mapping).
457. History and Charter, OFF. LEGIS. COUNS., U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://
www.house.gov/legcoun/HOLC/AboutOurOffice/HistoryandCharter.html; History of the
Office, OFF. LEGIS. COUNS., U.S. SENATE, http://www.slc.senate.gov/History/history.htm.
458. For an assessment of this process, see Robert A. Katzmann, The American Legislative
Process as a Signal, 9 J. PUB. POL'Y 287 (1989), which analyzes the political and institutional
dynamics influencing legislative policymaking, and for a more recent analysis, see Abbe R. Gluck
& Lisa Shultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part 11, 66 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2358074.
459. See BJ Ard, Comment, Interpreting by the Book: Legislative Drafting Manuals and
Statutory Interpretation, 120 YALE L.J. 185, 189 (2010) (explaining that certain provisions from
the manuals were "written in anticipation of judicial interpretation" and that these provisions
reference "established canons of construction, Supreme Court precedent, and the United States
Code to advise drafters on how courts are likely to interpret certain language"). Both Offices have
drafting manuals that are available online. See OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE
(1995), available at http://www.house.gov/legcoun/HOLC/DraftingLegislation/draftstyle.pdf;
OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, U.S. SENATE, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL (1997),
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Faculty/SenateOfficeoftheLegislativeCoun
selLegislativeDraftingManual(1997).pdf. And officials in the House Office have published a
desk reference that is even more savvy and detailed about the new textualist rules often followed
(and often not followed) by the Justices. See LAWRENCE E. FILSON, THE LEGISLATIVE DRAFT-
ER'S DESK REFERENCE (1992).
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Title VII (Lilly Ledbetter's own case) or under other workplace
discrimination statutes.
Based upon their survey of congressional drafting staff, Professors
Gluck and Bressman have reported significant limitations in the role of
Legislative Counsel, however. Because the committee or member staff
working on the substantive legislation and the political maneuvering to
press it through Congress are different from the drafting staff, there is a
coordination problem--one that is virtually insuperable when last-minute
changes are made in bills as they rush through Congress in the late days of a
session. 460  The division of drafting responsibility within Congress is in
stark contrast with the practice elsewhere in the industrial world, where the
norm is centralized drafting.46' Congress ought to consider greater
centralization-but for our purposes the eclectic arrangement is sufficient.
Thus, a partial solution to the Lilly Ledbetter problem is operationally
simple-CRS research that contributes to Legislative Counsel drafting to
create an override that not only reverses the particular Supreme Court case
but also sets new policy for the statute as a whole and protects against the
shadow precedent's migration into other statutes with similar language.
Operationally simple, but politically difficult. The broader the override
language, the harder it is to assemble a coalition of legislators to override
the Court.
Consider another approach. Every state has codified canons of
statutory construction, and Congress long ago passed the Dictionary Act,
which presumptively defines a few terms for the U.S. Code.462 Congress
ought to study the possibility of adding a few anticanons to Title I of the
U.S. Code. Congress might pass an Interpretation Act that specifies
presumptions that are applicable to language found in enacted statutes.
Specifically, Congress might negate the presumption of consistent usage
that was the basis for the repudiated rulings in both Lorance and
Ledbetter;463 the presumption against surplusage, which presumes each term
or phrase in a statute adds something and does not duplicate another term or
phrase; and the presumption of meaningful variation, which presumes that
different statutory language must have completely different meanings, and
460. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 458 (manuscript at 19-20).
461. See Serge Lortie, Providing Technical Assistance on Law Drafting, 31 STATUTE L. REV.
1, 3 (2010) (identifying the United Kingdom and Canada as countries that use centralized
drafting).
462. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431. The modem version can be found at
1 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (2012). See also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory
Interpretation, 115 I-IARV. L. REv. 2085, 2152 (2002) (advocating for a congressional code of
canons). See generally Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98
GEO. L.J. 341 (2010) (analyzing the canons codified in the states).
463. See supra notes 439-40 and accompanying text.
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464which was the primary argument invoked by the Court in Casey, as well
as an argument complementing the consistent usage point in Ledbetter. All
these canons share one trait in common: they are whole act/whole code
canons that are strongly correlated with congressional overrides.465
What these canons (consistent usage, no surplusage, meaningful
variation) also have in common is that they often cannot, as a practical
matter, be taken into account even when staff are aware of the canons and
have an opportunity to seek input from Legislative Counsel and CRS.
Professors Gluck and Bressman report that many congressional staff
dismiss the presumption against surplusage because repetition (i.e.,
surplusage) is typically what supporting institutions and groups want from
the legislative process.4 66 The presumptions of consistency and meaningful
variation, even when congressional staff are aware of those canons, are hard
to apply because different congressional committees are involved for
multiple statutes and even for individual statutes.467
3. Delegation of Lawmaking or Adjudicatory Authority to
Administrators, and Away from Courts.-The Lilly Ledbetter problem is
part of a larger conflict between a libertarian Court and a proregulatory
Congress. If Congress is serious about creating a strong and dynamic
regulatory program for workplace diversity and other issues, it ought
consider restructuring the process of statutory interpretation for particular
statutes. The most successful congressional override in recent years was
the 2009 Tobacco Control Act, which was backed up by public opinion and
an electoral mandate.468 One of the big virtues of that override was that it
vested implementation in a purposive, proregulatory agency (the FDA) and
not in the foot-dragging, libertarian judiciary. This is a model that
Congress might consider implementing more often.
For Title VII issues, the EEOC has been a more reliable barometer of
congressional values and policy than the Supreme Court has been-and this
cannot be much of a surprise. As Judge Katzmann has documented,
agencies tend to be quite responsive to Congress because of commitments
agency heads make to secure confirmation for their limited terms; formal
and informal legislative history (including subsequent deliberations); the
464. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88-92 (1991).
465. See supra Figures 25 and 26.
466. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 302, at 934-35.
467. See id. at 936-37.
468. See supra notes 325-30 and accompanying text.
1448 [Vol. 92:1317
Congressional Overrides, 1967-2011
yearly campaign to secure appropriations; and oversight hearings as well as
informal pressure through phone calls and e-mails.
469
Most of the big restorative overrides of the Court's conservative
Title VII jurisprudence have occurred for issues where the Court was
rejecting the EEOC's interpretations-from General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
which triggered the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, to Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., which triggered the 2009 Ledbetter Act.4 70
In most of these Title VII cases, dissenting Justices have invoked the
EEOC's interpretive stance-but the Court majorities responded that the
EEOC's views are not entitled to strong deference from the Court because
Title VII does not delegate lawmaking authority to the EEOC.471
If Congress wants to reduce the Lilly Ledbetter problem in Title VII
cases, one option would be to grant the EEOC the lawmaking authority
Congress withheld when enacting Title VII exactly fifty years ago. Thus,
the EEOC might be given the authority to issue substantive rules, after
notice and comment, or to adjudicate at least some claims administratively,
with EEOC orders being directly enforceable as a matter of law. While the
Supreme Court would still have the authority to trump EEOC rules and
orders if inconsistent with what the Court majority thought was the plain
meaning of Title VII, as the Court claimed to be doing in both Gilbert and
Ledbetter, the five-Justice majority might not hold firm in cases where the
EEOC is making law rather than just stating its opinion.
A more drastic option would be to shift the situs of Title VII litigation.
For example, Congress has the authority to remove Title VII cases from
federal courts altogether-and refer them to EEOC adjudication, constituted
as an Article I "court. 'A72 Although Congress cannot preclude the Supreme
Court from engaging in constitutional review of an Article I court's rulings,
Congress does have the power to preclude the Court from reviewing such a
court's judgments for consistency with the statutory scheme.473
469. Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 656-61 (2012). For leading
political science accounts, see LAWRENCE C. DODD & RICHARD L. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 155-211 (1979); JOSEPH P. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION (1964); Charles R. Shipan, Congress and the Bureaucracy, in THE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 432 (Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder eds., 2005).
470. See infra Appendix 1.
471. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 642 n.l 1 (2007) (declining
to extend Chevron deference to EEOC regulations); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
257 (1991) ("Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC authority to
promulgate rules or regulations .... " (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141
(1976))); id. at 259-60 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (assuming
EEOC regulations, as opposed to guidelines, deserve deference but still concurring with the
majority's opinion on other principles of statutory construction).
472. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
473. Cf Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87-89 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (opining that
the requirement of due process, not any other "prohibition against the diminution of the
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B. The Role of the Executive Branch: Administrative Overrides and
Workarounds
Our study demonstrates the importance of the Executive Branch to the
legislative process generally and to the override process in particular. The
Department of Justice and other agencies already do a good job identifying
and lobbying for overrides, as we document in Figures 11-13. This is one
reason we do not follow Judge Cardozo in advocating for a new
administrative officer or department focusing on legislative proposals and
overrides. What we do highlight and support (especially in light of the
decline of overrides) is agency workarounds and administrative overrides
as a means of keeping statutory policy up to date.
The idea of an agency workaround is simple and commonplace.
Through their narrowing constructions, judges may deny agencies
regulatory options-but typically those agencies can rely on other grants of
authority to advance their regulatory agendas. Recall TVA v. Hill. The
Court's ruling that the Interior Department could stop a costly public works
project based upon its threat to an endangered species's critical habitat left
enforcement of the ESA with that department. 4  Thus, President Carter
could have directed the Department to review the project's threat to the
snail darter and to explore possibilities for saving the critter.475 Indeed, the
President might have replicated the initial congressional override by
requiring interdepartmental consultation before a "major" public project
476could be terminated to protect an endangered species.
For an example where the Executive Branch promptly worked around
a Supreme Court decision, consider 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which
"enhances" a sentence for drug convictions if the defendant "uses or
carries" a firearm in furtherance of the crime.477 In Bailey v. United
States,478 the Supreme Court ruled that a drug dealer with guns in the trunk
of his car does not "use" the guns.479 The Department of Justice had no
problem working around this decision, by seeking the same enhancement
on the ground that a defendant with guns in his trunk wF.;: "carrying"
jurisdiction of the federal district courts as such," is what may prevent controversies from being
subject to "conclusive determination of administrative bodies or federal legislative courts").
474. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 159-63 (1978) (describing the statutory scheme and the
authority of the Interior Department).
475. See id. at 162, 163 & n.13 (describing efforts of the Department to find a suitable habitat
for relocation of the snail darter population).
476. Indeed, after Congress directly legislated for the Tellico Dam to be completed, it was
discovered that the TVA's previous efforts at relocating the snail darter had been successful and
that the fish enjoyed a habitat elsewhere that no one knew about. Garrett, supra note 316, at 89-
90.
477. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012).
478. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
479. Id. at 139, 142-43.
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firearms.48° Workarounds may not be perfect substitutes for overrides, but
they are one way that agencies deal with adverse Supreme Court decisions
in the absence of an override.481
Our novel idea is that agencies can engage in administrative overrides
as well as workarounds. Unlike a workaround, an administrative override
modifies a point of law accepted in a Supreme Court decision. One of the
high-profile Supreme Court cases of the 2013 Term, Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA (UARG), 482 provides an excellent example of the process we
are describing. In Massachusetts v. EPA,483 the Supreme Court held that
greenhouse gases fit within the Clean Air Act's broad definition of "air
pollutant," at least with respect to some parts of the Act.484 On remand
from that decision, the EPA issued an "endangerment finding," which
485
required the agency to regulate greenhouse gases from mobile sources.
Several rulemakings ensued, through which the EPA used various
provisions of the Clean Air Act to limit different sources of greenhouse
gases.486 In issuing these regulations, however, the EPA faced a challenge.
One of the provisions it invoked was the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) program-itself the product of an override487-which
requires permits for certain new or significantly modified emissions
sources.488 The statute, as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court in
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA,489 requires a
480. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 131-32 (1998) (upholding the Department's
interpretation). Ironically, Congress overrode both decisions shortly afterwards. See Act of Nov.
13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, § 1(a), 112 Stat. 3469, 3469-70 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)) (rewriting § 924(c)(1) to include possession of firearms).
481. For more on the Executive Branch's ability to respond to Supreme Court decisions,
specifically in the tax context, see Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?,
84 B.U. L. REv. 185 (2004).
482. 82 U.S.L.W. 3206 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013) (No. 12-1146).
483. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
484. See id. at 528-29.
485. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
486. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert.
granted in part sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 82 U.S.L.W. 3206 (U.S. Oct. 15,
2013) (No. 12-1146).
487. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685, 731-42
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7472-7479 (2006)) (overriding Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S.
541 (1973), af'g by an equally divided Court Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253
(D.D.C. 1972)).
488. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (requiring permits for certain emitters); Coal. for
Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 115-16 (stating that the EPA was acting pursuant to the PSD
program).
489. 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
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permit for any source that emits more than 100 or 250 tons of the pollutant
490at issue, depending on the source.
The dilemma facing administrators was that the PSD program, as
originally enacted in 1977, surely did not contemplate the possibility of
carbon dioxide as a statutory "air pollutant. ''49 Because carbon dioxide is a
much more ubiquitous pollutant than those for which the program was
originally intended, a staggering number of sources would have exceeded
the thresholds and, therefore, would have required permits, sweeping large
apartment buildings and hospitals into a regime meant for power plants and
other industrial facilities. So the EPA decided to "tailor" the Clean Air
Act's applicability to these sources by limiting the permitting requirement
to sources that emit over 75,000 or 100,000 tons of carbon dioxide, or its
equivalent, per year492-several hundred times the thresholds that a straight-
forward reading would have required. Had this rule been enacted through
legislation, it would have qualified as an override because it carved out an
exception from the 100- and 250-ton limitations that the Court had
previously applied.4 93 But with no legislative solution to climate change on
the horizon, the EPA chose to act unilaterally, justifying its departure from
the statutory text and judicial precedent based on the "absurd results" that
would have followed had permitting authorities been forced to regulate all
494these sources.
The "Tailoring Rule" illustrates both the potential benefits and the
pitfalls of administrative overrides. On the one hand, the endangerment
finding and the EPA's subsequent regulations, including the Tailoring Rule,
have allowed the EPA to address a major environmental priority despite
congressional inaction. When the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review parts of the EPA's greenhouse gas regulations in UARG, it notably
left untouched the question whether the EPA had the authority to treat
greenhouse gases as a pollutant and to regulate them under the Clean Air
Act-for all intents and purposes approving of the agency's exercise of that
authority.495 The Tailoring Rule's administrative override has thus allowed
490. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (requiring permits); id. § 7479(1) (defining the sources that fall
within the statute's ambit); see also Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 472
(construing the statute).
491. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) (stating that
the EPA would be imposing control requirements on carbon dioxide for the first time in 2011).
492. Id.
493. See Alaska Dep 't of Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 472.
494. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. at 31,516.
495. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 82 U.S.L.W. 3206 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013) (No. 12-
1146) (limiting its review to only "[w]hether EPA permissibly determined that its regulation of
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the EPA to address the issue of greenhouse gases with regulations
considerably less burdensome than the statute's plain text would have
produced. But at the same time, the administrative override is on much
shakier footing than a legislative override would have been. A legislative
override can change a statute's text; an administrative one cannot. And
while it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court reaches the validity
of the Tailoring Rule in UARG, at oral argument several Justices were
skeptical or hostile to the interpretive moves underlying the Tailoring
Rule.496 Even if the Tailoring Rule survives UARG intact, the point is clear:
administrative overrides are limited by the text of the statute and an attempt
to stretch that text too far may undo the entire administrative override.
As the example of the EPA's Tailoring Rule illustrates, delegated
authority and the ambiguity that usually accompanies it can provide the
Executive Branch with considerable leeway to update policy. That leeway
empowers an agency or the White House to step into the policy-updating
gap left by the post-1998 Congresses. But delegated authority comes with
limitations. Most obviously, any administrative override must conform to
the policy architecture already in place; as the FDA Tobacco Case and other
precedents make clear, the Court will not tolerate major policy shifts
undertaken by agencies. For this reason, in the greenhouse gas example, a
carbon tax and a cap-and-trade program-the two approaches to greenhouse
gas regulation favored by most economists and policymakers-were off the
table for the EPA. Its only option was to pursue a program originally
designed to require pollution control devices for pollutants like sulfur
dioxide and lead. And, as the Tailoring Rule illustrates, the assumptions
that underlay the original statute may complicate any administrative
override. The Tailoring Rule had to rely on the absurd results canon to
avoid a program that would have proved unmanageable. Because the
current Court is not friendly to the project of rewriting clear statutory text to
avoid absurd results, the Agency faces an uphill battle to protect this
particular interpretation.497
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles triggered permitting requirements under the
Clean Air Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases").
496. We went to press before the Court decided UARG, but oral argument in that case
revealed strong resistance on the part of five or more Justices to the EPA's absurd results
argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, No. 12-1146 (U.S.
Feb. 24, 2014).
497. Of course, consistent with the D.C. Circuit decision below, the Court may not reach the
merits of the Tailoring Rule. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102,
146 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted in part sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 82




A comparison with the override of Brown & Williamson makes the
point even clearer. After the Court struck down the FDA's attempt to
regulate tobacco, Congress (eventually) responded with an override that
included several policy compromises and trade-offs that neither the FDA
nor the Court could have shoehorned in under the text of the statute-
including treating tobacco differently than a "drug" as that term is used in
the FDCA.49 8  The FDA must ensure that drugs are actually "safe and
effective," a requirement that was central to the Brown & Williamson
majority's decision that the Act was never intended to regulate tobacco
products.499 This compromise-giving the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco,
but exempting it from the safe and effective standard-was a more artful,
and surely more efficient, compromise than anything an administrative
override could have legitimately produced in this case. In short, while we
believe that administrative overrides can help address the decline in
legislative overrides, they are no substitute for the real thing.
But in some cases they can come close. If there is one area where
administrative overrides are nearly identical to legislative overrides, it is
with respect to agency interpretations rendered within the policymaking
space left by Congress-namely, decisions made at what the Court deems
"Chevron Step Two." The Supreme Court laid the doctrinal foundation for
this type of override in National Cable & Telecommunciations Service, Inc.
v. Brand Xlnternet Services, where it held that an agency may reinterpret-
and replace entirely-a policy that a court upheld as reasonable-i.e., at
Chevron Step Two. "A court's prior judicial construction of a statute
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only
if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion.', 50 0  Brand X's interpretation of Chevron explicitly gives
agencies room to update their rules, guidance, and adjudications to reflect
new circumstances that otherwise might require legislative overrides.
Brand X can be understood to vest the Executive with formal override
authority for a limited subset of cases. This is most commonly understood
in the context Brand X presented, namely, where a court upholds one
interpretation as reasonable under Chevron Step Two. Subsequently, the
agency (often after a change in presidential administration) decides to
change its interpretation. Brand X thus gives the Executive Branch the
authority to make such changes when the rule is made pursuant to an
498. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 101(a),
123 Stat. 1776, 1783-84 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(rr)).
499. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133-37, 161 (2000).
500. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
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ambiguous statute. By itself, that is a significant power. And it might be
even broader. In an earlier decision, the Court had suggested that even
when an agency prevails under Chevron Step One, there might be some
room for agency updating within the statutory scheme.5°' In other words,
even where the text compels one option rather than another, the agency may
nonetheless retain some flexibility to reinterpret the margins of the
statutorily compelled policy. As Justice Scalia's Brand X dissent
demonstrated, the Communications Act and other regulatory statutes create
a huge policy space for agencies to update statutes in ways that are the
functional equivalent to policy-updating overrides by Congress. °2
Because many cases are resolved at Chevron Step Two, Brand X has
the potential to counteract statutory ossification in a number of important
areas. The treatment of the Internet as an information service in Brand X is
perhaps the best example. 50 3 But there are also many narrower potential
overrides that could prove excellent candidates for updating. Consider a
recent example in a different area of law. In Astrue v. Capato,504 the
Supreme Court upheld the Social Security Administration (SSA)'s
interpretation of the Social Security Act that precluded survivor benefits for
posthumously conceived children who could not inherit under state
intestacy law.50 5 The groups most adversely affected by this decision-
veterans, cancer patients (two groups that frequently utilize sperm banks),
and children-would appear to be sympathetic parties capable of garnering
Congress's attention and securing an override. But in the absence of an
override, a new interpretation by the SSA that reflects the evolving norms
associated with assisted reproduction could achieve many of the policy
benefits associated with overrides. Because Capato found the statute
ambiguous and therefore deferred to the agency under Chevron Step
501. See Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106, 114 & n.8 (2002).
502. See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1005, 1016-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to the Court's
roadmap for agencies to override judicial decisions, laid out in Brand X and suggested in
Edelman). The Court rejected Justice Scalia's alarm that allowing the FCC's regulatory
revolution was a deep sacrifice ofjudicial integrity. See id. at 983-84 (majority opinion).
503. See id. at 977-78, 989, 997 (indicating that the FCC classified the Internet as an
information service and that its classification was reasonable). This example continues to have a
lasting effect. Earlier this year, the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC's "net neutrality"
regulations because they effectively imposed common carrier status on regulated cable companies,
a status prohibited by the Communications Act. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir.
2014). Although not a Supreme Court case, we note that this case could be considered a candidate
for a second administrative override-undoing the rule at issue in Brand X The FCC has
indicated that it will not appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, instead focusing on rewriting
its rules and potentially reclassifying Internet providers. See Statement of Tom Wheeler, FCC
Chairman, on the FCC's Open Internet Rules (Feb. 19, 2014), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
document/statement-fcc-chairman-tom-wheeler-fccs-open-internet-rules.
504. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
505. Id. at 2033-34.
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Two,5°6 the SSA has the discretion under Brand X to override its own
interpretation.
The potential drawback for this option-as with all administrative
overrides-is that it lacks the full legitimacy bonus of congressional
overrides. But it can approximate that legitimacy bonus under some
circumstances. An administrative override adopted through notice-and-
comment rulemaking can involve the regulated community and interested
parties in a way that parallels or echoes the legitimacy bounce of a
congressional override. Notice-and-comment rulemaking possesses many
of the attributes of the open, deliberative, and pluralistic process that we
find so admirable for most congressional overrides.50 7 Through their
statement of basis and purpose, agencies administering the process identify
the goals of the statute and the impact of the new rule. In this respect, they
function similarly to the committee reports and hearings that Congress uses
to inform the public.
The notice-and-comment process also requires the agency to engage in
a conversation with affected parties, responding to the comments and
concerns that they place in the record. And the rulemaking process
frequently draws in numerous supporters and opponents of the proposed
rule, endowing it with a pluralistic character. Indeed, because it is so much
easier to submit comments than to secure precious time before a
congressional committee (especially for opponents of the override), the
rulemaking may provide superior access for some of the groups that we find
underrepresented in the override process-consumers, prisoners, etc.508
And although critics complain that notice and comment may not deeply
affect final rules, and thus provides a forum without effect, 50 9 these are
problems with the legislative process as well. We are skeptical that the
notice-and-comment process is less responsive than the process by which
legislation is drafted. If it is less responsive, we doubt that it is significantly
SO.
506. See id. at 2026.
507. See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT
THE ENDS OF POLICY 219-20 (2002) (acknowledging that notice-and-comment rulemaking allows
"interested members of the public [to] make their voices heard" but arguing that this process in
and of itself does not go far enough in enhancing democratic participation); Mark Seidenfeld, A
Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1511, 1559-62
(1992) (expressing a similar theoretical optimism about the democratic benefits of notice-and-
comment rulemaking and a similar skepticism with regard to its actual benefits).
508. See supra Figure 12.
509. See, e.g., RICHARDSON, supra note 507, at 220 ("The interested members of the public
can certainly make their voices heard through [the notice-and-comment] process. What is less
clear is how their voices will then influence the revision of proposed rules.").
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But the notice-and-comment process has its limits, and regulations are
not a perfect substitute for congressional overrides. An agency cannot
adopt an interpretation that the Court has rejected as a matter of law, nor
can it adopt a new interpretation that conflicts with the statute's text. And
in many of the principal override-generating areas, there is no agency with
rulemaking authority. Recall that the EEOC lacks rulemaking authority for
Title VII issues, 510 and the Department of Justice cannot change the
criminal code by regulation. Importantly, there is no agency administering
federal jurisdiction and procedure statutes (the single most fertile source of
overrides), bankruptcy, or the habeas corpus statutes. The rulemaking route
is only a partial fix.
The Executive Branch might also help reinvigorate congressional
overrides. As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the Executive Branch
is the single most important outside player in the legislative process.5 '
Officials from the Executive Branch testify more than any other group of
persons or representatives. Departments and agencies play an influential
role, both in submitting legislation and in shaping bills already under
consideration. Thus, the Executive Branch might leverage this position to
coordinate priorities for an override, thereby helping to spur the override
process. As suggested above, the Department of Justice already has a
process for identifying cases that no longer embody wise policy and should
be candidates for an override.51 2  Consider a more ambitious Executive
Branch approach to overrides. The White House is already a force to be
reckoned with on this front, by means of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), located within the Office of Management and
Budget. OIRA's primary function is to engage in cost-benefit analysis of
agency rulemaking-but the office also serves as a policy clearinghouse.
51 3
In 2011, for example, President Obama asked all federal agencies to submit
to OIRA proposals for trimming existing regulations. 514  OIRA then
cooperated with the agencies to reduce regulatory burdens. The President
might run a similar process for overrides, asking agencies to identify areas
of the law where policy priorities were stymied by statutory decisions by
the federal judiciary. The office might then come up with a list of override
priorities that could inform the President's legislative agenda that might
510. See supra notes 471-73 and accompanying text.
511. See also, e.g., supra Figure 12 and accompanying text.
512. See supra pp. 1441-42.
513. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Lost World ofAdministrative Law,
92 TEXAS L. REV. 1139, 1164 (2014) (describing OIRA's position within the Executive Branch).
514. See Exec. Order No. 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
103 (2012) (requiring federal agencies to develop and release plans for periodic review of existing
regulations and implying that OIRA would have input in their development).
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become priorities for overrides through executive orders. A renewed focus
by the most important nonlegislative player (the President) thus might help
to reinvigorate the override process, even marginally.
C. The Role of the Supreme Court and Implications for Statutory
Interpretation Doctrine
The foregoing data and analysis upend the major models political
scientists and many law professors have used to ground their thinking about
the Supreme Court and its role in our system of separated powers. To begin
with, many positive political theory models are inconsistent with our study.
Most such models assume the Supreme Court is primarily a strategic actor,
seeking to impose its political and institutional preferences onto statutes and
to avoid overrides through crafty dodges. 51 5 These models have been the
basis for much legal scholarship.1 6 As Pablo Spiller and Emerson Tiller
first demonstrated, even positive political theory has adjusted its strategic
actor approach to account for the occasions where the Court invites an
override5 l7-a phenomenon the current study documents as an important
and common occurrence. 1 8
Thus, positive political theory needs to consider the Supreme Court as
an institution that cooperates with as much as (or more than) competes with
Congress and the President in developing the contours of American
statutory law.519  Nevertheless, as this study documents, there is a
significant range of statutory issues, reflected in the restorative overrides
such as the 1991 CRA and the 2009 Ledbetter Act, where competition and
conflict between the libertarian Court and the regulatory Congress is the
dominant motif.
520
Among law professors, a much more popular (and more explicitly
normative) model of Court-Congress relations is the precept that, for
statutory interpretation, Congress is the principal and the Court is the
"faithful agent," carrying out the directives that have successfully passed
through the Article I, Section 7 process. 52  The faithful agent model is
515. See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory
Interpretation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 263 (1992) (providing an overview of such a model).
516. See, e.g., Symposium, Positive Political Theory and Public Law, 80 GEO. L.J. 457
(1992). For an especially helpful survey of the field, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992).
517. Spiller & Tiller, supra note 3, at 504-05; accord Staudt et al., supra note 3, at 1364-65.
518. See supra subpart IV(F).
519. This idea is prominently associated with HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS, and has been recently articulated in BREYER, supra note 192, at 80-87, and
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 192, at 27-29.
520. See supra text accompanying notes 154-55, 216-17.
521. See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualistsfrom Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L.
REv. 70, 71-72 (2006) ("In our constitutional system, federal courts act as faithful agents of
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consistent with the cooperative model of Court-Congress interactions-but
is strongly inconsistent with the Court's behavior in the many cases that
yielded restorative overrides. For example, in the cases overridden by the
1991 CRA, the Court was not being a "faithful agent" of Congress; the
Justices were applying their own understanding of what the rule of law
requires and/or their own policy preferences upon Title VII and § 1981,
which protect employees against workplace discrimination. 522  Professors
Brudney and Ditslear have demonstrated that these decisions are not
explicable under neutral rule of law precepts.523 Professor Widiss has
demonstrated that, in the arena of restorative overrides, the Court continues
to obstruct congressional goals or slow down Congress's regulatory
agendas.524
Most important, the current study documents a more realistic picture of
the institutional interaction in the federal government: the principal-agent
dyad is the wrong way to look at an institutional interaction that is triadic
and where each institution brings something different to the evolution of
statutory policy. When there is a simple principal-agent relationship
implicated in federal statutes, it is in the large majority of cases one where
Congress is the principal and an executive or independent agency (rather
than the Court) is the agent. 525 Where federal courts are even relevant to the
elaboration of statutory policy, they are more like monitors of agent actions
rather than agents themselves. Within this triadic network, consider some
implications of our study of congressional overrides for Supreme Court
statutory interpretation doctrine.
Congress; accordingly, they must ascertain and enforce Congress's commands as accurately as
possible."); see also John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 102-05 (2001) (arguing that the faithful agent model is encoded into the original meaning
of the judicial power in Article III).
522. As the analysis in this study makes clear, to say that the Justices impose their "policy
preferences" onto statutes is not the same as saying that partisan GOP Justices are trying to thwart
liberal Democrat statutes, though they might be doing that subconsciously. The main point is that
Justices who are super-libertarian for institutional as well as other reasons are imposing that
perspective on broadly written antidiscrimination laws.
523. See James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive
Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 1205-10 (2010) (discussing the Court's use of substantive canons
and recognizing that these canons lack interpretive neutrality); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note
49, at 78-95, 108-11 (noting the ideological coloring of the Justices' use of canons of
construction and legislative history); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of
Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89
JUDICATURE 220, 227 (2006) [hereinafter Brudney & Ditslear, Decline and Fall] (finding that
the Justices' use of legislative history breaks down along ideological lines).
524. See Widiss, supra note 42; Widiss, supra note 4.
525. See Farber & O'Connell, supra note 513, at 1146-49 (discussing the widely held
assumption that agencies are agents of Congress).
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1. Super-Strong Presumption of Correctness of Statutory
Precedents.-The Supreme Court has long held that statutory precedents
are entitled to a super-strong stare decisis effect, stronger than either
constitutional or common law precedents.526 As suggested by Justice
Brandeis, an important foundation for this doctrine is that Congress ought
to have primary responsibility for correcting the Court's erroneous or
outdated statutory decisions.527 Most scholars have rejected the strong stare
decisis effect for statutory precedents because they believe Congress is not
capable of following the Court's legisprudence and responding with
overrides.528 This argument is undermined by the current study, which
demonstrates that congressional committees devote enormous effort to
evaluating Supreme Court statutory decisions in a wide range of subject
areas and that Congress does override a lot of those decisions.
Notwithstanding the formidable veto gates that render legislation quite
difficult, for the most part, Congress is capable of policy responses even in
periods of divided government and partisan acrimony. Recall that the
golden age of overrides was the period of bitterly divided government
between 1991 and 1999.
More important, the current study provides important support for
Justice Brandeis's institutional judgment. Not only is Congress capable of
responding to Supreme Court statutory constructions, but this study
demonstrates the many ways in which a congressional resolution is superior
to a judicial one. Recall Flood v. Kuhn, one of the Court's most universally
criticized decisions and a pifiata for critics of the super-strong presumption
of correctness for statutory precedents. 529 Refusing to overrule the Court's
precedents exempting baseball, but no other sport, from the Sherman
Antitrust Act, Flood v. Kuhn is defensible along several dimensions.
Because professional baseball had matured under the umbrella of Sherman
Act immunity, the Court was concerned about reliance interests that would
526. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)
("Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here,
unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and
Congress remains free to alter what we have done."); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-
78 (1938) ("If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared
to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century."); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988) ("Statutory precedents.., often
enjoy a super-strong presumption of correctness.").
527. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Court adheres to stare decisis "even where the error is a matter of
serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation").
528. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL
L. REv. 422, 425-29 (1988); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 388-89
(1988); see also REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 252-
55 (1975) (suggesting that courts should at least be willing to correct clear prior misreadings).
529. See supra text accompanying notes 334-42.
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be unsettled by an overruling. Congress was the institution that could best
deal with the reliance interest problem-and do so in a legitimate manner,
through its open, deliberative, and pluralist process. When Congress did
override the decision in the 1998 Curt Flood Act, it overrode antitrust
immunity only for challenges to the reserve clause and not for other kinds
of challenges (such as collusion among the team owners to set rules and
restrict entry, for example). Because the reserve clause had already been
abrogated through private arbitration, the benefit of the override was quite
small. But so were the costs because Congress left in place baseball's
insulation from other forms of antitrust liability (such as price-fixing and
market segmentation), a move that the Court would not have been able to
make in 1972.
Flood v. Kuhn is instructive in another sense as well. One reason the
Court gave for declining to overrule the baseball antitrust immunity
precedents was Congress's "positive inaction." 530  Far from ignoring the
issue, Congress had devoted thousands of hours of attention to antitrust
immunity for professional athletics and had considered many proposals-
almost all of which sought to expand immunity to other sports rather than
take it away from baseball.531 Many scholars and Justices have expressed
disdain for this kind of evidence, what its critics call "subsequent legislative
history" or "legislative inaction., 532  Our view is that this kind of
terminology obstructs a proper understanding of a well-functioning
interbranch dynamic. When the Court has interpreted a statute and
Congress has engaged in an open, deliberative, and pluralistic appraisal of
the Court's decision without overriding it, that ought to be an additional
reason for the Court to be reluctant to overrule its statutory precedent. And
when the congressional deliberations reveal legislative approval for the
Court's decision, that ought to close the door on reconsideration of that
precedent.
Contrast Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. The issue was whether
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided a claim for relief to an employee who
was allegedly harassed and fired because of her race.533 In 1976, the
Supreme Court had interpreted the law to provide a cause of action against
530. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972).
531. Id. at 281-83.
532. See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1092 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) ("[P]ostenactment legislative history created by a subsequent Congress is ordinarily a
hazardous basis from which to infer the intent of the enacting Congress."); Sullivan v. Finkelstein,
496 U.S. 617, 631-32 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("Arguments based on subsequent
legislative history, like arguments based on antecedent futurity, should not be taken seriously, not
even in a footnote."); Maltz, supra note 522 (stating that relying on "legislative inaction" is not
always appropriate because such inaction may not reflect conscious congressional choice but
instead might be the result of political forces).
533. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 169-71, 176 (1989).
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private institutions for contract-based discrimination because of race.534
The Patterson Court, on its own, asked the parties to file briefs to determine
whether the Court should overrule the precedent, 535 which had arguably
stretched the statute beyond its most obvious target of state actors.
Invoking the super-strong presumption of correctness, the Court
unanimously reaffirmed the 1976 precedent 536-- but the five-to-four
majority opinion ignored evidence that the precedent had been ratified by
Congress after 1976.537 The same slender majority then interpreted the
precedent and the statute narrowly, to deny claims to employees with whom
firms entered into contracts but then harassed and terminated because of
their race.
538
Patterson was inconsistent with stare decisis, whether super-strong or
not, because a logical implication of the prior precedent was that
institutions could not deny normal contractual rights because of race.539
The Solicitor General recognized this and had urged a more liberal
application of the 1866 CRA-and the Bush Administration joined civil
rights and other groups in urging Congress to override Patterson,54 ° which
Congress did in the 1991 CRA.54' As noted above, the 1991 CRA override
of Patterson was restorative-indeed, one of the most lopsided and
outraged political repudiations of a Supreme Court opinion in American
history.542 A positive lesson of the Patterson debacle is that the Court
should be super-leery of overruling or drastically narrowing statutory
precedents when both the Legislative and Executive Branches have taken
positions supporting normal readings of statutory precedents. That
Democrat Congresses and a GOP President joined in support of reaffirming
the 1976 precedent and applying it in a normal manner should have been
red flags cautioning the Supreme Court against the course that it took.
534. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 166-68, 186 (1976).
535. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171.
536. Id. at 167, 171-75 (acknowledging that some Justices believed Runyon was wrongly
decided but finding no justification for overruling it).
537. Id. at 190-95 (Brennan, J., concurring) (agreeing that Runyon should be reaffirmed but
adding that Congress after 1976 ratified the Court's decision).
538. See id. at 178-89 (majority opinion).
539. Specifically, Runyon ruled that private schools violated § 1981 if they refused to admit
children because of their race. 427 U.S. at 167-68, 172. A clear implication of this holding is that
a school could not admit such children and then drive them out with racial harassment and race-
motivated expulsions. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 219-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (discussing implications of Runyon for § 1981).
540. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 53 (1991) ("[T]he Department of Justice recommended
corrective legislation to overturn two of the [Supreme Court's] decisions: Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union and Lorance v. AT&T.").
541. See infra Appendix 1.
542. See supra text accompanying notes 216-17.
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2. Representation-Reinforcing Statutory Interpretation: Deference to
Agency Interpretations and Deliberation-Encouraging Canons.-The
current study also has interesting implications for the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence of deference to agency interpretations. As a practical matter,
the Supreme Court has traditionally followed agency interpretations almost
70% of the time,543 an astounding record of success by the Solicitor
General, who presents most of these interpretations to the Court. The actual
record of cases before the Court refutes the notion that the Court defers only
when an agency interprets a statute pursuant to congressionally delegated
authority.
544
Indeed, the leading case, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.,545 relied
on congressional delegation of lawmaking authority to the EPA as only one
reason for deferring to the agency when Congress had not directly
addressed an issue.546  Chevron's distinctive rationale was that when a
policy choice must be made to fill in a statutory gap, an agency connected
with the President is a more democratically legitimate policymaker than the
Supreme Court, whose members are not connected to the electorate in any
formal way.547 One point that the current study adds to the Chevron
analysis is that the democratic legitimacy of agency interpretations owes as
much to administrators' ongoing connections with Congress as to their
connections with the President. As we have seen, the Department of Justice
and other agencies are the most important nonlegislative players, by far,
when Congress considers legislation overriding the Court's statutory
548decisions.
To the extent that the Supreme Court wants to advance the cooperative
features of institutional interaction, the current study supports the Court's
attentiveness to agency views; indeed, we would advise the Court to be
more deferential in cases like Patterson, where the Justices ignored the
543. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 49, at 1129 tbl.7.
544. The conventional wisdom is that the basis for deference is congressional delegation. See
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 & n.11 (2001) (following Thomas W. Merrill &
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 872 (2001)). But the Court's actual
practice is all over the map. In most cases where there is lawmaking delegation, the Court has
ignored Chevron. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 49, at 1123-29. The agency win rate is actually
higher for cases where the Court follows a more informal deference regime. Id. at 1099 tbl.1,
111-15.
545. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
546. See id. at 859-66.
547. See id. at 865-66; see also Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era,
3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 312 (1986) (summarizing the implications of Chevron).
548. The key role played by agencies drafting legislation, lobbying Congress to enact it,
interpreting such legislation, and then selling their interpretations to the Court is a phenomenon
that dates back to the New Deal. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The




Solicitor General's sage advice. Thus, we endorse Justice Scalia's
campaign within the Court to expand formal deference to agencies beyond
the category of cases where Congress has delegated lawmaking authority to
the agencies.549
As the restorative overrides teach us, however, the Supreme Court is
also sometimes at odds with the Legislative and Executive Branches-and
so has incentives not to defer to the political branches. There are (at least)
three kinds of potentially legitimate reasons, inherent in the Court's
important role in our system, why the Court ought to push back against
agencies.
The first are rule of law reasons: the Court has a systemic obligation to
enforce statutory plain meanings consistently and honestly; when an agency
interpretation deviates from the plain meaning of the text, the Court should
usually trump the agency's view with its own insistence on clear statutory
texts. If clarity is required, Congress can override the Court with the
requisite language, a possibility that this study has demonstrated to be a
tangible one (until recently). Casey, the expert witness fees case, is an
example of this phenomenon, if one agrees with Justice Scalia that the Civil
Rights Attorneys' Fees Act of 1976 is crystal clear against fee shifting for
expert witnesses as well as for attorneys.55 ° Congress speedily provided the
requisite statutory language.551 Recall that most of the overridden Supreme
Court decisions relied on statutory plain meaning; an important and
legitimate role for congressional overrides is to supply clear statutory texts
when the Court finds them lacking.
A second important role for the Court is enforcement of constitutional
rules and values. The Court more often enforces due process, federalism,
and separation-of-powers norms through narrowing statutory interpretations
than through outright invalidations. Although the Court sometimes strikes
down congressional efforts to subject the states to federal programs and
rules, its most common strategy is to require explicit congressional
deliberation and targeted language before the Court will find that Congress
has abrogated state immunity from regulation or from private lawsuits.552
Many of those narrow interpretations are then overridden by Congress, 553 an
549. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 239-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord David J. Barron & Elena
Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 S. CT. REV. 201, 258.
550. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88-92 (1991).
551. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)).
552. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 608-09 (1992).
553. See, e.g., Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476,
§ 103, 104 Stat. 1103, 1106 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1403 (2012)) (overriding Dellmuth v. Muth,
491 U.S. 223 (1989)).
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excellent set of examples where the Court in its thwarting mode is insisting
that important constitutional values be considered by Congress, which our
study has shown to be capable of open, deliberative, and pluralist
consideration. The broader point to be drawn from these examples is that
constitutional judicial review in this country is more often accomplished
through deliberation-encouraging clear-statement rules than through direct
invalidation. This bears a striking similarity to proportionality review that
is the norm throughout the industrial world554 and is on the whole a more
democratic and deliberative approach to the enforcement of constitutional
values.
Third, the Court plays an important representation-reinforcing role in
American governance.555 Underappreciated examples of this role are the
cases where the Court enforces nondelegation values by requiring clearer
statements from Congress when agencies are overreaching their statutory
mandates. Thus, a central rationale of the FDA Tobacco Case was that the
FDA was making a big policy move not contemplated by Congress when it
enacted the FDCA in 1938 and contrary to the tobacco-regulatory laws
adopted from 1965 onward.556 As the Court put it, "we are confident that
Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic
and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion. ' ,557 Rather
than strike down the statute as unconstitutional as applied based upon the
nondelegation doctrine, the Court interpreted the broad statutory
authorization narrowly-and invited Congress to respond,558 which it did in
the 2009 Tobacco Control Act.559 Our study lends some support to the
canon that "[Congress] does not.., hide elephants in mouseholes. '5 60 The
canon not only enforces democratic values, but it places the burden of
inertia upon institutions (agencies and sometimes the White House) that
have political clout and can secure congressional consideration of serious
override proposals.
56'
554. See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 72 (2008) (providing a large-scale account of the
rise of proportionality review by courts and other tribunals all over the world).
555. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980), for an explication and justification of democracy-enhancing judicial review.
556. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143-60 (2000).
557. Id. at 160.
558. See id. at 161 (noting that regardless of the importance and severity of the issue at hand,
grants of administrative power "must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from
Congress" and finding that it was "plain that Congress [had] not given the FDA the authority" it
sought in the case).
559. See supra note 498.
560. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). Whitman was followed in
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006).
561. Thus, in two of the four leading no-elephants-in-mouseholes precedents-namely, the
FDA Tobacco Case, Brown & Williamson, and MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218,
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As the 1991 Eskridge study maintained, the rule of lenity is the
substantive canon that gains the most representation-reinforcing traction
from any serious study of congressional overrides because the rule of lenity
gently enforces important constitutional values in ways that encourage
congressional deliberation and response and because the politics of lenity
ensures that such deliberation will actually occur most of the time, as the
Department of Justice (the typical loser in lenity cases) is usually able to
secure a congressional hearing and often an override.562 Thus, the rule of
lenity gently enforces the due process idea that criminal statutes ought to be
particularly clear563 and the nondelegation idea that punitive sanctions ought
be enforced against alleged wrongdoers only when the deliberative and
pluralist legislative process has authorized those sanctions. 64
In 1994, one of us proposed a representation-reinforcing meta-canon
for allocating the burden of legislative inertia in cases where the legal
arguments are evenly balanced: "In close cases, the... interpreter ought to
consider, as a tiebreaker, which party or group representing its interests will
have effective access to the legislative process if it loses its case, and to
decide the case against the party (if any) with significantly more effective
access." 565  Subsequently, Professor Elhauge advanced pretty much the
same idea, but with the further suggestion that such a canon ought to weigh
in favor of Carolene groups, namely, discrete and insular minorities.566 We
agree with the general idea (as it was ours) but caution against Professor
Elhauge's effort to refocus it. Based upon our data, this tiebreaker is not a
good representation-reinforcing justification for interpreting civil rights
laws liberally because Carolene groups and women now have better
override success than many of the traditional powerhouses in Washington,
D.C. As documented above, women, racial and ethnic minorities, people
with disabilities, religious minorities, and even sexual minorities and their
allies have won impressive overrides of rights-denying Supreme Court
decisions in workplace discrimination cases, for example.567
231 (1994)-the Court's stingy renditions of delegated authority were overridden by statutes
providing the needed authorization, after open, deliberative, and pluralist consideration in
Congress. See infra Appendix 1.
562. See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 413-14; Elhauge, supra note 4, at 2193-96.
563. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 296-99 (2012) (contending that the rule of lenity, properly applied, is simply a
mechanism for reinforcing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard).
564. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 S. CT. REv. 345
(arguing for the retirement of the rule of lenity and acknowledging that the nondelegation
rationale is the best support for lenity in criminal cases).
565. ESKRIDGE, supra note 331, at 153; see also id. at 151-61 (explaining, applying, and
justifying this meta-canon).
566. Elhauge, supra note 4, at 2209-11.
567. See supra Figure 13. Sexual minorities have been much less salient on Congress's
agenda, until recently, when they secured an important repeal of their exclusion from the armed
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Our list of groups lacking relative clout in the legislative process is a
shorter one: consumers and other diffuse citizenry, criminal defendants and
prisoners, and the poor and the dependent. 68  For example, recall our
finding in subpart V(A) that overrides affecting prisoners and those on the
wrong end of criminal statutes were disproportionately likely not to be
open, deliberative, and pluralist.569 An excellent example of representation-
reinforcing statutory interpretation is Brown v. Plata,57 ° where the Supreme
Court interpreted the PLRA of 1995, 57' one of the most important override
statutes in the current study. The PLRA sought to curtail class action
lawsuits seeking court-enforced reform of unconstitutional prison con-
ditions by imposing more stringent procedural requirements in such
lawsuits.572 Following the letter of the law, the lower courts had imposed
an order directing the release of prisoners until conditions could reach a
constitutional floor, and the Supreme Court affirmed.573 In dissent, Justice
Scalia propounded an antiprisoner interpretive rule, couched as a subsidiary
of the absurd results canon, namely, that the Justices ought to "bend every
effort to read the law in such a way as to avoid [the] outrageous result" of
releasing prisoners.574 The majority opinion enjoyed the virtue of enforcing
the reasonable meaning of the statutory text without undue "bending" of the
law. To the extent that the majority read the text liberally, it did so to avoid
constitutional difficulties-and our meta-canon strongly supports the
majority's reading. 575  If dissenting Justices are concerned about state
prisoners having "too many" statutory rights, the current study
demonstrates that Congress is an eager audience for their concerns, and it
might be a good thing for legislators to consider whether documented
prison conditions are consistent with American constitutional values.
3. Apply the Plain Meaning Rule in Light of Congressional
Deliberations.-The plain meaning rule has made a great comeback at the
forces (the nation's most important employer). See Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends 'Don 't Ask,
Don't Tell'Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/23military
.html?_r=0; see also Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067-
77 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012)) (overriding the most antigay Supreme Court
decision in our history, Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967)).
568. ESKRIDGE, supra note 331, at 153; accord Elhauge, supra note 4, at 2207-09
(identifying consumers and taxpayers as also lacking in political clout).
569. See supra notes 348-51 and accompanying text.
570. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). None of the three overrides in the PLRA was open, deliberative,
or pluralist; hence, those overrides lacked the important legitimacy bonus of the override process.
See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
571. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922-23.
572. See id. at 1929-31 (describing the procedural requirements set forth in the PLRA).
573. Id. at 1922-23.
574. Id. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
575. See id. at 1937 (majority opinion).
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Supreme Court in the last generation, as the Justices have devoted more of
their opinions to textual and structural analysis and less often rely on
legislative history and purpose as decisive evidence of statutory meaning.576
This development has encountered a chilly academic reception. For
example, Professor Brudney and his political science coauthor have
demonstrated that conservative Justices have deployed the plain meaning
rule and various textual canons in a partisan manner to trump proworker
legislative expectations. 577  Nevertheless, Justice Scalia has continued a
vigorous public relations offensive in support of his new textualist
philosophy, with the publication of his book, with Professor Garner, on
Reading Law.578 The current study lends potential support to the Supreme
Court's insistence on plain meaning. Recall that Congress in the last five
decades has responded to many such decisions by supplying statutory
language that satisfied the Court's rule of law concerns.
We do sound a note of caution, however. Recall that Supreme Court
decisions relying centrally on whole act and whole code arguments were
much, much more likely to be overridden than decisions not critically
relying on those text-based structural arguments. 579 As Casey illustrates,
whole act and whole code arguments assume consistent usage throughout
the statute and the U.S. Code.580 Hence, the Court will assume that a term
used in one part of a statute will have exactly the same meaning in another
part, and sometimes in another statute altogether. Conversely, when a
statute uses different terminology, the Court often presumes different
576. See Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History:
The Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 395 (1999) (observing that
since Justice Scalia's appointment to the Court, opinions written by Justices Rehnquist and
Stevens contained significantly fewer citations to legislative history); David S. Law & David
Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1653, 1655 (2010) (concluding that the decline in the use of legislative history by
Justices is due to "a rightward shift in the ideological composition of the Court").
577. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 49, at 79-95 (examining specific cases that put language
and substantive canons ahead of "legislatively expressed preferences" and noting that the use of
canons in the majority and legislative history in the dissent reflected ideological differences in the
Court); Brudney & Ditslear, Decline and Fall, supra note 523 (recognizing that both liberal and
conservative Justices used legislative history in a way that cut away from Congress's proemployee
purpose); cf Brudney, supra note 523, at 1229-32 (criticizing the imprecise nature of canons of
construction).
578. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 557. But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 563) (questioning the viability of the Scalia and Garner project of
establishing a canons-based regime for neutral and predictable statutory interpretation).
579. See supra Figures 25 and 26.
580. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1991) (arguing that since
attorney's fees and witness fees are referred to separately multiple times in the statute, they should
be referred to separately when determining court costs).
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meanings.581 Relatedly, the Court likes to say that every term, phrase, or
provision adds something to a statute and is not "surplusage" or
"redundant. 5 82
Holistic canons such as these are now under heavy attack. Congress
does not draft statutes with these holistic canons in mind, and a recent study
documents that the process of enactment assures that these canons,
especially the rule against surplusage, cannot be carefully adhered to even if
legislative drafters focused on them.583  Hence, these canons are
antidemocratic in a serious way, and our study demonstrates that their
deployment burdens the legislative agenda more than any other kind of
interpretive canon. Do the holistic canons have a compensating utility, such
as assuring a reliable rule of law regime? We doubt it. Even some devout
textualists maintain that the whole act and whole code canons detract from
rather than contribute to a rule of law regime.
584
Our study supports that conclusion. We found that, in the cases in
which the Court relies on the whole act canon, it also relies on plain
meaning nearly two-thirds of the time-a higher amount than even the
baseline number for overrides in the last twenty-five years.585 By contrast,
in the same cases, the Court relies on legislative history and congressional
purpose only slightly more than one-third of the time. Although these
numbers are roughly in line with the general population of overrides,586 we
interpret our findings as evidence that the Court would be well-served to
expand its interpretive toolbox in those cases in which it might be tempted
to apply the whole act canon.587 Hence, our friendly suggestion to
textualists is to follow a plain meaning rule that is not dogmatic about
importing strong presumptions from elsewhere in the statute, much less
from elsewhere in the Code, as the Court did in Casey.
588
581. See id. at 99 (focusing on Congress's choice to use restrictive language in the statute at
issue instead of the more expansive language it employed in other statutes and using that
difference to justify its strict application of the term "attorney's fees").
582. See supra notes 463-67 and accompanying text.
583. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 302, at 934-35 (finding that a certain level of
surplusage might be politically necessary); see also Eskridge, supra note 578 (criticizing Scalia
and Garner for investing so much significance in textual canons that Congress does not know
about or cannot easily anticipate when it drafts statutes).
584. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 202-04 (2006) (urging courts to follow a strict plain meaning
approach to statutory interpretation and rejecting as wasteful reliance on whole act and whole
code evidence).
585. See supra Figure 21.
586. See supra Figures 22 and 23.
587. We found a similar pattern for the whole code canon, although the Court did rely on
plain meaning less often in those decisions than in decisions relying on the whole act canon.
588. Along these same lines, Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS
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Our overrides study also has a broader lesson for the Court's
deployment of the plain meaning rule, namely, that plain meaning ought not
to be determined without reference to the ongoing congressional
deliberations that produced the text. Perhaps the largest normative point to
emerge from our study is the legitimacy power of the override process.
Consistent with the work of political scientist Jeb Barnes, 589 we found that
the override process was typically open and well-publicized, deliberative
and fact-oriented, and pluralistic, considering the perspectives of most
relevant groups and interests. This is also a process that produces
compromises that ought to be respected by judges. We shall illustrate this
point with perhaps the most-taught statutory case of the last generation,
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, where
the Court confronted a superstatute, as amended to override both the
Supreme Court and an agency rule (in part).59 °
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 was enacted for biodiversity
purposes-to protect endangered species from becoming extinct.591 Section
9(a)(1)(B) of the Act makes it an offense for any person to "take any
[endangered] species within the United States or the territorial sea of the
United States. 592 Section 3(14) defines the statutory term "take" to mean
"to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect,
or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 593 The Department of the
Interior's 1975 regulation, as revised in 1981, defines "harm" in the
statutory definition of "take" as any activity that "actually kills or injures"
endangered species, including an activity that results in "significant habitat
modification or degradation," and includes acts that "significantly impair[]
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.
'" 594
Under that definition of "harm," private landowners that disrupt breeding
patterns by destroying a significant habitat for an endangered species are in
violation of § 9(a)(1)(B).
In Sweet Home, the Supreme Court upheld the Department's
regulation, based in part upon the plain meaning of "harm," one of the
terms included in the statutory definition of "take. 595 This would appear to
L. REV. 961 (2013), provides an excellent analysis of the perverse interaction of two liberal
override statutes.
589. See BARNES, supra note 4, at 103-13.
590. See 515 U.S. 687, 690-92. For more information, see the discussion of the case in
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino 's Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a Jurisprudence of
Toggling Between Facts and Norms, 57 ST. Louis U. L.J., 865, 875-84 (2013).
591. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2(b), 87 Stat. 884, 885 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012)).
592. Id. § 9(a)(1)(B), 87 Stat. at 893 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)) (emphasis
added).
593. Id. § 3(14), 87 Stat. at 886 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)).
594. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1982).
595. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708.
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be a routine plain meaning case; but, regardless of whether the language
was ambiguous, the Court should have upheld the agency rule under Step
Two of Chevron (which all Justices agreed was the governing
framework).596 Yet Justice Scalia dissented.597 His best legal argument was
that two other provisions, and not § 9, of the 1973 Act were Congress's
exclusive response to habitat threats: Section 7 explicitly barred federal
projects from harming the habitat of endangered species,598 and § 5
authorized the Department to use its eminent domain power to secure
needed habitat from private landowners, 599 thereby leaving § 9's antitake
regulation probably concerned with more targeted activities.6 °°
This was a good structural argument, but, as is often the case for
structural arguments, it should not have been dogmatically asserted without
more contextual evidence. Reading nothing but the text of the statute, it is
reasonable to say that §§ 5 and 7 are the primary mechanisms for protecting
habitat, with § 9 being an ancillary but important mechanism as well. Ever
going for the analytical jugular, however, Justice Scalia supported his
structural argument with floor speeches by both Senate and House sponsors
articulating the protection-of-habitat purpose with greater precision and,
probably, reflecting the compromises reached among the coalition of
legislators supporting the statute. 60 1 As the House manager put it,
[T]he principal threat to animals stems from destruction of their
habitat.... [The bill] will meet this problem by providing funds for
acquisition of critical habitat.... It will also enable the Department
of Agriculture to cooperate with willing landowners who desire to
assist in the protection of endangered species, but who are
understandably unwilling to do so at excessive cost to themselves.
602
The sponsor then noted, "Another hazard to endangered species arises from
those who would capture or kill them for pleasure or profit,,603 which the
bill prohibited in § 9. The Senate floor manager made a similar speech
596. See id. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
597. Id. at 714.
598. Endangered Species Act § 7, 87 Stat. at 892 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)); see also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172, 193-95 (1978) (enforcing, dramatically,
§ 7's habitat-protective rule by requiring TVA to halt construction of a $100 million dam that
would, allegedly, have destroyed a necessary habitat for an endangered species).
599. Endangered Species Act § 5, 87 Stat. at 889 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1534).
600. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 727-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
601. See id. at 727-28 (preferring the "direct evidence" from Senate and House floor
managers of the bill over the majority's reliance on "various pre-enactment actions and
inactions").
602. Id. at 728 (alterations in original) (quoting 119 CONG. REc. 30,162 (1973) (statement of
Rep. Sullivan)).




before his chamber.6 °4 Completing his analysis of statutory structure,
Justice Scalia's analysis of legislative history persuades us that the 1973
Act did not require private property owners to avoid any harm to the habitat
of endangered species. Thus, the Department went too far in 1975 when it
originally adopted the habitat-protecting interpretation of "harm" for
purposes of § 9(a)(1).
Good for Justice Scalia, but a central lesson of our study of
congressional overrides is that the enactment of a major statute is never the
end of Congress's deliberations. They continue as the statute is applied,
and the statutory interpreter needs to consider the statute's ongoing
deliberations, amendments, and overrides as well as the story of its birth.
After the Department issued its broad habitat-protection regulation in 1975,
Congress heard testimony from ranchers and farmers objecting to the
Department's broad regulation and considered bills to override that
regulation's statutory definition.60 5  Not only did Congress refuse to
override the Department, but the 1978 ESA Amendments adopted to
override TVA v. Hill included provisions premised upon the assumption that
§ 9(a)(1)(B) barred everyone from harming endangered species by
destroying needed habitats.6 °6 That, alone, should have caused judges like
Scalia to consider whether the structure of the statute had changed in ways
that undermined his argument.
In 1982, a more serious challenge to the 1975 regulation emerged.
The Reagan Administration and the Republican-controlled Senate were
sympathetic audiences for an override of the Department's habitat
regulation-but the Democrat-controlled House was not. The ESA
Amendments of 1982 represented a compromise between the
proenvironmental forces in the House and the profarmer and prorancher
forces in the Senate. The ESA Amendments partially overrode the
Department's interpretation of § 9(a)(1)(B)-not by negating its definition
of "harm" (and therefore "take"), but instead by providing for a broader
exemption mechanism in new § 10(a)(1)(B), which authorized the
604. Id. at 727.
605. Brief for Petitioners at 31 & n.18, 32-36, Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687 (No. 94-859)
[hereinafter Sweet Home Brief] (indicating that Congress considered and rejected proposed
measures to amend the Act and providing a list of congressional hearings on the subject).
606. When Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act Amendments, in part to override
TVA v. Hill, not only did Congress reject serious proposals to override the Department's harm
regulation, but the Amendments added § 7(o) to the ESA. Section 7(o) exempts from § 9 federal
habitat-threatening projects (like the TVA dam) if they are granted an exemption from § 7(a)'s
rules for federal projects through a new procedure Congress created in 1978. Endangered Species
Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3751, 3759 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 1536(o) (2012)); see also Sweet Home Brief, supra note 605, at 31-33 (recounting the
legislative history of § 7(o)). Section 7(o) would have been superfluous if § 9(a) did not prohibit
interference with the habitat of an endangered species.
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Department to grant permits allowing incidental and cost-justified habitat
"takings" by private enterprises. 60 7 As the committee reports demonstrated,
Congress was both accepting the Department's reading of "harm" and
ameliorating its potentially harsh application through the liberal exemption
process. 60 8  Although Justice Scalia had relied on floor statements to
support his view of the 1973 Act, he refused to credit committee reports
that went against his view of the 1982 Amendments, purportedly because
the text of revised § 10 did not, in his view, codify the Department's 1975
regulation.60 9  This is precisely the kind of structural reasoning that the
Justices should eschew, for reasons of democratic legitimacy as well as the
orderly rule of law.
Conclusion: What If Overrides Are Drying Up?
Recall Professor Hasen's warning about the eclipse of statutory
overrides and the New York Times's alarm that congressional overrides in
the new millennium have "fallen to almost none., 610  Although these
warnings are overstated, we also demonstrate that overrides have fallen off
dramatically since the Clinton impeachment. Moreover, the invaluable
policy-updating overrides have declined much more than the contentious
restorative overrides. Finally, there is no relief in sight. The first year of
the current 113th Congress has been one of the most unproductive sessions
in decades, 611 and divisions among Republicans in the House of
Representatives have greatly reduced the already slim possibility of
dealmaking among the House, the Senate, and the President.
A long-term decline in policy-updating overrides is very bad for the
country, for reasons we have developed in this Article. Even during periods
of divided government and partisan acrimony (such as the 1990s),
607. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6, 96 Stat. 1411,
1422 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)) (establishing a permit system for takings incidental
to lawful activities and not for the purpose of threatening endangered species); see also Sweet
Home Brief, supra note 605, at 34-38 (providing the legislative history of § 10).
608. See H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 29 (1982) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that the new § 10(a)
addresses "concerns of private landowners who are faced with having otherwise lawful actions...
prevented by section 9 prohibitions against taking[s]"); S. REP. No. 97-418, at 10 (1982) (same).
The § 10 permit process was described in the Senate report as being modeled after the response to
a specific situation in San Mateo County, California, in which the "taking" of endangered
butterflies was incidental to "the development of some 3000 dwelling units" on a site inhabited by
the species-i.e., was incidental to habitat modification. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at
30-32 (comparing a conservation plan under § 10(a) to habitat conservation plans in Northern
California counties).
609. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 730 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
610. Liptak, supra note 8.
611. Jonathan Weisman, Underachieving Congress Appears in No Hurry to Change Things




congressional overrides have been an important part of a vigorous federal
government. Overrides have kept the U.S. Code current with rapidly
changing technologies in areas such as intellectual property. They reflected
a changing consensus on important public norms, such as the importance of
economic efficiency in bankruptcy and tax laws and the status of
homosexuals in immigration law. And the legitimacy bonus, alone, of an
override process that is open, deliberative, and pluralist is a boon to the
country. Because we think the decline in overrides is a consequence of both
Congress's post-9/1 1 agenda and its hyperpartisan divisions, we have no
solution. Perhaps the political debate will shift away from entitlement
programs and terrorism and back to the superstatutes that disproportionately
generate overrides. But how to engineer such a shift is certainly well
beyond our scope here.
Even if we cannot solve the problem, we should like to point out some
of the consequences of the dry spell for overrides, especially if it turns out
to be a longer-term phenomenon. The most obvious consequence is a
reduction in the power of Congress to direct public policy in America.
With declining relevance, Congress cannot serve the legitimating and
policy-advancing role vested in it by the Constitution. And as Congress
declines, other institutions will fill the power void.
A. The Supreme Court: More Power to Narrow Statutory Directives
Professor Hasen worries that the lower level of overrides shifts more
power to slender Supreme Court majorities,612 and we agree. With fewer
overrides, five Justices on the Supreme Court have more freedom to impose
their values-which for the last four decades have been much more
libertarian or antiregulatory than the values of Congress (whichever
political party is in control)-and this increases Professor Widiss's concern
that the Supreme Court undermines statutory overrides by reading them
narrowly and even counterproductively. The 2012 Term of the Court saw
this phenomenon at work in Title VII cases. Recall Vance v. Ball State
University, where the Court made it harder for victims of sexual harassment
to sue employers. 613 But Vance was not the most dramatic example of this
process at work last Term.
The issue in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar614 was the standard of proof a plaintiff had to adduce to prevail upon
a claim that she was subject to retaliation for complaining about race
discrimination and illegal harassment under Title VII.61 5 If Dr. Naiel
612. Hasen, supra note 3, at 224-27.
613. See 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013).
614. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
615. Id. at 2522-23.
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Nassar had made a claim of outright race discrimination, he would have
enjoyed a burden of proving that discrimination was "a motivating factor,"
as required by the 1991 CRA, which overrode the Supreme Court's view in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins616 that plaintiffs needed to show the
discriminatory motive was a "substantial factor. ' 617 But Dr. Nassar's claim
was one sounding in retaliation, and a 5-4 majority of the Court ruled that
he had to meet a much more demanding standard: that his complaints of
discrimination were the "but-for cause" of the employer's retaliation against
him. 618  As in Vance, the EEOC had long viewed the matter the way
Dr. Nassar did, and Justice Ginsburg again wrote for the four-Justice
dissent, explaining how Congress had decisively rejected the Court's
approach in the 1991 override and how Congress's rule was consistent with
the Court's precedents and the statutory structure. 619  As in Vance, the
majority dismissed the EEOC's views and invoked the 1991 override as a
key reason in favor of applying a stricter standard for retaliation cases.
620
Unlike Vance, however, the Court in Nassar did not treat the overridden
Supreme Court decision as a precedent to be followed. Instead, the Nassar
Court adopted the "but-for cause" standard advocated in the Price
Waterhouse dissenting opinion-the standard which a 6-3 Court had
decisively rejected in 1989 and that overwhelming majorities in Congress
had even more decisively rejected in 1991.621
The Court delivered Vance and Nassar in the last week of the Term,
when their holdings were overshadowed by the Court's big decisions
striking down part of the Voting Rights Act and the Defense of Marriage
Act. But Vance and Nassar are important decisions that, as a practical
616. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
617. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)) (overriding Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228). In Price
Waterhouse, the plurality opinion would have allowed plaintiffs to state a claim that
discriminatory intent was a motivating factor, see 490 U.S. at 249-50 (plurality opinion), but two
Justices concurring only in the judgment required that the discriminatory intent be a "substantial"
motivating factor, see id. at 259 (White, J., concurring); id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The dissenters would have required the plaintiff to show but-for causation. Id. at 281 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
618. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534.
619. Id. at 2538-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
620. Specifically, the majority Justices ruled that, because the 1991 CRA only changed the
burden of proof for discriminatory intent cases, the presumption of meaningful variation kicked in,
creating strong textual evidence that the default rule in tort cases (but-for cause) should be the
standard for retaliation claims. Id. at 2524-29 (majority opinion).
621. Justice Kennedy, the author of Nassar, wrote the dissenting opinion in Price
Waterhouse. When Congress overrode Price Waterhouse, it was rejecting the more plaintiff-
friendly standard of the majority Justices.
622. See 2012 Term Opinions of the Court, U.S. SUP. CT., http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/slipopinions.aspx?Term=12 (indicating that Vance and Nassar were decided the day
before their more newsworthy counterparts).
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matter, make it hard for Title VII plaintiffs to sue discriminating employers.
The boldness of the five-Justice majority in those cases, especially in
Nassar, suggests that the sting of the 1991 CRA rebuke has worn off and
that the majority does not fear a congressional response. Nor should it, so
long as it marginalizes and isolates the 1991 congressional pushback in a
polite and orderly manner.
A similar paring back has occurred in the context of the Voting Rights
Act and may operate in ADA cases as well, if the Court treats the 2008
ADA Amendments with the same limiting approach strategy that it has used
to interpret Title VII. If Congress remains paralyzed from pushing back
against the Court and if Justice Kennedy remains the median Justice in
these kinds of cases, the Court's antiregulatory tendencies may become
more pronounced in other areas, such as environmental law. 623 Also
worrisome is the Court's potential for disrupting law and policy in areas of
law that are not as charged with partisan politics as Title VII. In those
areas, however, the Court is prone to follow federal agency guidance (in
contrast to the Court's dismissive treatment of the EEOC in recent cases).
This brings us to the second big consequence of Congress's torpor on the
override front: As overrides recede, the power of the White House and of
the Executive Branch increases.
B. The President and Agencies: Much More Power Through
Administrative Overrides and Workarounds
If regulatory liberals ought to be concerned that a conservative,
antiregulatory majority of the Supreme Court is left less constrained by a
paralyzed or disengaged Congress, regulatory conservatives ought to be
concerned that a liberal, proregulatory White House and agencies are left
less constrained as well. The Solicitor General and federal agencies already
win most Supreme Court statutory cases, and they have had continued
success in securing overrides after 1998.624 Moreover, even for most areas
of law where the Supreme Court plays a major role (tax, energy,
communications, transportation, environmental law, etc.), policy is largely
623. Consider Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), a 4-1-4 decision in which
Justice Kennedy cast the deciding vote to invalidate the government's expansive (and long relied
upon) interpretation but proposed his own test for narrowing the application of the Clean Water
Act. Id. at 759-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Con-
servation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009) (employing another restrictive interpretation of the Clean
Water Act that Congress has proposed overriding, Clean Water Protection Act, H.R. 1310, 11 1th
Cong. (2009), but on which it has not taken much action).
624. Recall that the biggest decline is with policy-updating overrides contained in legislation
that comprehensively revises the law in a particular field. Restorative overrides have remained
prominent in the post-1999 period, and restorative overrides championed by the Bush-Cheney




set by agencies, with courts serving as monitoring or corrective checks.
Because much of the Court's role in these cases is limited by the
Administrative Procedure Act, and its own deference holdings,625 agencies
enjoy considerable freedom in construing statutes to fulfill the priorities of
the Executive Branch. Whatever policy void is left by a torpid Congress is
more likely to be filled by agencies than by judges.
If policy-updating overrides continue to languish, the biggest challenge
for national governance will be how to update ossified statutory policies-
and Executive Branch officials are the first movers for such measures.
Indeed, the OIRA might become a situs for the White House to take up
some of the slack left by Congress. By executive order, President Obama in
July 2011 requested that independent as well as executive agencies update
their regulations to save money.626 As the policy consequences of
congressional inaction accumulate, the White House ought to be inclined to
press agencies toward other forms of substantive updating-and in our view
the judiciary will probably accommodate the White House in areas of law
where the Justices do not have strong political preferences.
The doctrinal structure is already in place-namely, the Court's
various deference regimes, especially Chevron, as elaborated in the Court's
important decision in Brand X. "A court's prior judicial construction of a
statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron
deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows
from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for
agency discretion. 627 Brand X explicitly gives agencies room to update
their rules, guidance, and adjudications to reflect new circumstances that
otherwise might be appropriate for overrides and other forms of legislation.
And we predict that agencies, perhaps prodded by the White House, will
take this opportunity.
To be sure, the Supreme Court can be expected to exercise its power to
628veto agency moves it considers too aggressive.   But most agencyinnovations are not subject to lawsuits, few lawsuits reach the Supreme
625. These holdings have been largely reaffirmed, or in some views expanded, in this Term
alone. See City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def.
Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
626. Exec. Order No. 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 103
(2012). Congress is considering legislation extending White House/OIRA jurisdiction to inde-
pendent as well as executive agencies, Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2013, S.
1173, 113th Cong. (2013), but President Obama's action, a request rather than a directive, is
clearly legal. In our view, the President also exercises some supervisory authority over inde-
pendent agencies, which are probably part of the Executive Branch of government.
627. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
628. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843 (2012)
(ruling that Brand X did not protect an agency update that contravened the outer boundary of
agency discretion established by precedent).
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Court, and the Justices do not have strong views on the merits in most areas
of law. Regulatory agencies such as FERC, the FCC, the FDA, the EPA,
and the Patent Office have radically updated regulatory policies without
explicit congressional authorization or judicial disapproval for the last
several decades.629  The EPA's regulation of greenhouse gases and the
FCC's "net neutrality" regulations are examples of expansive, policy-driven
interpretations that might at another time have gone through the legislative
process. This kind of sweeping Executive Branch reinterpretation will
probably increase, especially if the decline in overrides proves long-lasting.
If the Executive Branch cannot secure its agenda through legislation, it will
have every incentive to come as close to that agenda as possible through
aggressive statutory (re)interpretation, often via the rulemaking process.
C. State Regulation: More Federalism Workarounds
While we believe the big institutional winners in a declining-role-of-
Congress scenario are the President and federal agencies, there is also room
for state entrepreneurship. Although many fertile areas for overrides are
exclusively federal-e.g., bankruptcy, intellectual property, immigration,
tax, and federal procedure-in others, such as labor and employment,
business regulation, antitrust, and environmental law, the states may play an
important role in responding to the Court. In all four areas, the Supreme
Court has become increasingly libertarian and antiregulatory during the
second half of our study. In the absence of overrides, states may fill the
substantive gaps opened up in these regimes by the Court while also
asserting a more forceful posture in enforcing state statutes already on the
books. At the very least, it is a trend to keep an eye on and an avenue for
future study.
Workplace antidiscrimination rules are the best example. Since 1991,
Congress has struggled to update Title VII and other job discrimination
laws to respond to narrow judicial constructions that allow a fair amount of
workplace harassment and discrimination based upon race, sex, pregnancy,
age, and disability, and a lot of harassment and discrimination based upon
gender and sexual orientation. Because the Supreme Court is vigilant in
policing what its majority views as the limits of these statutes,
congressional overrides are narrowly construed and administrative
overrides are highly unlikely. All the states have workplace antidiscrim-
629. In other words, the FDA Tobacco Case, where agency updating received a rebuke from
the Supreme Court, is not the norm. More typical is the revolutionary revision of the wholesale
electricity sector by FERC in the last 30 years, which transformed the sector almost beyond
recognition (with little congressional supervision) and was completely undisturbed by the courts.
See Matthew R. Christiansen, The Administrative Constitutionalism of Electricity Restructuring:




ination laws, and many states have copied features of the federal statutes.
But state legislatures, judges, and administrators have often refused to
follow narrow Supreme Court constructions when they face the same issues
under state laws. For example, federal courts have declined to hold that
federal job discrimination laws protect lesbians and gay men from open
discrimination.63° In contrast, state courts have been more willing to outlaw
that form of discrimination, through dynamic readings of their statutes and
state constitutions.631 And many state legislatures have explicitly added
protections against sexual orientation discrimination. 632  These are what
might be called federalism workarounds of federal court decisions.
A sustained decline in overrides will create winners and losers
throughout the polity at large. Certain groups, such as those singled out in
Carolene Products, may continue to secure the restorative overrides that
have persisted even during the last decade's decline in overrides. Or
perhaps these overrides too will diminish. Other groups that have recently
fared poorly before the Court, such as debtors, environmental groups, and
even the federal government during the 2012 Term, will likely suffer if they
cannot secure overrides of adverse decisions. This may be a good thing or a
bad thing depending on one's political stripe-though, of course, a single
retirement or election could upend the relative regulatory leanings of the
three branches.
But one of the most important conclusions of this Article is that
overrides usually are not a zero-sum game in which rent-seeking groups
expend their political capital for favorable but generally inefficient
treatment by Congress. Instead, the majority of overrides update the U.S.
Code to meet changed circumstances, to address largely uncontroversial
changes in the public consensus, and to correct problems in the
administration of the rule articulated by the Court. These overrides usually
garner broad bipartisan support. And they achieve these results through a
political process that better reflects the values of republican democracy than
change driven by the other branches ever could. A sustained loss of these
overrides would be an unfortunate result for the rule of law in this country.
630. I. Bennett Capers, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1158 (1991)
(surveying early case law); cf Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-81
(1998) (evincing a strictly textual approach to Title VII and limiting discrimination claims to those
strictly "because of sex").
631. See, e.g., Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). See
generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW
557-661 (3d ed. 2011) (summarizing and digesting state cases).
632. See In Your State, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/states-regions (sum-
marizing statutory protections for LGBT persons for all 50 states and the District of Columbia).
14792014]
Texas Law Review
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W. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of & Procedure
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3660-63
Child Sexual Abuse and Cleveland v. United Criminal Law
Pornography Act of States, 329 U.S. 14
1986, Pub. L. No. 99- (1946); Caminetti v.
628, § 5(b)(1), 100 Stat. United States, 242 U.S.
3510,3511 470(1917)
Immigration Reform
and Control Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
603, 100 Stat. 3359
§ 101(a) De Canas v. Bica, 424 Criminal Law;
U.S. 351 (1976); Immigration
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg.
Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973)
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§ 103(a) United States v. Immigration
Campos-Serrano, 404
U.S. 293 (1971)
§ 315(b) INS v. Phinpathya, 464 Immigration
U.S. 183 (1984)
Act of Nov. 4, 1986, Block v. N.D. ex rel. Federal Lands
Pub. L. No. 99-598, 100 Bd. of Univ. & Sch.
Stat. 3351 (amending Lands, 461 U.S. 273
Title 28, which relates (1983)
to quiet title actions
against the United
States)
Age Discrimination in Johnson v. Mayor & Civil Rights; Labor
Employment City Council, 472 U.S. Relations &
Amendments of 1986, 353 (1985) Workplace
Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 3,
100 Stat. 3342, 3342
False Claims United States v. Sells Criminal Law
Amendments Act of Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S.
1986, Pub. L. No. 99- 418 (1983)
562, § 6, 100 Stat. 3153,
3158-68
Tax Reform Act of Gen. Utils. & Operating Taxation
1986, Pub. L. No. 99- Co. v. Helvering, 296
514, § 631(c), 100 Stat. U.S. 200 (1935)
2085, 2272
Omnibus Budget Bowen v. Mich. Acad. Entitlement
Reconciliation Act of of Family Physicians, Programs; Federal
1986, Pub. L. No. 99- 476 U.S. 667 (1986); Jurisdiction &
509, § 9341, 100 Stat. United States v. Erika, Procedure
1874, 2037-38 Inc., 456 U.S. 201
(1982)
Electronic United States v. N.Y. Criminal Law
Communications Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159
Privacy Act of 1986, (1977)
Pub. L. No. 99-508,




Rehabilitation Act Atascadero State Hosp. Civil Rights;
Amendments of 1986, v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. Government &
Pub. L. No. 99-506, 234 (1985) (1st Administration;
§ 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, override) Labor Relations &
1845 Workplace
Superfund Amendments Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, Environmental Law
and Reauthorization Act 475 U.S. 355 (1986)
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, § 114(a), 100 Stat.
1613, 1652
Air Carrier Access Act U.S. Dep't of Transp. v. Civil Rights;
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99- Paralyzed Veterans of Transportation
435, § 2(a), 100 Stat. Am., 477 U.S. 597
1080, 1080 (1986)
Handicapped Children's Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. Civil Rights;
Protection Act of 1986, v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 Education
Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 2, (1984); Smith v.
100 Stat. 796, 796-97 Robinson, 468 U.S. 992
(1984)
Judicial Improvements Lambert Run Coal Co. Federal Jurisdiction
Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. & Procedure
99-336, § 3, 100 Stat. Co., 258 U.S. 377
633,637 (1922)
Firearm Owners'
Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 99-308, 100 Stat.
449 (1986)
§ 101(5) Dickerson v. New Criminal Law
Banner Inst., Inc., 460
U.S. 103 (1983)
§ 104(a)(3) United States v. One Criminal Law
Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354
(1984)
Act of Dec. 23, 1985, California v. Nevada, Federal Lands





Patent Law Deepsouth Packing Co. Intellectual Property
Amendments Act of v. Laitram Corp., 406
1984, Pub. L. No. 98- U.S. 518 (1972) (1st
622, § 101, 98 Stat. override)
3383, 3383
Local Government Cmty. Commc'ns Co. Antitrust
Antitrust Act of 1984, v. City of Boulder, 455
Pub. L. No. 98-544, § 3, U.S. 40 (1982); City of
98 Stat. 2750, 2750 Lafayette v. La. Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S.
389 (1978)
Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473,
tit. 2, 98 Stat. 1976
§ 1005(a) Busic v. United States, Criminal Law
446 U.S. 398 (1980)
§ 1107 Williams v. United Criminal Law
States, 458 U.S. 279
(1982)
§ 1602 United States v. Maze, Criminal Law




1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
426, 98 Stat. 1639
§ 4 Wash. Metro. Area Labor Relations &
Transit Auth. v. Workplace; Maritime
Johnson, 467 U.S. 925
(1984)
§ 21(c) Bloomer v. Liberty Health & Safety;
Mut. Ins. Co., 445 U.S. Labor Relations &
74 (1980) Workplace; Maritime
2014] 1501
Texas Law Review
Deficit Reduction Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
369, 98 Stat. 494
§ 211 Comm'r v. Standard Taxation
Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 433 U.S. 148
(1977)
§ 421(a) United States v. Davis, Taxation
370 U.S. 65 (1962)
§ 422(a) Comm'r v. Lester, 366 Taxation
U.S. 299 (1961)
§ 1026 Diedrich v. Comm'r, Taxation
457 U.S. 191 (1982)
Bankruptcy NLRB v. Bildisco & Bankruptcy; Labor
Amendments and Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 Relations &
Federal Judgeship Act (1984) Workplace
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, § 541, 98 Stat. 333,
390-91
Railroad Retirement Hisquierdo v. Pensions
Solvency Act of 1983, Hisquierdo, 439 U.S.
Pub. L. No. 98-76, 572 (1979)
§ 419(a), 97 Stat. 411,
438
Social Security Rowan Cos. v. United Taxation
Amendments of 1983, States, 452 U.S. 247
Pub. L. No. 98-21, (1981)
§ 327, 97 Stat. 65, 126-
27
97th Congress (1981-1982)
Act of Jan. 14, 1983, Agsalud v. Standard Oil Pensions
Pub. L. No. 97-473, Co. of Cal., 454 U.S.





Futures Trading Act of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Business Regulation
1982, Pub. L. No. 97- Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
444, § 235, 96 Stat. Curran, 456 U.S. 353
2294, 2322-24 (1982)
Act of Dec. 29, 1982, Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of Antitrust
Pub. L. No. 97-393, 96 India, 434 U.S. 308
Stat. 1964 (amending (1978)
the Clayton Act)
Garn-St Germain Ford Motor Credit Co. Business Regulation
Depository Institutions v. Cenance, 452 U.S.
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 155 (1981)
97-320, § 702(a), 96
Stat. 1469, 1538
Uniformed Services McCarty v. McCarty, Armed Forces
Former Spouses' 453 U.S. 210 (1981)
Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 97-252, tit. 10,
§ 1002(a), 96 Stat. 730,
730-35 (1982)
Tax Equity and Fiscal United States v. LaSalle Taxation
Responsibility Act of Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S.
1982, Pub. L. No. 97- 298 (1978)
248, § 333(a), 96 Stat.
324, 622
Voting Rights Act City of Mobile, Ala. v. Civil Rights (Voting)
Amendments of 1982, Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, (1980)
96 Stat. 131, 134
Federal Courts United States v. King, Federal Jurisdiction
Improvement Act of 395 U.S. 1 (1969) & Procedure;
1982, Pub. L. No. 97- Government &
164, § 133(a), 96 Stat. Administration
25, 39-40
Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Maryland ex rel. Levin Armed Forces;
Pub. L. No. 97-124, 95 v. United States, 381 Veterans Affairs
Stat. 1666 (extending U.S. 41 (1965)
federal tort claims
provisions to acts or
omissions by members
of the National Guard)
2014] 1503
Texas Law Review
Immigration and Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. Immigration
Nationality Act 619 (1975)
Amendments of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 8,
95 Stat. 1611, 1616
Omnibus Budget Bums v. Alcala, 420 Entitlement
Reconciliation Act of U.S. 575 (1975) Programs
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
35, § 2312(a), 95 Stat.
357, 853
96th Congress (1979-1980)
Miscellaneous Revenue Comm'r v. Kowalski, Taxation
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 434 U.S. 77 (1977) (2d
96-605, § 107, 94 Stat. override)
3521, 3524
Equal Access to Justice Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Federal Jurisdiction
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, Co. v. Wilderness & Procedure;
tit. 2, § 204, 94 Stat. Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 Government &
2325, 2327-29 (1980) (1975) (2d override) Administration
Installment Sales Pac. Nat'l Co. v. Taxation
Revision Act of 1980, Welch, 304 U.S. 191
Pub. L. No. 96-471, (1938)




1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
349, 94 Stat. 1154
§ 3 Roadway Express, Inc. Federal Jurisdiction
v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 & Procedure
(1980)
§ 6 United States v. Am. Antitrust
Bldg. Maint. Indus.,
422 U.S. 271 (1975)
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Soft Drink Interbrand Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. Antitrust
Competition Act, Pub. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
L. No. 96-308, § 2, 94 U.S. 36 (1977)
Stat. 939, 939 (1980)
Civil Rights of Wilwording v. Civil Rights
Institutionalized Persons Swenson, 404 U.S. 249
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, (1971)
§ 7, 94 Stat. 349, 352-
53 (1980)
Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Dist. of Columbia v. Civil Rights
Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Carter, 409 U.S. 418
Stat. 1284 (extending (1973)
the protections of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to rights
violations occurring
under color of the laws
of the District of
Columbia)
Energy and Water TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. Environmental Law;
Development 153 (1978) (2d Federal Lands
Appropriations Act of override)
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-









Endangered Species Act TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. Environmental Law;
Amendments of 1978, 153 (1978) (1st Federal Lands
Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 7, override)
92 Stat. 3751, 3762
Revenue Act of 1978, United States v. W.M. Taxation
Pub. L. No. 95-600, Webb, Inc., 397 U.S.




Act of Nov. 6, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92
Stat. 2549 (making
bankruptcy law uniform
and enacting Title 11 of
the U.S. Code)
§ 101, new § 507(a)(4) Joint Indus. Bd. of the Bankruptcy
Elec. Indus. v. United
States, 391 U.S. 224
(1968); United States v.
Embassy Rest., Inc.,
359 U.S. 29 (1959)
§ 101, new § 523(a)(3) Birkett v. Columbia Bankruptcy
Bank, 195 U.S. 345
(1904)
§ 101, new § 523(a)(6) Tinker v. Colwell, 193 Bankruptcy
U.S. 473 (1904)
§ 101, new § 541(a)(1) Lines v. Frederick, 400 Bankruptcy
U.S. 18 (1970);
Lockwood v. Exch.
Bank, 190 U.S. 294
(1903)
§ 101, new § 547(b) United States v. Bankruptcy
Randall, 401 U.S. 513
(1971); Segal v.
Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375
(1966)
§ 241, new § 1471 Phelps v. United States, Bankruptcy; Federal
421 U.S. 330 (1975) Jurisdiction &
Procedure; Taxation
§ 401, new § 101 Am. United Mut. Life Bankruptcy
Ins. Co. v. City of Avon





of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
563, 92 Stat. 2383
§ 7 Crown Coat Front Co. Federal Jurisdiction
v. United States, 386 & Procedure;
U.S. 503 (1967); United Government &
States v. Utah Constr. Administration
& Mining Co., 384 U.S.
394 (1966)
§§ 8(g), 14(h) S&E Contractors, Inc. Government &
v. United States, 406 Administration
U.S. 1 (1972)
§ 10(b) United States v. Carlo Federal Jurisdiction
Bianchi & Co., 373 & Procedure;
U.S. 709 (1963) Government &
Administration
Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Nashville Gas Co. v. Civil Rights; Labor
Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, Satty, 434 U.S. 136 Relations &
92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1977); Gen. Elec. Co. Workplace
(amending title VII of v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125




Foreign Intelligence United States v. U.S. National Security
Surveillance Act of Dist. Court (Keith), 407
1978, Pub. L. No. 95- U.S. 297 (1972)
511, § 102, 92 Stat.
1783, 1786-88
Airline Deregulation Act Hughes Tool Co. v. Transportation
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95- Trans World Airlines,
504, § 30, 92 Stat. 1705, Inc., 409 U.S. 363
1731 (1973)
Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Comm'r v. Kowalski, Taxation
Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 4, 434 U.S. 77 (1977) (1st







Age Discrimination in United Air Lines, Inc. Civil Rights; Labor
Employment Act v. McMann, 434 U.S. Relations &
Amendments of 1978, 192 (1977) Workplace
Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2,
92 Stat. 189, 189
Clean Water Act of EPA v. Cal. ex rel. Environmental Law
1977, Pub. L. No. 95- State Water Res.
217, § 61, 91 Stat. 1566, Control Bd., 426 U.S.




Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91
Stat. 685
§ 116 Hancock v. Train, 426 Environmental Law
U.S. 167 (1976)
§ 127 Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 Environmental Law
U.S. 541 (1973)
94th Congress (1975-1976)
Federal Land Policy and United States v. Federal Lands
Management Act of Midwest Oil Co., 236
1976, Pub. L. No. 94- U.S. 459 (1915)
579, § 704(a), 90 Stat.
2743, 2792
Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Wingo v. Wedding, 418 Federal Jurisdiction
Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 U.S. 461 (1974) & Procedure
Stat. 2729 (defining the
jurisdiction of United
States magistrates)
Unemployment Philbrook v. Glodgett, Entitlement
Compensation 421 U.S. 707 (1975) Programs
Amendments of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-566,




The Civil Rights Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Civil Rights; Federal
Attorney's Fees Awards Co. v. Wilderness Jurisdiction &
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 Procedure
94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. (1975) (1st override)
2641, 2641
Act of Oct. 19, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90
Stat. 2541 (amending
Title 17 of the U.S.
Code, dealing with
copyrights)
§ 101 Twentieth Century Intellectual Property
Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151 (1975);
White-Smith Music
Publ'g Co. v. Apollo
Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908)
§ 108 Williams & Wilkins Intellectual Property
Co. v. United States,
420 U.S. 376 (1975)
§ 111 Teleprompter Corp. v. Intellectual Property
CBS, 415 U.S. 394
(1974); Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc., 392
U.S. 390 (1968)
§ 301 Goldstein v. California, Intellectual Property
412 U.S. 546 (1973)
Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90
Stat. 1520
§ 1204(a) Comm'r v. Shapiro, 424 Federal Jurisdiction
U.S. 614 (1976) (1st & Procedure;
override); Laing v. Taxation





§ 1205(a) United States v. Federal Jurisdiction
Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 & Procedure;
(1975); Donaldson v. Taxation
United States, 400 U.S.
517 (1971)
§ 1207(e) United States v. W.M. Taxation
Webb, Inc., 397 U.S.
179 (1970)
(1 st override)
§ 1306(a) Bob Jones Univ. v. Federal Jurisdiction
Simon, 416 U.S. 725 & Procedure;
(1974); Alexander v. Taxation
"Ams. United" Inc.,
416 U.S. 752 (1974)
§ 2009(a) United States v. Byrum, Taxation
408 U.S. 125 (1972)
Hart-Scott-Rodino Hawaii v. Standard Oil Antitrust
Antitrust Improvements Co. of Cal., 405 U.S.
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 251 (1972)
94-435, § 301, 90 Stat.
1383, 1394-96
Act of Sept. 13, 1976, Mahon v. Stowers, 416 Bankruptcy
Pub. L. No. 94-410, § 8, U.S. 100 (1974)
90 Stat. 1249, 1251-52
(amending the Packers
and Stockyards Act of
1921)
Government in the Adm'r v. Robertson, Government &
Sunshine Act, Pub. L. 422 U.S. 255 (1975) Administration
No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90
Stat. 1241, 1247-48
(1976)
Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Hagans v. Lavine, 415 Federal Jurisdiction
Pub. L. No. 94-38 1, § 3, U.S. 528 (1974) & Procedure
90 Stat. 1119, 1119
(amending the
requirement for a three-





Magnuson-Moss FTC v. Bunte Bros., Antitrust
Warranty-Federal Inc., 312 U.S. 349
Trade Commission (1941)
Improvement Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-637, § 201, 88
Stat. 2183, 2193 (1975)
Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. Fleischmann Distilling Federal Jurisdiction
L. No. 93-600, 88 Stat. Corp. v. Maier Brewing & Procedure;
1955 (amending the Co., 386 U.S. 714 Intellectual Property
Trademark Act by (1967)




providing for the award
of attorney fees)
Act of Nov. 21, 1974, EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. Government &
Pub. L. No. 93-502, 73 (1973) Administration;




Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Warden v. Marrero, 417 Criminal Law
Pub. L. No. 93-481, § 2, U.S. 653 (1974)




Act of Aug. 7, 1974, Emps. of the Dep't of Entitlement
Pub. L. No. 93-368, § 5, Philpott v. Essex Cnty. Programs
88 Stat. 420, 420-21 Welfare Bd., 409 U.S.








Fair Labor Standards Pub. Health & Welfare Federal Jurisdiction
Amendments of 1974, of Mo. v. Dep't of Pub. & Procedure; Labor
Pub. L. No. 93-259, Health & Welfare of Relations &
§ 6(a), 88 Stat. 55, 61 Mo., 411 U.S. 279 Workplace
(1973)
Act of Dec. 27, 1973, Gulf-Canal Lines, Inc. Transportation
Pub. L. No. 93-201, 87 v. United States, 386








Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86
Stat. 1251
§ 18(a), new 33 U.S.C. Moragne v. States Labor Relations &
§ 905(a) Marine Lines, Inc., 398 Workplace; Maritime
U.S. 375 (1970);
Nacirema Operating
Co. v. Johnson, 396
U.S. 212 (1969)
§ 18(a), new 33 U.S.C. Jackson v. Lykes Bros. Labor Relations &
§ 905(b) S.S. Co., 386 U.S. 731 Workplace; Maritime
(1967); Reed v. The
Yaka, 373 U.S. 410
(1963); Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-
Atl. S.S. Corp., 350
U.S. 124 (1956); Seas
Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85
(1946)
Equal Employment Dewey v. Reynolds Civil Rights; Labor
Opportunity Act of Metals Co., 402 U.S. Relations &
1972, Pub. L. No. 92- 689 (1971) Workplace




Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Toussie v. United Armed Forces;
Pub. L. No. 92-129, States, 397 U.S. 112 National Security
§ 101(a)(31), 85 Stat. (1970)
348, 352-53 (amending
the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967)
Act of Aug. 10, 1971, Dampskibsselskabet Government &
Pub. L. No. 92-79, 85 Dannebrog v. Signal Administration;
Stat. 285 (amending the Oil & Gas Co. of Cal., Maritime
Ship Mortgage Act of 310 U.S. 268 (1940);
1920) United States v. Carver,
260 U.S. 482 (1923)
91st Congress (1969-1970)
Organized Crime Alderman v. United Criminal Law
Control Act of 1970, States, 394 U.S. 165
Pub. L. No. 91-452, (1969)
§ 702(a), 84 Stat. 922,
935-36
Newspaper Preservation Citizen Publ'g Co. v. Antitrust
Act, Pub. L. No. 91-353, United States, 394 U.S.
§ 4, 84 Stat. 466, 467 131 (1969)
(1970)
Tax Reform Act of Comm'r v. Brown, 380 Taxation
1969, Pub. L. No. 91- U.S. 563 (1965)
172, § 121(b), 83 Stat.
487, 537-45
90th Congress (1967-1968)
Act of Oct. 17, 1968, Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 Government &
Pub. L. No. 90-590, 82 U.S. 269 (1949) Administration;






Colorado River Basin Arizona v. California, Federal Lands
Project Act, Pub. L. No. 373 U.S. 546 (1963)
90-537, 82 Stat. 885
(1968)
Act of Sept. 26, 1968, World Airways, Inc. v. Transportation
Pub. L. No. 90-514, 82 Pan Am. World
Stat. 867 (amending the Airways, Inc., 391 U.S.
Federal Aviation Act of 461 (1968)
1958)
Act of July 31, 1968, Denver Union Stock Antitrust; Business
Pub. L. No. 90-446, 82 Yard Co. v. Producers Regulation
Stat. 474 (amending Livestock Mktg. Ass'n,
Title III of the Packers 356 U.S. 282 (1958)
and Stockyards Act of
1921)
Act of Apr. 11, 1968, United States v. Guest, Civil Rights
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)
§ 101, 82 Stat. 73, 73-
75 (amending the Civil
Rights Act of 1968)
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Appendix 2: Coding Overridden Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions
This Appendix elaborates on the coding methodology we followed for




We listed the full case name, the official U.S. Reports citation, and the
exact date for each case.
For cases decided after the 1946 Term, we listed the Spaeth number
for each case (available at http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php). We also
assigned every case a unique "override case number" that extends to cover
the cases excluded from the Spaeth database.
Subject Matter of the Issue Before the Court
Antitrust = 1
Armed Forces = 2
Banking & Finance = 3
Bankruptcy = 4
Business Regulation = 5
Civil Rights = 6
Intellectual Property = 7
Criminal Law = 8
Education = 9
Energy = 10
Entitlement Programs = 11
Environment = 12
Federal Government = 13
Foreign Affairs = 14
Federal Jurisdiction &
Procedure = 15
Federal Lands = 16
Health & Safety = 17
Housing = 18
Immigration = 19
Indian Affairs = 20






Veterans Affairs = 27
National Security = 28
Habeas Corpus = 29
Prisons = 30
Note: A case can have more than one subject matter. For example, a
Title VII case posing a procedural issue would earn three subject-matter
numbers, 6 + 15 + 21. See, for example, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
2014) 1515
